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ABSTRACT 
 
 It is very difficult to calculate in advance the positive and negative long-term impacts of an 
investment or a development venture. The fact that there are environmental-defense orientated, 
private and “state” ventures that are incorrectly handled and therefore are detrimental to the state of 
both the environment and economics (market) is a serious problem all around the world. The 
number of innovative energetic investments, waste and water management projects, etc. in Europe, 
which cause more devastation to society than we could even imagine, is also high. In Hungary, the 
state funding – be it direct or indirect – of such enviro-protection orientated ventures amounts to 
thousands of billions of HUF every year, and the improper use of these funds can set an entire 
economic sector back in its development for decades. Therefore, for these funds, proper surveying, 
guiding in terms of market mechanisms, and sufficient re-structuring (as fast as possible) can not 
only liberate enormous resources for both society and the national economy, but can also contribute 
to the advancement of the current state of the environment, the labor market, and welfare statistics. 
For these aforementioned development strategies and investment programs to be contestable, the 
need for a “construction mechanism” that can fundamentally overcome these detrimental processes 
and wrong ways of development throughout the course of planning and actualization arises. In this 
document, I try to find solutions to these planning and development methodology questions, which 
are based on both the Rubik Logic and modern Game Theory applications. 
A standard form of environmentally/economically detrimental funding is when economical 
policy doesn’t have sufficient information in terms of the environmental damages and negative 
environmental effects on the infrastructure to be developed (e.g. electric systems or regional waste 
management facilities). Because of the low transparency of enviro-orientated developments, both in 
an economic and in a market sense, if we compare them to “non-government financed” sectors, we 
are faced with far worse conditions when we aim for an economic advancement which keeps the 
market balance intact. And, if this balance is not present, supply and demand being either too high 
or too low is a much more relevant and problematic occurrence.  
It is therefore a necessity from society that the investments show a sustainable structure not 
only in terms of economic indexes, but also in terms of labor, by the usage of market and natural 
resources. The instability of product paths and the ever-changing economic regulation, unstable 
economic environments in case of the evaluation criteria preceding the investments result in an 
unpredictable planning environment, primarily for temporary economies (mainly the ex-members of 
the Eastern Bloc, now members of the EU), which makes creating an appropriate method of 
planning impossible, or at the least, through much trouble. Therefore, if we find investment and 
development programs aimed at risk-avoidance, then in our case, the practice of implementing 
project management and realization through unique laws and new economic policy products (e.g. 
Policy Risk Insurance) is the usual way.  
The evaluation of project resources is further complicated by the fact that economic indexes 
are practically useless for implementation in development processes, since the relevance of 
underground and shadow economies distorts the criteria system of processes and derail it from the 
market’s measurement system to a degree that they show impossible economic optimums and times 
required for payoff. Knowing the circumstances, it’s no coincidence that the Environment 
Programme of the United Nations, or the programs of the European Energy Centre that analyze the 
criteria system of financing renewable energy both aim at extreme financing practices which block 
the spread of renewable energy production systems. Because of the high investment risk presently 
relevant in developing countries, banks loaning for investment try to avoid the return times which 
exceed 3-4 years, and this can’t mean a foundation for sustainable economic development in case of 
renewable sources, either. That is why the interventions by the economic policy try to correct the 
criteria systems of development through the regulation and tax systems, but this usually causes 
more damage to product paths which aim at enviro-protection than the positive impact it has. As a 
result, we can find loads of failed climate protection and renewable energy production projects, both 
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in the European and the American economic regions. Slower but safer developments, which have a 
return time of more than 8 years, are only possible through state investments, but in this case the 
flexibility of capital sources can’t be guaranteed to the required degree. The investment methods 
required for the sustainable developments (low-carbon innovations) are therefore not present in the 
development processes; however, as we’ve seen in the previous overview, the realization of this is 
not only dependant on the perfection of project management processes.  
The main goal of this dissertation is to make the investments aimed at enviro-protection and 
positive impact on the climate change sustainably plannable, while being conscious of both 
economic and political instability. Therefore, my goal is to make a scientifically comprehensive 
model of mathematic correlations based on project development and management systems which 
can handle the aforementioned problems with its new approach, regardless of national borders.  
To realize the main goal of my research, I thought up and defined sub-goals, which are the 
following: 
- Through the process of cited literature, introduction of the relations of economical 
value and sustainability in both the classic and modern style.  
- The mathematic interpretation of sustainability factors, introduction of the 
sustainable economic equilibrium or corporate strategies in a Game Theory 
approach, interpretations of finding classic balance points in non-cooperative Game 
Theory solutions.   
- Introduction of conflict alleviation and compromise search through Game Theory 
methods, and the evaluation of its adaptability in sustainable cooperative corporate 
strategies. 
- The sustainability interpretation of the structure and solution of Rubik’s Cube, and 
the analysis of relations between sustainability and the Rubik solution algorithms.   
The market errors which presently have a detrimental impact on the economic environment 
require a capable external – meaning it is positioned outside the market’s condition systems but has 
an impact on them nonetheless – condition system, because it is imperative for the actualization of 
sustainable enviro-investments. The creation of a set of rules through the summary of external 
effects and the defining and typification of the correct external effects of developing sustainable 
economic structures (and keeping said set of rules definable through mathematic functions) is a 
social requirement, because it can define the presently used criteria of sustainability for both market 
shareholders and political decision-makers. 
If we go by what was said above in the defining of goals, I primarily found the verification 
of the following hypotheses to be important:    
- H1: The correspondence systems of project attributes which have an impact on the 
“shelf-life” and sustainability of enviro-orientated investments, or investments that
have a positive impact on climate change can be defined through models.  
- H2: When searching for a state of equilibrium using Game Theory methods, it is 
possible to make functions of the relations between the compared attributes.  
- H3: Trial functions with multiple variables may be used to select attribute groups 
which dominantly affect the successful actualization of the project. 
- H4: If the various sustainability logics can be synchronized with the 3×3×3 Rubik’s 
Cube solution algorithms, then the relations of the cube’s sides define a planning 
strategy that provides a new scientific approach for investment planning.   
The Interpretation of Sustainability Criteria using Game Theory Models
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I assume that the “Layer by layer” Rubik’s Cube solution method, meaning the row to row 
solution, can be used to model the sustainability criteria, in other words, various project planning 
processes (e.g. investments in renewable energy) can abide by the sustainability criteria with this 
method.
According to the hypothesis on the solution algorithms of the Rubik’s Cube, the parts 
rotated next to each other, meaning the project attributes which have an impact on each other, have 
a relation system which can be defined in mathematical terms, therefore, their point of balance (e.g. 
Nash’s) can also be determined by Game Theory models (games of finite kind, zero sum games, 
oligopolistic games, etc.). 
In this document, I would also like to prove that the hypothesis which states that the solution 
algorithm of Rubik’s Cube, namely the “Layer by layer” method, can be used to model the process 
of project development. Also, the correspondence system of project attributes can be represented by 
the proper Game Theory models. This way, the various enviro- and climate-friendly investments 
can be realized in a well-plannable, low-risk economic environment regarding both human resource 
planning and the preserving and advancement of environmental criteria.  
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1. INTERPRETATION OF SUSTAINABILITY WITH BASIC GAME THEORY MODELS 
AND RUBIK’S CUBE SYMBOLISM   
During the detailed review of specialized literature, I categorized the used material into three 
different topics:  
- Sustainability dilemmas and tolerance questions in economic evaluation systems. 
- Search for equilibrium using non-cooperative Game Theory models, and cooperative 
strategies in corporate strategy planning. 
- The structure of Rubik’s Cube, and mathematic algorithms for its solution.
In the sustainability dilemmas part, I introduce the questions of defining strong and weak 
sustainability, the sustainable indexes of ecological economics and environmental economics, and 
the new approach on total economic value. I also show why the economy theses which view 
ecological economics and environmental economics as the same, uniform system aren’t true.
In the parts on Game Theory, I introduce the Game Theory themes, both domestic and 
foreign, which are connected to sustainability and corporate cooperation, and the creation of 
cooperative strategies. I introduce the Nash equilibrium as a highlighted topic, which, although 
written 20 years ago, the view on its applicability and usefulness is varied. Nash divided the 
optimization games into cooperative and non-cooperative types. According to his thesis, the 
cooperative game is a kind where cooperation between players is simply enforced. According to 
him, we can only talk about non-cooperative games if agreement between players is impossible to 
enforce. In the case of the Nash equilibrium, the strategies of the various players are the optimal 
replies to others’ strategies, so there aren’t any players who want to break this status quo by 
choosing new, different cooperative strategies.  
The third part of the procession of literature is basically the myth of Rubik’s Cube. The 
Rubik’s Cube, which is one of the most impressive games of Hungarian origins worldwide, is a
phenomenon and mathematical mystery even today. The cube’s fame was followed closely by the 
mystical meaning of the number three. Many believe the cube to symbolize connections by which 
man can be linked with nature and natural existence. During the part on Rubik’s Cube, the solution 
methods, “God’s number,” and the mathematical interpretation of the solution process is 
demonstrated.  
1.1. Sustainability dilemmas, and questions of tolerance 
We can find very different approaches on interpretations of sustainability in economics. In 
trying to define sustainability orientations/strategies, a widely known dilemma is whether we should 
apply weak or strong sustainability criteria for the various cases. 
1.1.1. Definition of strong and weak sustainability 
The evolution of environmentally important, different economic thoughts can be nicely and 
thoroughly followed in Sándor Kerekes’ essay, “A fenntarthatóság közgazdaságtani értelmezése” 
(“Economic interpretation of sustainability,” 2005). However, in this dissertation, I tried to 
introduce the integration of the sustainability concept into the system of economics, using the 
effects of various resources on each other, by which we can get a clear view on the fact that 
handling market questions is possible with market instruments, if there is no aggregation of errors.  
According to our line of thought, the indirect assumption that development based on market 
economy in itself means sustainable development structure is revealed (in case of an environment 
rid of overproduction and production shortage), which however moves on a very different 
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equilibrium point to the Pareto optimal because of the indirect global effects, and direct political 
and state interventions against them, and is far from the sustainability point because of market 
errors. However, the desired market balance and the definition of sustainability are not obvious, and 
even less so if the process moves according to economic policy interests (Spash, 2011).     
The problem and solution search is by no means new, since Pearce and Atkinson already 
defined the generic requirement named the Hicks-Page-Hartwick-Solow rule in the early 
development phase of global economics in 1993, which states the criteria of weak sustainability.  
The Hicks–Page–Hartwick–Solow rule: 
dK /dt = K = d(KM + KH + KN)/ dt ≥ 0   
where: K = KM + KH + KN
Pearce and Atkinson differentiate between three types of capital:  
 KM - man-made (or reproducible) artificial capital (roads, industrial establishments, 
factories, mansions etc.),  
 KH - human capital (amassed knowledge and experience),  
 KN – natural capital, quite widely interpreted, includes all the natural resources 
(minerals, soil, etc.) and other natural goods required for daily life, like bio-diversity, 
capacity assimilating pollution, etc.  
According to Pearce and Atkinson, if we accept the basic thesis of neoclassic economy, by 
which we state that different capitals can be interchanged limitlessly, then weak sustainability is as 
follows: 
   
  
  
            
  
  
Therefore, in an economic sense, weak sustainability is when the value sum of capital 
accessible to society doesn’t decrease with time.
Since capital can be defined as savings minus depreciation, and of the three aforementioned 
capitals, the depreciation of human capital is zero (accepted since the knowledge and experience 
amassed by humanity doesn’t whither), the weak sustainability (Z – sustainability value) can be 
defined as such, according to Pearce and Atkinson (based on: Kerekes, 2005): 
   
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
Where S stands for savings, Y for Gross National Product (GNP), delta M (  ), and delta N 
(  ) for the amortization rates of man-made and natural capitals, respectively. If we don’t allow 
interchange between capitals, then Pearce and Atkinson (1993) state that we arrive at strong 
sustainability. For the strict sustainability to be fulfilled, it is a criterion that the value of natural 
capital does not decrease with time:
     
 
  
According to Pearce and Atkinson (1993), a national economy is sustainable if the savings are 
more than the depreciation of artificial man-made and natural capitals (Table 1). We can see in 
Table 1 that the resource sum (the quotient of savings and GNP) is positive, and therefore 
sustainable, if the depreciation of natural capital is lower than that of the artificial capital, or if the 
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resource reserves made in the same year are vastly superior to the value sum of both resources’ 
destruction (K  KM + KN).  
Scientists and ecologists therefore don’t accept the interchange of capitals, and by extension, 
weak sustainability; furthermore, they have problems even with strict sustainability, since it also 
allows for the compensations between different natural capitals. Most ecologic economists state in 
relation to strict sustainability that irreversible changes in the environment (e.g. the extinction of 
species, or the reduction in diversity) must not be caused (Pearce - Atkinson, 1995).  
Table 1. Sustainable and non-sustainable economic systems (1992) 
Weak sustainability S/Y -     -     = Z
Sustainable economy
Brazil 20 7 10 +3
Finland 28 15 2 +11
Germany 26 12 4 +10
Hungary 26 10 5 +11
Japan 33 14 2 +17
USA 18 12 4 +2
Marginal economy
Mexico 24 12 12 0
Philippines 15 11 4 0
Non-sustainable economy
Ethiopia 3 1 9 -7
Indonesia 20 5 17 -2
Madagascar 8 1 16 -9
Nigeria 15 3 17 -5
Mali -4 4 6 -14
Note: 
S stands for savings, Y for Gross National Product (GNP), delta M (  ) and delta N (  ) for the 
amortization rates of man-made and natural capitals respectively, Z for sustainability value
Source: Pearce - Atkinson: Are national economies sustainable? Measuring Sustainable 
Development, 1993 
The natural and man-made capital ratio basically determines the difference between weak 
and strong sustainability. The weak sustainability theory says that natural and man-made capitals 
are interchangeable. The sustainability criterion is also met if the combined value of the two types 
of capital is not reduced. This criterion is met if, during the destruction of natural resources, at least 
the same amount of artificial capital is created (Gowdy - Erickson, 2005).  
The strong sustainability theory, however, explicitly states that man-made capital and natural 
capital are not, or only to a very small extent interchangeable, so this criteria creates an absolute 
limit of sustainability, which at a defined level must be maintained to reach sustainability (Málovics
- Bajmócy, 2009).   
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1.1.2. Ecologic economy versus enviro-economy 
According to Turner and his affiliates (1996), the discussion of the relationship between the 
economic and ecological systems is a very good opportunity for economists, since the optimistic 
and the pessimistic theories, economics, and marketing strategies can be checked against each other. 
The essentially growth-oriented, techno-optimistic environmental economics, and the stable 
(equilibrium) size-oriented, techno-pessimist ecological economics show different approaches to the 
sustainability concept via their theories. 
The basic theories are the same, in that environmental economics and ecological economics 
are practically uniform in their starting points: both are based on the natural capital being the basis 
of all kinds of economic activities, therefore, differences of opinion between these schools in 
relation to sustainability are not primarily defined by weak or strong sustainability or discussions on 
artificial and natural capitals (Spash, 1999). The difference is rather in the relation system of the 
environmental economics and the ecological economics approach (Turner et al., 1993).  
The basis of environmental economics is the examination of the macroeconomic indicators 
(GDP, GNP etc.) also well known to neo-classical economics, and together with their errors they 
show us the characteristics of changes in well-being. In contrast, ecological economics uses a 
problem-oriented approach during the empirical phase that often does not really concretize system 
parameters from the economic point of view. In the case of ecological economics, the deeper 
integration of other social and natural sciences’ knowledge is important for the determination of 
sustainability (Korten, 2011).  
In many cases, ecological economics handles the environmental economics’ simplistic views 
and problem-solving suggestions with reservation. It sees the causes of environmental problems in 
market errors and market failure problems (the accumulation of external effects and their 
inadequate internalization) more deeply rooted, and wants to advance sustainability by achieving 
radical institutional changes (Málovics-Bajmócy, 2009).
Ecological economics is outlined along the original concept of sustainability, which heavily 
relies on three main issue topics: defining the connection system of ethics, economy, and economic 
value. 
Therefore, we can ask the important main questions: What is the economy? Where are the 
limits of resource systems? Is it possible to talk about socially and / or environmentally responsible 
business practices? What values do business and political decision-makers base their decisions on? 
What is tolerable by the various test systems and what isn’t?
1.1.3. Relations between total economic value and sustainable economic value 
Over the past decades, economics, including environmental economics, made significant 
progress in the classification of the economic value of the natural environment. The evaluation was 
based on reshaping the traditional relationship between the evaluator, man, and goods that it 
evaluates. People are attributing increasing value to commodities that are not precisely definable, 
such as environmental goods (Korten, 2013). The aggregate of these values can be perceived as the 
so-called total economic value. Total economic value (TGÉ) can be divided into several 
components, the two main elements of which are use-related, or non-use-related value components. 
Total economic value is therefore:  
TGÉ = use-related values + non-use-related values
The system of total economic value (TGÉ), which is basically a modern adaptation of 
economics that also manages environmental values, is still unable to properly handle the issue of 
transformations related to the time value of money resources. This is helped by a still not too well 
known approach entitled the sustainable economic value by Molnár in 2005 (Molnár, F. 2005).  
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Sustainable economic value (abbreviated FGÉ), in contrast to the traditional concept of 
total economic value (abbreviated TGÉ), basis much on the future concepts and display of 
feedback and peer effects, as these questions are important to ensure sustainability. In the 
sustainable economic value concept, economy is present only in a derived form, not like in the 
traditional total economic value concept. The FGÉ concept takes matters relating to the time value 
of money into account much more importantly, and therefore does not forget about future 
generations or values associated with the preservation of property, either (F. Molnár, 2005). 
Sustainable economic value is therefore an evaluation method that is capable of - taking into 
account the local information and their calculated use - integrally presenting the social and 
technical capital elements’ change in addition to natural capital, which the total economic value 
only implements in a very limited fashion (Kiss, 2004).  
The search for economic equilibrium is therefore a prerequisite for meeting the 
sustainability criteria, so the related research and the primary preference model experiments have 
been given priority over the years. Finding the point of equilibrium (defined as a kind of 
sustainability economic value) and the accurate detection of correlations based on Game Theory is 
therefore one of the most popular areas of research. In order to get an exact outline of 
sustainability in an actual criteria system of equilibrium, we can’t make do without knowledge on 
renewable energy projects, conditions affecting the market environment, and the cooperative, or 
non-cooperative game theory context (Fogarassy et al., 2007). In the next Game Theory chapters, I 
wish to present how the market factors that influence economic decisions may determine the 
definition and change in "economic equilibrium points," in other words - sustainability.
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1.2. Theory of non-cooperative games 
Economics basically states that rational behavior is based on consistent preferences. If a 
person’s preferences satisfy some basic needs or consistence-criteria, then these preferences can 
correspond to a well-defined usefulness function. Therefore, rational behavior can be viewed as the 
maximization of the usefulness function. This leads to the fact that we can call this definition of 
rational behavior the usefulness theory, says Harsányi (1995).
However, Harsányi also states that there is much evidence that this hypothesis is not valid, 
and that economics is rather based on the hypothesis that the preferences of people are completely 
consistent (1995). Most economists view this as a useful and simplifying hypothesis, arguing that 
economics, which is built upon this hypothesis, can offer mostly good, even if not perfect forecasts 
of the machinations of the economic system. 
Economic policy argues about how the happenings of economy affect the behavior of 
society. To prove that this is a basic part of everyday life, e.g. the fact that the average family size 
has been in decline in most countries in the last few decades, is well-based proof. The reason for 
this is that the economic pros of a larger family were greatly diminished while the cost was 
heightened due to the effects of urbanization and intensive technological advancement. The 
preference of a smaller family model and the consumption and living standards of families 
consisting of 3-4 people therefore took an important role in the process of optimum search (Hobson, 
2012). 
In order to link not only decision aspects based on economic indexes, but actual factors that 
have an impact on living standards to the choice preferences of various families, e.g. the criteria 
system of their purchases, we have to aim at creating a comparison method which can be used for 
many different attributes that aren’t dependent on each other (Vincze, 2009). If in the course of our 
decisions we have to form a judgment on a system or an object based on more characteristics 
simultaneously and these characteristics mean a mostly controversial characteristic set, while the 
sorting principles being connected to this show complicated contexts, then we may turn to 
mathematical modeling and its software applications for help. Therefore, to start the examination of 
the multipurpose systems, we should assign the most important criteria. We have to accept that fact 
at the time of the optimization of more opportunities, that according to Axelrod (2000) we can’t 
optimize all characteristics taken into consideration simultaneously. The simple reason for this is 
that the optimum of the attribute-representing objective functions usually won’t correspond to the 
same alternative all the time. 
We can generally say about the designation of the criteria system that we cannot take each 
single characteristic that influences our system or the function of its examined object into 
consideration. That is why we have to select those that are worth the additional investigation from 
the essential characteristics. The various characteristics have to be totally independent of each other. 
This is very important during the course of the selection in order to have no overlaps between the 
single criteria, since these cross characteristics may cause unnecessary examinations and a loss of 
time during the analysis.  
Therefore, during the multipurpose optimization tasks, we may have the following tasks in 
order for the process of the model creation, and the criteria system of problem solution to take shape 
(Forgó et al., 2005):
1. Designation of criteria system (and also, major attribute sets) 
2. Independence analysis of attribute sets (avoiding overlaps between attributes) 
3. Designation of choice variables and parameters in attribute sets (deterministic, or 
stochastic – in other words, realized with some level of probability – marking) 
4. Designation of binding criteria related to set (creation of sets) 
5. Designation of possible criteria of the criteria system, and the number of objective 
functions in set (the number of objective functions is finite) 
6. Search of optimum for objective functions  
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The general form of the multi-purpose programming task according to Molnár et. al. 
(2010a) is as follows (if we assume that      ) = L and in case of any 
  ,       is a real number):
   
                                  
X – system of choice variables  
L  - possible set of values for choice variables  
     ) – choice domain of function 
n – number of objective functions  
  = k - th objective function, in other words, the payoff function
We have to note, however, that the need for multipurpose problem solving is not the 
requirement of the present, since János Neumann already laid down the function-like necessities of 
the behaviors attached to rational decisions in 1928, and, in his work written together with Oskar 
Morgenstern entitled “Game Theory and economic behavior,” wrote it down in detail already in 
1944 (Neumann – Morgenstern, 2007). 
1.2.1. Search for points of equilibrium in non-cooperative games 
Game Theory fundamentally deals with the solution of multipurpose problems, that is, with 
so-called strategic games. Game Theory is one of the branches of mathematics with an 
interdisciplinary character and it primarily tries to tackle the question of what is rational behavior in 
situations where the possible choices of the participants influence the result of the decisions of all 
participants. A problem or problem solution can be called a strategic game if the decision makers 
may have influence on the outcome of the game between the existing conditions and the framework 
of rules (Mező, 2011a).
We always assume that we may characterize the outcome of the game for all players with an 
objective function in Game Theory solutions, in other words, the payoff function already 
mentioned. And for the various players (characters), the bigger the payoff function value, the more 
beneficial the outcome of the game is. The players' decisions, in other words, the outcome of the 
decisions onto the final result, are what we call the player’s strategy. We know two- or multi-person 
variants of Game Theory solutions. The Game Theory solution is non-cooperative if the players or 
characters compete with each other during problem solving, while the game is obviously 
cooperative if cooperation takes shape between the players. The importance of searching for points 
of equilibrium is emphasized in Game Theory. If the search aims at the fact that, when including all 
players’ strategies, the benefit of one player won’t change in case of him changing his strategy and 
none of the other players do so either, we call it the Nash equilibrium (Szidarovszky - Molnár, 
1986). 
The theory of the Nash equilibrium originates from John Nash, who was rewarded with a 
Nobel-prize for the development of the theory at the same time as János Harsányi, exactly 20 years 
ago. It was shown through Nash’s equilibrium theory that all finite games have at least one point of 
equilibrium.  
Nash divided the optimization games into cooperative and non-cooperative types. According 
to his thesis, the cooperative game is the kind where cooperation between players is simply 
enforced. According to him, we can only talk of non-cooperative games if agreement between the 
players is impossible to enforce. A non-cooperative game in the case of various strategies of players 
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can only be called stable if the so-called Nash equilibrium is present. In the case of Nash 
equilibrium, the strategies of the various players are the optimal replies to the others’ strategies, so 
there aren’t any players who want to break this status quo by choosing new, different cooperative 
strategies. The game will not be stable if it is not in the Nash equilibrium point, because there is 
always at least one player in this case to whom his strategy does not mean the best answer in the 
given situation, and therefore he will be interested in looking for a new strategy for himself 
(Harsányi, 1995). 
As I’ve already mentioned, the equilibrium situation may also be stable in case of 
cooperative games if one of the strategic combinations isn’t in accordance with the rest of the 
strategies, because the strategic cooperation will sooner or later be enforced. However, in economic 
life we mostly face strategy creations that do not take each other into consideration and run beside 
each other or that do not take the multipurpose decision process or the designation of choice 
optimum into consideration (Molnár-Kelecsényi, 2009). From the European or economic policy 
practice, we have a good example for this: the bulk of strategies concerning environment protection 
or renewable energetic developments, since we often face a strategy creation with a contradictory 
direction here.  
A principle is that developments with an environment protection aim have an opposite 
direction to that of the priority system of economic development (f. e. the program taking aim at the 
reduction of greenhouse gas and fossil energy use takes aim at the minimization of the intake, while 
the other one at the increase of a polluter energy source). A good example for this is two of the EU's 
main strategies: EU Low-carbon Roadmap 2050 vs. Nuclear Power in France (2014). 58 nuclear 
power plants operate currently in France, and additional developments are going on, while Germany 
just decided that by 2020, all (now 8 operating plants) of them will be shut down.  
In case of cooperative games, the selected strategy may also be stable even if a strategy 
combination is not in Nash equilibrium but the players come to an agreement that this strategy 
combination will be selected. During the course of the presentation of this search dilemma for the 
Nash equilibrium point – in case of non-cooperative games - I lean fundamentally on István Mező’s 
study (2011b), “Game Theory,” while if I differ from this, I’ll note it separately in the description.
 
Definition 1:  
According to the Definition of the Nash equilibrium: 
The point of equilibrium or strategy for an n player                  game is a point 
(strategic n), for which
     
 , …,                          , …,                 (1.1)
holds true for every          player. The point of equilibrium is therefore called a Nash 
equilibrium. [Shortened:       ,…,                      , ...,                             ].
If 1.1. ’s equality is strict, then it is called a strict equality. 
If we do not state anything else, we say it’s the point of equilibrium is non-strict.  
The  -th player can maximize his own payoff if he plays the equilibrium strategy, namely 
  
 , if all the other players do the same. We will need the following definitions to find the state of 
equilibrium:  
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Definition 2:
An   player  game is called a constant sum if the rewards and demerits earned by the 
player is a constant  value, regardless of strategy. 
With formula:  
  
 
              
   
If    , the game is called zero sum game.
Two-player, zero sum games are useful for demonstrating the definition of the point of equilibrium 
better. If we take a             point of equilibrium, based on (1.1) 
                      for every      (1.2)
and  
                      for every      .
The game is zero sum, therefore:  
                                             
and:  
                          .
If we rearrange the formula:  
.
and including (1.2) inequality as well, we get:  
                                    .
This inequality system states that from a          point of equilibrium, if player one leaves with a 
strategy different from    , the payoff function can only be either lower or equal. If player two is the 
one who leaves, the payoff function of player one will either be greater or equal, and since the game 
is zero sum, this would mean that his “payment” won’t be greater.
Definition 3: 
Let’s look at two games, which only differ in payoff functions: 
                                          
 and   are called strategically equivalent, if there’s a positive number, and there are 
                          , that 
  
              for every                    .
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The following thesis describes the obvious fact, which is also clear on the basis of simple 
intuition and logic, that strategically equivalent games must always be played in the exact same 
manner.   
Thesis 1:  
The points of equilibrium for strategically equivalent games are the same.  
Proof: Let                 and                    be our strategically equivalent games, 
and let               be one of the points of equilibrium for game   According to the definition 
for point of equilibrium (1.1), at     player’s every      strategy:
                                                                  
Since   is strategically equivalent to  , then with the constants            :
   
                                   
    
                                   
which, due to being positive results in  
  
                                                                 
And this means            is a point of equilibrium for   .
Thesis 2:  
 For every constant sum game, there is a zero sum game that is strategically equivalent to it, 
therefore having an overlap in points of equilibrium. 
 Proof: Let us simply subtract the constant sum from the value of payoff functions. This 
results in a zero sum in every possible outcome, and the new game remains strategically equivalent 
to the old one. Because of our previous thesis, their points of equilibrium are also the same. If we 
look at constant sum games, it’s enough for us to only concern ourselves with the zero sum variants 
only. Furthermore, a two-player game is zero sum if one player wins exactly as much as the other 
one loses (or the opposite). Therefore:  
                   )
we can use this function, and we don’t actually need a payoff function altogether, we simply use 
   instead of e.g.   .
1.2.2. Theoretical correspondences of finite games 
If an n – player game’s                 strategy sets are finite, then we say the game is 
of a finite kind. Games of a finite kind can typically be either two-player or n - player, meaning 
more than two players. In the function-like correspondence system of games of finite kind, it can be 
made obvious that during the solution of multi-purpose problems, the strategic sets, in other words, 
the defined parameters, or criteria groups are finite, but are always more than two. Since the project 
development decision process of our analyzed problem, the investments related to environmental 
defense and renewable energetic developments is n - player       , it’s advisable for us to 
analyze the behavior of multi-person games (Szidarovszky et. al 2013). We do assume however,
that the game isn’t concluded in a mere moment, but at previously designated              times, 
where only one player can modify the state of the game due to a previously set consecution. This 
state can be depicted with a tree graph (refer to Figure 1). This process in search of optimum is 
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quite similar to a 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube’s solution process alternatives, since we decide by the cube’s 
randomness, in other words, unsortedness, which shortest combination row (or depth level) we 
choose to heighten the level of sortedness, or simply, the solution of the cube in the case of layer by 
layer solution method (G. Nagy, 2008). 
 
Figure 1: Decision tree graph with pre-determined times (t0, t1, t2, t3) and combination 
alternatives (K1, K2, K3) 
Source: self-made (based on MIEA, 2005) 
The state of the system made by the players, in other words, the multi-purpose problem 
solving, can be illustrated with a problem tree, or tree graph, however, let’s assume (according to 
Forgó et al. 1999) that: 
a) the tree has a starting point (state of   time, which goes towards           ),
b) one player is assigned to the starting point and every branching point in accordance 
with a previously defined rule; this player can choose between the various, finite 
number of edges, and relocates the system’s state from this edge’s starting point to 
the conclusion point,  
c) every player knows the game’s current progress in every        time point, 
including all the states of the game up to it, 
d) in all the conclusion points of the tree diagram, all players have a payoff function 
value known to them. 
Furthermore, let’s assume that there are no players assigned to some of the peak points of the tree 
graph and the progression from here happens randomly through predetermined distributions, 
meaning the players don’t have choices, or do, but only symbolically. For the sake of uniformity,
let’s assign a player to these peak points as well, but their decisions are merely formal. In this case, 
the payoff functions of the game should be replaced with anticipatory values based on the random 
distributions. This game can be illustrated with a finite tree graph and is called a perfect information 
extensive-form game (Molnár - Szidarovszky, 1995; Molnár 1994). 
Thesis 3:  
Every perfect information extensive-form game that can be depicted with a tree graph has at 
least one point of equilibrium.  
Proof: Let I mark the starting point of the tree graph, while            marks the 
conclusion points. In our tree graph’s case, there is a single route leading from I to every   
conclusion point. The length of the longest route is called the tree graph’s length. We will prove the 
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thesis with the complete induction of the game’s tree graph’s length, according to Molnár and 
Szidarovszky (2011a).  
If       ,  then the tree graph only consists of the starting point. This means that players 
only have a single strategy. Furthermore, in this case, this single strategy is obviously the point of 
equilibrium. Let’s say that       . Let m mark the number of edges originating from the starting 
point, and let            be the conclusion points of the edges originating from the starting 
point. Furthermore, let              mark the maximum part-graph with the   starting point, 
excluding the I peak point. It is obvious that   ’s conclusion points are from  ’s points. Let 
                                   mark the original game narrowed to   , meaning that to    ’s 
peak points, we assign players also assigned to them in  , and to its conclusion points, we assign 
the payoff function values of  .
In this case, it’s obvious that            therefore, according to our induction thesis, 
   games have                         existing points of equilibrium. Let us say that in the game 
of graph  , we assigned player   to the starting point. 
a) Let us assume that player   can freely decide between the m routes originating from 
the starting points. In this case, it’s obvious that if     then                 
         
    
   
           .
Therefore, player   , apart from advancement in graph   , has to decide the 
advancement from the starting point as well. Let                numbers’ highest 
index, where the strategic n bundle obviously offers the point of equilibrium for the 
game, in case of           games’      points of equilibrium, supplemented 
by advancement from starting point I to point    .
b) Let us assume that player   randomly makes a choice at the start of the game from a 
pre-determined              probability distribution. In this case, the Cartesian 
product of    games’      points of equilibrium gives the original game’s point of 
equilibrium. To prove this, let’s say that in case of          and          :
  
                                      .
with arbitrary   
   
   
   , multiplying the inequality by   and in case of          , we obtain the inequality defining the point of equilibrium for the original 
game by addition. 
The thesis was proven based on Molnár - Szidarovszky (2011b), who stressed during the 
proof that the multipurpose problem solving is primarily suitable for the solution of smaller tasks, in 
other words, forming short tree graphs. Here, we get games that can be depicted with zero length 
tree graphs, in case of which staying in their only point means the only point of equilibrium. 
However, the number of the short tree graphs may grow so much in case of bigger tasks that it 
makes searching for points of equilibrium impossible. This can be recognized with experimentation 
– trial and error.  
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1.2.3. Games of infinite kind – Game Theory models with one or more points of equilibrium  
1.2.3.1. Games with a single point of equilibrium 
The simplification of the points of equilibrium for any given game can be proven by e.g. 
proving the problem of one of the exact fixed point-problems, which is equivalent to the problem of 
equilibrium. During the proof, I basically follow Szidarovszky’s logical process, while if I differ 
from this, I’ll note it separately in the description. 
A single-variable, fixed point problem usually means the solution of the f ( x )  =  x
equation. It is a known fact that if f is a decreasing function of x, there can be no more than one 
solution. Let’s try to generalize this monotonization criteria to a multi-dimension case. Therefore, 
let f be a vector-variable, vector-value function, f : Rn —> Rn . The following example shows that 
strict monotony by component still won’t guarantee exactness (Szidarovszky, 1978a).
Example. Let’s look at the
x = - x - 2 y 
y = - 2x - y 
fixed point-problem, given by                              
                     f (x, y)=         
imaging. Both components in both their variables are strictly decreasing functions, and yet there are 
an infinite number of fixed points:  
y   - x.
We can show however, that a different type of monotony is sufficient to prove the exactness 
of fixed points.  
Definition. Let D  Rn be a convex set. We call an f: D Rn function monotone, if for any x, y 
D : 
(x - y ) T ( f (x ) - f ( y ) ) 0 .
function f is called strictly monotone, if for any x , y D  and x  y : 
(x - y ) T ( f (x ) - f ( y ) ) > 0 .
 
We can easily see that if f is monotone, the imaging cannot have two different fixed points. Let us 
assume in spite of this that x and y are both fixed points.
0 < (x - y)T(x - y) = (x - y)T(f(x) - f ( y) )
= - (x - y) T ( ( - f (x ) ) - ( - f ( y) ) )   
This is obviously a contradiction. 
 
-
-
-
-
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We can easily check the monotony of the imaging, as shown by the next thesis:  
Thesis. Let D  Rn be a convex set and f: D  Rn function continuously differentiable. Let
J ( x )  mark f ’s Jacobi matrix at point x . 
a) If J(x) + J T ( x ) is positive semi-definite in all x   D points, f is monotone,
b) If J( x ) + JT ( x ) is positive definite in all x D points, f  is strictly monotone.  
Proof.
For a fixed x ,  y D, let’s introduce the
g(t) = f( y + t(x - y))
scalar variable function. Obviously
g(0) = f(y) and g(l) = f(x),
therefore 
 
f(x) - f ( y)  =   
 
 
( y + t( x  - y) )  ( x  - y)dt.
Let’s multiply both sides from the left by the (x - y)T linear vector, and we get: 
(x - y)T (f(x) - f(y)) =            
 
J (y + t ( x - y)) (x - y)dt
=  
 
        
 
{ J (y + t (x - y)) + JT (y + t (x - y))} (x - y) dt 
In the previous step, we used the fact that for any given u D Rn vector and n x n type J matrix:  
uT Ju = uTJTu,
since both sides are scalar, and each other’s transposes. If J + JT is positive semi-definite, the right 
side isn’t negative, and if it’s positive definite, then it’s positive, respectively. Having precise 
knowledge about imaging is an absolute necessity to use the results above, which isn’t always 
possible, due to the need for knowledge on solving optimum-problems. This is why results which 
are based on the attributes of strategic sets and payoff functions are very important (Molnár-
Szidarovszky, 2011c; Mészáros, 2005).
1.2.3.2. Two-player games of an infinite kind: biomass-management  
Let’s take a builder depot as an example, which is in contract with a logging firm for 
firewood (biomass) supply. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll only include one type of firewood, 
meaning one type of product. According to our hypothesis, the distribution of the purchases arriving 
to the builder depot is exponential, meaning it’s a question of incoming needs per timeframe 
(Molnár-Szidarovszky, 1995): 
                        
To understand the example, we will be using the following:   is the total profit from selling 
one unit of product, meaning firewood, if it supplies from its own stock.   will be the total profit 
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of the builder depot, which comes from purchased firewood        .   will be the deposit cost 
of the builder depot per unit.   will be the logging firm’s deposit cost per unit. 
The strategies of both the builder depot and the logging firm can be described by one 
number: the size of their stock. If  marks the builder depot’s stock while  marks that of the 
logging firm, then the builder depot’s anticipatory profit is as follows: 
                      
 
       
 
                      
   
                
The first part of the formula refers to when need is lower than  , then the building depot can cover 
it from its own stock. In this case, his profit per unit is   . The second part refers to when      
    . In this case, the building depot covers  amount from its own stock, and the remaining
   need is covered by purchase. The third part refers to when      , where the building 
depot can’t cover all needs from its own stock, therefore, it satisfies   from its own stock, and 
  from purchase, namely the logging company’s stock. The fourth part of the formula refers to the 
cost of deposit. Based on the same correlation, the anticipatory profit of the logging firm is as 
follows:
                            
 
   
 
   
           
With this, I defined a two-person game of infinite kind. If we propose that  ’s permissive values are 
  ,         and   ’s permissive values are  ,         , while we allow mixed strategies as 
well, then we have a bimatrix game (Molnár et al., 2010b):
                       
                       
1.2.3.3. Three-player games of infinite kind: production of minerals 
The solution optimums for three-person games of infinite kind will be demonstrated with an 
example based on Molnár’s (2010) Enviro-IT studies, taking into account the factors of mining and 
environmental defense. In the example, we can follow a multi-equilibrium (three points of 
equilibrium) Game Theory solution, during which we’ll try to maximize the payoff functions in all 
three cases.  
The production of minerals – literally the process of mining – may and will have an impact 
on not only the close proximity of the mining area, but also the surrounding bigger regions and 
ecologically unified areas as well. Usually, nodes can be found below the underground water 
region; it is therefore necessary to have a water-defense strategy for the planning of the mining 
process to be realizable. However, the changes in the water system not only require us to form plans 
and strategies in relation to the close proximity of the mining process, but the drinking water supply 
system as well, since the mining’s water strategy will have an impact on both the drinking water 
and karst water supplies important to industrial water supplies. Furthermore, karst water plays an 
important role in thermal and hot spring water supplies as well, which are important factors in 
health tourism. Therefore, for the mining process of mineral resources, we have to include the 
factors of the direct water control of mining, the regional strategic objective system of drinking and 
other water supplies, and the water supply requirements of hot springs for the stable continuation of 
health tourism. In light of the aforementioned statements, we can define three strategic programs in 
the process of strategic planning: 
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A. Water protection related to mining  
B. Defense of drinking water reserves  
C. Defense of karst water reserves for thermal water supply  
Mathematically defining the above mentioned goals is not an easy task, and even after that, 
the calculation of the Game Theory payoff functions can only be done if the special criteria systems 
are set up. For the mathematical definitions, we’ll introduce the following: let   be the  -th mine’s 
extracted water supply and its annual cost. Let    be the  –th mine’s profits from the inrush of 
water. Let    be the  –th mine’s loss of water due to water defense. Let    be the  -th mine’s 
sealed water amount. Let   (  ) be   water withdrawal’s (investment+industrial) cost in the  -th
mine. Let        be    economical loss due to the inrush of water in the  -th mine, and        
the water defense cost of water loss due to water defense (investment+industrial) in the  -th mine. 
Let        be the costs of sealing (investment+industrial) in the  -th mine. Let    be the amount 
of water transported from  -th mine to  -th re-feeding point. Let  be the number of artificial re-
feeding points, let          be    water amount’s transport costs. Let  be the number of water 
supply requiring points, let    be the amount of transported water from mine, or other location (i) 
to  -th location. Let         be    amount of water’s transport cost. Let      +   be the mines’     and other sources’     amounts. Let   be  -th water supply requiring point’s supply needs. 
Let  be the underground resupply of hot spring waters. Let   be the  -th mine’s number of 
inrushes of water. 
In our example model,   ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    are the choice variables. Their values are 
not dependant due to the applicable circumstantial correlations, therefore, the  -th mine’s payoff 
function can be easily calculated as follows: 
                                          .
For the variables, the following must hold true: 
             
meaning the withdrawn water equals to the water lost due to mining and water defense. The mine 
water’s   profit equals to   withdrawn and    sealed water’s sum, as follows: 
         
Also, 
        ,
meaning we can not transport more water than what we have. The first objective function is the 
mining objective, meaning the cost of all mines:  
    
 
     
The water supply goal means that in case of regional water management, we try to satisfy water 
needs with the best cost efficiency. We consider the possible underground water withdrawal points 
(including the mines) and the water supply requiring points the points of a network (Salazar et al, 
2010). The water supply requirement can be described as follows: 
f2=                        
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with the following criteria holding true: 
        (1 = 1, 2,.., m);
                    (i=1, 2,…, n1).
The requirement of environmental protection is fulfilled completely, if we pick {xi}, 
{yij}, {vik} choices, with which we keep up the required resupplied amount of hot spring waters. 
Therefore, the environmental protection goal’s function is as follows:
f3=b-h(...., xi....yij....., vij.....) min
We define the underground water amount leaving the system with the h function, 
regarding i choice variables. If we would only have to take the environmental protection goals 
into consideration, then we’d pick the choice variables in a way that h = b  would hold true. In 
our model, we define the barring criteria that  
h(..., xi ..., yij ...., vik.....) ≤ b.
Three possible methods are of use to estimate function h. According to Molnár et al. 
(2010c), all three are based on one of the system’s simulation models, which consists of 
modeling using the partial differential equation system. This equation system describes the 
water movements underground, and with the help of this, regarding the previously analyzed                 choice variables, and with their set values, function h can be easily calculated.
1. With the help of the system’s simulation model, we can calculate function h’s various 
values for many combinations of choice alternatives. The chart model should theoretically 
not be applicable to solutions, but in reality, it causes IT problems that make it impossible 
for us to spend time on the alternative. 
2. A solution could be if we use the regression analysis in f3 to estimate h , since with 
the help of the simulation model we can make a multi-variable linear regression function. 
3. To estimate h, we again use regression analysis but using empirical or experienced data. 
This solution can prove adequate if we have a well-known system at our hands, when we 
want to determine the best possible development method. In case of a freshly starting 
system however, empirical data doesn’t define the system in its entirety all that well. 
In light of the above, we used the second alternative: regression analysis. We have to realize 
that the choice variables can be categorized into three different groups. The                     variables are for mining purposes,         are for water supply purposes, 
while         are for environmental protection purposes. The above mentioned three goals are 
used as payoff-functions, while the u1, u2, u3, vectors are used as strategic vectors, with which we 
can define a three-player game. Our objective can therefore be written as a three-person game 
mathematically, where u1, u2, u3, are the appropriate strategic vectors, while,           is the 
simultaneous strategic vector:
 i (u) =  i  (u1, u2, u3,) = cTi1 u1 + cTi2 + u2 + cTi3 + u3 = cTi + u    
Objective functions are the strategic vectors. 
         A1 u1+ A2 u2 + A3 u3 b
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In this case, the coefficients are the vectors and matrixes derived from the previous model 
coefficients. 
In Game Theory, the goal is usually to maximize the value of payoff functions. Therefore, in 
our case, it is advisable to use the original payoff functions multiplied by (-1). 
Let S be A1 u1+ A2u2 + A3u3 b criteria system’s            set of vectors. In this case, we 
have to see S as its simultaneous strategic set. The game with S set and   payoff functions has a 
point of equilibrium, which is a u*= (ui*)   S vector, for which any S:
            
  
 
             
  
 
              
  
 
in case of vectors:                                 k (u(k)) ≤   k (u*)
The  k (u(k)) ≤  k (u*) correlation, as we know, technically means that none of the objective 
functions’ values can be raised by single-sidedly changing its strategy, meaning the u*k strategic 
vector is the maximum of  k, if the other u*i (i ≠ k) equilibrium strategies are set. Since the A1 u1+
A2u2 + A3u3 b criteria system and the objective functions are linear, based on the Kuhn – Tucker 
– theory, u can only be a point of equilibrium if the following criteria system holds true: 
                                                         
                (k = 1, 2, 3,),
                               
                                                              
 
where Vk is the sufficient vector. The third criteria’s left side is never negative; therefore, the 
problem equals the problem, which means a quadratic programming task for the uk choice and vk
new variables, due to the objective function.
     
          (k = 1, 2, 3)
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Using simple transformations, we can rewrite the task’s objective function as follows:  
If we introduce the  
    
     
     
      ,           ,        ,           ,           .
hypermatrix and vectors, then the function can be written in a simpler form: 
                                                       vTHu – cTu - bTv 
This way, we’ve reduced our original goal to a quadratic programming task, for the solution 
of which we have more easily applicable methods. 
During our calculations, we analyzed three mines, meaning i = 1, 2, 3. For these, A1 = 60m3/
min, A2 = 150 m3/ min, A3 = 100 m3 / min, which we got from annual data. The annual investment 
and operation costs per unit were given by Table 2 (104 HUF / m3/ min). Therefore, we suggest that 
the functions in question are all linear.  
Table 2: Annual data on profits of the various mines (HUF/m3/min) 
bi, Li, di, gi
WATER WITHDRAWAL WATER DEFENSE SEALING
invest. indust. loss invest. indust. invest. indust.
Mine 1 28,5 73,5 940 non-realizable 12,0 42,0
Mine 2 32,0 116 1200 35,0 129,0 8,5 25,5
Mine 3 100,0 184 1420 45,0 147,0 22,3 34,7
   Source: self-made (based on Molnár (2010c))  
Including the three mines, we took six water withdrawal points, and analyzed seven water 
supply requiring points. The annual investment and industrial costs of water transportation can be 
seen in Table 3. These costs were also defined in HUF 104 / m3 / min units, as previously. In each 
reaction, we show two costs, first of which is the investment cost, second is the industrial unit cost, 
therefore, Sij the functions are also linear. 
The needs of the various water supply requiring points are as follows (m3 / min): 33, 14, 83, 
14, 83, and 28. We also take into consideration two other resupply points, the costs of which (first 
of which is the investment, second is the industrial) can be seen in Table 4 (HUF / m3/ min). 
Table 3: Analysis of water withdrawal points (HUF / m3 / min) 
   Source: self-made (based on Molnár et. al. (2010c)) 
Sij 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 6 3 7 8 9 7 11 8 14 8 15 7 1 7
2 9 10 5 4 5 2 8 4 10 4 10 4 14 6
3 9 11 5 2 7 3 10 6 10 6 14 8 18 9
4 261 45 257 40 255 39 262 43 262 43 264 45 268 46
5 272 45 269 43 262 40 259 30 259 30 253 37 256 40
6 264 42 258 32 261 35 258 32 258 32 262 32 265 34
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Table 4: Costs of water resupply points (HUF /m3/ min) 
aik 1. RE-FEEDING POINT 2. RE-FEEDING POINT
Mine 1 25 0 45 53
Mine 2 68 112 72 78
Mine 3 63 94 50 32
Source: self-made (based on Molnár et. al. (2010c))
In the third objective function, b = 30 m3 / min, and the function h which we got from the 
regression is as follows: 
                                                                                        . 
We can solve the model with the quadratic programming task above. The optimal choice 
variables can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. In the first Table, the optimal xi, xLi, xDi, xGi, vi1, and vi2
values can be found in case of i = 1,2,3, while in the second, we will give the yij (1≤ i ≤ 6,1 ≤ j ≤ 7) 
values. From Table 5, based on the exact yij values, we can also say that according to the optimal 
program, there is water transportation between nine different places.  
Table 5: Optimal choice variables at water withdrawal points (3 places) 
i xi xLi xDi xGi vi1 vi2
1 33 33 0 27 0 0
2 33 0 130 0 0 0
3 150 0 100 0 0 25,16
      Source: self-made (based on Molnár et. al. (2010c)) 
   Table 6: Choice variables at water withdrawal points (6 places) 
i/j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 25 14 0 83 28
3 0 14 58 0 2,84 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 11,6 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
      Source: self-made (based on Molnár et. al. (2010c))
Note: The differing results don’t mean contradictions, instead they illustrate the multi-purpose 
programming tasks’ fundamental problem, meaning the optimal solution is highly dependent on the 
choice of the applied method. The various methods may designate differing optimum values. And 
this reflects the attitude of the one who makes the decision.  
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1.3. Theory of cooperative games  
Primarily those market players and companies that can be defined well on the market can 
already apply Game Theory solutions well in the present practice. Game Theory mathematics, 
meaning the selection of suitable strategies supported by numbers, may happen in an exact manner. 
What currently doesn’t generally apply to the selection of appropriate strategies is the practice of 
cooperative aim or strategic choice. The sustainability concepts make it unambiguous that a
production/consummation goal system can be planned long-term if the use of resources is planned 
and in a synchronized manner. Sustainable development may not be realized without this 
cooperation. The cooperative attribute and the fact that market players form coalitions provides a 
new approach to the Game Theory approach, as well. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the 
interests of players are the same regarding e.g. the distribution of costs, but during the cooperation, 
it is compulsory to abide by a collectively defined criteria system (Hardin, 1968). 
During cooperative strategies, the players or market players have the natural aim of raising 
their profits by giving up on their autonomy partially or completely (Solymosi, 2009). By this 
method, a given group of players or all players cooperate with each other and perhaps form 
coalitions or even a single coalition. The natural requirement of the cooperation is that the 
participating players or market players must have a higher share of profits compared to those who 
do not take part in cooperation at all. In this case, the goal won’t be the increase of personal profits, 
but the maximization of the cooperation’s profits. This aim completes the criteria of sustainability, 
in other words, sustainable development, or economy’s weak sustainability (Molnár - Kelecsényi, 
2009). 
Cooperative games will be defined with the following descriptions.            is the 
set of players for which a given  subset is commonly known as a coalition:    . Let  be the set 
of subsets or the set of coalitions. The  base set is called complete coalition (Szidarovszky, 
1978b). 
 
1.3.1. Conflict alleviation methods 
Conflict alleviation methods are one of the favored groups of cooperative Game Theory 
solutions. Of these, we can stress the importance of Nash’s axiomatic solution, which used axiom 
sets to assure that the solution is always placed on the Pareto-line. And the Kálai - Smorodinsky 
solution can give the last possible point which is the achievable minimum or the solution of the 
conflict by defining the worst outcome point of the conflict (Molnar - Szidarovszky, 1994).  
Conflict alleviation methods will be demonstrated with a two-person case. In our example, 
let   and   be the players’ strategy sets, and          the two payoff functions. The set of 
possible payoffs can therefore be as follows: 
                                
In this case, as always, both players aim at maximizing their payoffs, but their respective 
payoffs are naturally dependent on the other player’s strategy, and a general rule is that raising one 
player’s payoff leads to a drop in the other’s (Nowak - May, 1992). Therefore, our task is that we 
have to find a solution that is acceptable to both parties. Before each solution, we have to state that 
if there’s no cooperation, both parties will get either a lower payoff, or a penalty. 
General definitions:  
            
this will be our payoff vector, for which we assume that there is a           , for which       
and       . The conflict is defined mathematically by the       pair. This pair was defined in
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Figure 2. We will also assume that set H  is closed, convex and bounded, which therefore means 
that:                            
for which            is essential, and bounded in both coordinates, therefore 
                    
 in case of        .
 
Figure 2: Graph of conflict  
Source: based on Molnár-Szidarovszky, 2011c 
Furthermore, we also assume that H’s borderline is the graph of function          , which 
is strictly decreasing in point   and concave. The graph of function   is usually called the Pareto
line, therefore the optimum criteria for sustainability can only be satisfied here. Between the game 
and solution dependencies, we have to take note that no rational player will accept a partnership 
which means a worse payoff than a payoff without any partnerships. 
Therefore, the possible payoff set can be narrowed as such:  
                                 
1.3.2. Model of oligopolistic games 
Oligopolistic game solutions are the most popular for the modeling of economic decision 
processes. They can be used for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies; however, in my 
dissertation, I wish to present the cooperative model to define the sustainable maximization of the 
usefulness function, due to the importance of the sustainability attribute system. 
There may be two relevant problems of economic science in the case of the usefulness 
function. The first problem was that the consumers aren’t only defined by one usefulness function, 
but by an unlimited number of functions, and they are equivalent to each other. The second came up 
when the choice was made during insecurity. The solutions used on oligopolistic games can 
maximize the players’ usefulness functions with the highest probability when the criteria are fixed 
and the strategies used are cooperative (Simonovics, 2003; Ichiishi, 1983).  
In the wide scale of engineering (environmental protection) tasks, we can meet with exact 
problems that have a mathematical model which may be reduced to an oligopolistic game. Multi-
player Game Theory may be used to examine many variations of problems (Szilágyi, 2005). In the 
following example, I’ll try to introduce the process of optimum search based on oligopolistic games 
– 36 –
Csaba Fogarassy
by concentrating on a single product in the market process (this could be, e.g. green energy on the 
energy market), and by including market players and groups (manufacturers, transporters, 
regulators, implementers, etc.), who have an impact on the changes of the product’s cost, and the 
creation of the point of equilibrium.  
In case of cooperative games, giving up on independence must result in the raise in profits for 
players (Simonovics, 2003).  
General definitions for cooperative games: 
  - payoff function
  - strategic sets (          – strategic attributes
 – a certain positive integer
 – a certain set of   
Condition: for         ,         , and for every given        
                                    
The inequality could be defined in words as such: for the  -th player        , the
equilibrium strategy is the optimal strategy, assuming the other players choose the correct 
equilibrium strategy. The cooperative game results in a coalition where the coalition itself can 
always generate profits unlike those who are not members. 
Maximum of cooperative game, profits of coalition:  
Let’s assume that a set of players  makes the 
               
coalition. Furthermore, let us take the game defined by  
      
     and          
strategy sets, and 
                   ,               
payoff functions. It is obvious that function    ’s “max-min” value, meaning 
                              and       
quantity – in which it exists – is only dependent on set  . The coalition assumes that players not in 
the coalition aim at minimizing the coalition’s profits. 
Example for oligopolistic problem handling: 
To keep it simple, let’s assume that                 meaning we only examine a 
single product, and every group consists of a single unit. Referring to the known max-min function, 
 can be differentiated into the      interval. Let                    be a coalition (Molnár 
– Szidarovszky, 1994). 
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In this case,      can be as follows: 
                          , where                  .
To calculate value     , first we need to calculate the                          where    
quantity.  
We differentiate two possible cases during problem solution: 
1) is if          , then obviously 
                   
   
    
2) is if          , then obviously
                   
   
        
   
    
   
     
   
    
In our first case, function    ’s maximum point is based on functions’   ’s increase, meaning
            , therefore,
         
   
   
Let’s introduce the           and           definitions for our second case. 
Then, according to the formula above: 
                   (                  where          
We can solve the above written equality with a programming task. We can use dynamic 
programming for the numeric solution (Molnár – Szidarovszky, 1994; Simonovics, 2003).  
1.3.3. Method of equal compromise  
The search for the solutions to environmental problems can be solved in different ways, as 
I’ve already mentioned at the beginning of the chapter; therefore, the optimum point, conclusion 
point or solution can manifest on the Pareto line in multiple coordinates. The method we use is 
dependent on the attitude of the one who does the optimization, his beliefs, intuition, and the nature 
of the processed problem (Axelrod, 1984).  
Out of all the employable conflict alleviation methods, I chose the method of equal 
compromise to demonstrate the Game Theory solution, which (in case of two players) assumes that 
both players reduce their requirements at the exact same pace, to the point where they arrive at a
possible solution. One of the method’s characteristics is that there is usually a single solution point, 
and giving it outlines the optimal criteria system for the players (Forgó et al., 2005). This means 
that they accept the first solution (which is probably the best possible for both of them) as the 
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solution to the conflict, or conclusion point. If both players want the maximum payoff, the (        
point is needed, which is not possible. 
In case of continuously and collectively decreased requirements, the problem’s definition (if 
the solution is        , the two players always give                  discounts, therefore, in 
case of equal discounts:
  
              
Transforming the equation to   :
                    
where we see the left side strictly increasing, for       ,                                
  
  ,                    , therefore, there is exactly one solution for the problem (Molnár -
Szidarovszky, 1995). 
My hypothesis is that the previously introduced non-cooperative and cooperative Game 
Theory solutions are applicable to mathematically defining sustainability criteria, since they allow 
the determination of points of equilibrium for economic, production, and strategic creation and 
planning processes, which create a clear basis for both long-term sustainable resource usage, and 
avoidance of economy development processes which have a detrimental effect. 
During the implementation of the Game Theory method, we refer to the “Layer by layer 
method,” meaning row after row solution of Rubik’s Cube, which has the characteristic of being 
applicable to modeling the process of project development and the attributes that have an impact on 
each other during the development, through the logical sequence. According to the hypothesis on 
the solution algorithms of the Rubik’s Cube, the parts rotated next to each other, meaning the 
project attributes which have an impact on each other, have a relation system which can be defined 
in mathematical terms, therefore, their point of balance (e.g. Nash’s) can also be determined by 
Game Theory models (games of finite kind, zero sum games, oligopolistic games, etc.). 
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1.4. Rubik’s Cube (3×3×3) solution methods and mathematical approaches
Rubik’s Cube was invented in 1974 by Hungarian designer and engineer Ernő Rubik. The 
Hungarian game, first known as the mystical cube, was very popular in the countries of Central 
Europe, then slowly conquered the entire world, from the USA to China. The primary goal of 
designing the cube was to create an architecture demonstration tool for students that can make the 
three dimensions more easily understood by architect students. Via the 3×3×3 cube, some 
mathematical and logical correspondences can be easily defined, which are exceptionally useful in 
learning the thought processes in three dimensions. The international interest in Rubik’s Cube 
started in 1980, when it became clear that it is not just a simple toy, but also a specialized system. 
Each side of the six-color cube consists of 3 rows and 3 columns, which have a special meaning. 
The connection between the different sides is represented and further developed by the small cubes. 
Through the subsystems of the cube, by substituting certain attributes, the correspondence between 
said attributes can be clearly followed during the rotation of the cube. Both the correct and incorrect 
placements and correspondences can be identified (Rubik’s Revenge, 2011).
When Ernő Rubik created the 3×3×3 cube, he needed a whole month of intensive “work” to 
find the correct method for the cube’s solution. During the long time interval, he had many 
interesting ideas, which later raised the cube from the group of ordinary games and made it into one 
of the world’s most famous and popular logical device. According to Rubik, the “cube” is a perfect 
example of the unison of designed and natural beauty. The coloring of the cube is the result of a 
unique and well-thought planning process, by which if anyone looks at it, the first obvious fact is 
the beauty of the cube (Rubik, 1981). Furthermore, the cube is the perfect system of putting the 
human mind to the test, correspondence to science, and discipline. Ernő Rubik also holds that the 
cube can mean the unison of reality and beauty, since these can mean the same thing simultaneously 
(SZTNH, 2013).  
The mystical meaning of the number “three” followed the cube along its story of conquest 
and success. Many think that the cube symbolizes connections that link man to nature and a natural 
being. Ernő Rubik called the “mother-child-father” relationship, the “heaven-earth-hell” trio, the 
processes of “creation-protection-destruction,” or “birth-life-death” important symbols for the 
number three (Rubik et al., 1987).
The cube itself is an imitation of life, or more properly, the pursuit of making said life better. 
The problem of the cube’s solution is also closely related to solving life’s problems, thus we can say 
that our entire life is a puzzle. If you’re hungry, you need to find something to eat; but life’s daily 
problems are a bit more complicated than this and are not as obvious. Until you eat, you have only a 
single problem, but after you’re full, other problems quickly arise. The problem of solving the cube 
is basically your call. You can solve it alone, without help. However, finding happiness in life is not 
this easy, it is something that cannot be done alone. This is the biggest difference between life and 
the cube (Goudey, 2003). The above mentioned thought process is basically the same as the 
sustainability concept defined by sustainable economic value (FGÉ) mentioned early in the 
dissertation, which is able to present – also using local information – the changes in not only the 
natural capital, but social and technological capitals as well, and in an integrated manner, which can 
only be partially done using the various economic indexes.  
In the case of the logical game that caused the world the greatest headache, scientists were 
already interested in the early 80’s in how they can find “God’s number” out of all the possibilities 
of the quite impressive number of 43,252,003,274,489,856,000 starting positions, meaning exactly 
what is the maximum number of steps are necessary to solve the cube. The research team who 
publicized the results checked all the possible positions, using both Google’s calculation power, and 
a bunch of mathematical twists, and found that the possible states or positions is an incredible 43 
quintillion (~43*1018).  
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1.4.1. Interpretations of Rubik’s Cube solution methods and algorithms
Scientists basically thought that a maximum of 18 steps are required to solve the cube. 
However, the mathematician Michael Reid created a mathematical formula that made it obvious 
that the cube can’t be solved starting from any given state with a rotation which consists of less than 
20 steps (Korf, 1997). This means that the cube can only be solved with at least 20 rotation steps 
according to theoretical calculations, which means that “God’s number” must be at least 20. In 
2008, Thomas Rokicki, American scientist, proved (using a group theory method for calculations) 
that the cube can be solved with 22 rotation steps from any given starting state, which means that 
the “God’s number” being close to 20 is a fact in not only theory, but also technically. However, 
everyone already knew that the number 22 can’t be “God’s number,” since this was obvious from 
the calculations (Rokicki, 2008; Gregory, 2007).  
As a start, Rokicki and his affiliates divided all the starting configurations using the 
technique derived from group theory. This meant 2.2 billion groups, each of which consisted of 
19.5 billion configurations. The grouping was dependent on the reaction of the configurations to 10 
possible rotation movements. The mathematicians working on the project, using the different 
symmetries of the cube, successfully reduced the groups to 56 million. This reduction was made 
possible through a very simple methodology, since if we turn the given cube upside down, or to 
each side, the solution won’t become any more complicated, therefore making these equal 
‘combinations’ outright unnecessary. Apart from these simplifications, there were still numerous 
possible starting configurations, which made the creation of an algorithm for the hastening of the 
process necessary (Rokicki, 2010). 
The new algorithm was very important, since previous methods could only try 4000 cubes 
every second. This previous algorithm examined a starting movement, then determined if the 
position which resulted was closer to the conclusion of the overall solution process or not. If this 
wasn’t successful, the algorithm discarded these steps and restarted.  
“This method is like visiting our friend in an unknown town, for which he supplies the 
general direction, when to turn right or left, but he didn’t tell us where to start from. If we follow 
the directions from a random starting point, we will have a slim margin of possible success, 
meaning arriving at the correct destination, but if we can match it to the correct starting point, we 
can definitely make the trip,” said Joyner (1996a).  
Rokicki (2010) realized that those steps which result in a dead end are actually solutions to 
other starting states, which led him to creating a different algorithm with which he could try a 
billion cubes every second. This means that the newly created algorithm was able to match 
movements with the correct starting state at an incredible speed, making the solution of a 19,5 
billion series possible in a mere 20 seconds, which may seem like an astounding speed, but still 
would’ve required 35 years for an ordinary computer to complete the entire task. In order to shorten 
the time required, they were searching for an especially effective method. During the process of 
problem solving, it was quite fortunate that the work was followed by John Dethridge, one of 
Google’s engineers, and offered the free capacities of his IT systems to aid the research. By using 
the free capacity of the computer empire, he managed to solve the problem in a few weeks.  
The result of the astounding and persistent research spanning 15 years therefore proved the 
assumption made and supported by mathematicians for a long time, that no more than 20 moves is 
required to solve the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube from any given starting state. Many researchers agree 
that these research processes show how simple and pure mathematics can be used to simplify 
problems which need an enormous calculation (Rokicki, 2010). 
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Rotational mathematics 
The process of thought for the 3×3×3 cube was developed for the simplification of the 
mathematical definition. As a first step, we must realize that if we (theoretically) fix the innermost 
element, which keeps all the other ones together, then only the corners and the side edges can 
change their positions using the rotation movements, the middle element does not move from its 
position, only rotates around itself. After this, we assume that all the states of the cube are given a 
number from 1 to 43,252,003,274,489,856,000. We create sets using the numbers, which will define 
the set of possible cube positions (Davis, 2006). 
If we follow the basic theories by Singmaster (1981) and name the rotations based on the initials 
of the sides which are being rotated, we arrive at the list seen below. We can define a rotation 
condition that the rotation itself may only happen outward from the inside of the cube, and 
clockwise. This is also called left hand rule, and means that only six different rotations are possible.  
a – rotation of the bottom side 
f – rotation of the top side 
e – rotation of the foreside 
h – rotation of the backside 
b – rotation of the left side 
j – rotation of the right side 
Each one of the cube’s rotations (not restricted to these six variants) is called a 
transformation. We can imagine the various rotations as functions, which are defined on the set of 
stages for the cube. These also make sets, for which the rule of relation is that the value of the given 
function is the sequential number of the new cube position, defined by executing the correct 
rotation. In simple terms, it can be written as follows: f (64,523) = 578,526,687 (Joyner, 1996b).  
If we can define the rotation sequence as the sequence of the exact letters and use it for the 
analogy of the multiplication process, then the various rotation processes are easy to define. 
Therefore, in the case of this rotation combination where the left column is rotated twice, followed 
by the rotation of the top row once, and the back row once, can be written as follows: bbfh, meaning 
b2fh. We can mark the rotation sequence with which we turn the cube around, meaning 
repositioning it to its original state with the number 1. Written as follows: a: bbbb = b·b·b·b = 
b4 = 1. Naturally, the rotation 1 is also a transformation, but one which leaves all positions intact. In 
this correspondence, 1(1)=1, 1(2)=2, … , 1(43,252,003,274,489,856,000) = 
43,252,003,274,489,856,000. Based on this, we can interpret the counter-clockwise rotations as 
well, which are the same as the sequence of three clockwise rotations. Therefore, for example fff =f³
is such a rotation, which, according to the previous abbreviations, can be defined as 1/f or f−1 as 
well, since the formula 1/f · f = 1 defines that two 90° counter-clockwise rotations of the cube 
outward from the center, followed by the same re-rotation does not alter the cube’s combination. 
When defining a transaction, we can also say that a0 = 1, f0 = 1, e0 = 1, h0 = 1, b0 = 1, j0 = 1, 
meaning executing any rotation movement 0 times doesn’t alter the cube (Singmaster, 1981).
The set theory interpretation of the cube’s solution is also an extremely interesting research 
field. If we define a set from all the possible rotations, which we name A, and also interpret the 
process of continuous execution defined by multiplication (·) (which is the composition of rotation 
functions in another form), then we get an exact group. This can be defined with e.g.: (A, ·). 
However, we can state that this set has a finite number of elements (meaning that we can imagine a 
finite number of different rotations) and therefore the group consists of a finite number of elements, 
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since an infinite number of rotations could arrange the cube in an infinite number of combinations. 
However, there is a bounding criteria that each of the 9×6 sides can at most have six colors, 
therefore, the cube will strictly have less than 366 states, meaning we can see that only a finite 
number of different rotations is imaginable (Davis, 2006). 
Let us define 1 as the neutral element of group (A, · ). However, we can also see that each 
element is comprised of the sequential execution of f, e, a h, a b and/or j. In this case, we say that 
the set {a, f, e, h, b, j} generates group (A, · ). The arrangement of the cube, meaning the correct 
positioning of each color, is written mathematically as follows (assuming we mix it with the x 
sequence of rotations): e.g. x(1) = 456,358,966,568, where x = bfj³f²…aef²hj. If we do not know the 
value of x, we must find a y rotation, which arranges the cube, meaning y (456,358,966,568) = 1. 
Thus we can see that x · y = 1, meaning y = x−1, which makes our goal to find a transformation that 
inverts x. It holds true for every rotation that the inverse of the rotation is the same as the rotation 
done the opposite way. E.g.: the inverse of f is f−1 = f³, since f·f−1 = f · f³ =f4 = 1. In case of more 
complicated rotations, we have to invert the various elements, and do the whole process backwards. 
E.g.: (afj³f²…bef²hj)−1 = j −1h −1f −2e −1b −1…f −2j −3f −1a −1, where f −2 = f ² and j −3 = j, as checkable 
with simple multiplication (Frey, 1982). 
The basic rule is that during the arrangement of the cube, our goal is to move the small 
cubes into a different location or leave them in place, but at a different angle (e.g. let a corner cube 
do a 120° turn, or rotate an edge cube with its color) while everything else remains untouched. 
Naturally, it’s obvious to everyone that not every imagined movement can actually be done. If we 
want to rotate a corner cube, we have to know that it can only be moved together with another: we 
can’t rotate just that corner cube alone. This is also the case for the rotation’s direction, since the 
corner cubes don’t always rotate the same way. There are rotations which only move edge cubes, 
while some only move corner cubes. This is due to the rule that edge cubes can’t go into a corner 
cube’s position, and vice versa. An interesting fact is that the movements of a 3×3×3 cube’s corner 
cubes are identical to that of the 2×2×2 cube’s corner cubes, even though the latter doesn’t even 
have edge cubes at all. We can define this as well using function-form laws for the different 
solution methods (Snap, 2012; Slocum et al., 1981).
1.4.2. Analysis of solution methods for 3×3×3 Rubik’s cube 
To solve the 3×3×3 cube, many different methods were made independent of each other in 
the last few decades, one of which is the very popular layer by layer method designed by David 
Singmaster, which was published in “Notes on Rubik’s ‘Magic Cube’” in 1981.
“Layer by layer” method: 
The core of the method is that the solution of the cube happens row to row, first of which is 
the top row, the middle row, and finally the low facing side and the third row. With intensive and 
effective practice, this can result in a solution time lower than a minute. Almost everyone learns this 
method first. It’s important (in case of the solution method) that this has no fix algorithms, which 
means that two different people who both use the layer by layer method can solve the cube using 
completely different methods (Hardwick, 2014)! 
“Corner First” method:
Using another general solution, named corner first method, the speed of solution can be 
decreased well below a minute. Obviously, the speed is dependent on the number of required 
rotations. The corner first method is the basis of one of the fastest, Gilles Roux’s method. The point 
is that as a first step, all corners must be arranged to their position and proper angle. After this, all 
middle rows can be freely moved in a way that the corners remain intact. With this method, we have 
a much wider margin of freedom on the cube, compared to the layer by layer method (Doig, 2000). 
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By rotating the middle cubes, the edges can be arranged in a very short time. It’s especially popular 
on solution competitions, since it usually requires the least amount of rotations. A similarly 
effective method is the “Edges first method.” This is the inverted version of the previous method, 
since we arrange the middle rows first, and then the corners. Almost everyone uses this method for 
“blind,” that is blindfolded, solutions. This method has the advantage that it only requires 
knowledge of a single algorithm, which, if learned completely by the one solving the cube, can help 
him solve it in a matter of minutes (Ortega, 2013). The method isn’t hard, but can’t be used to 
simulate project development, since the solution logic is strictly automatic (Appendix 1).
According to Singmaster and Alexander Frey’s 1982 hypothesis, the cube can be solved 
with 20 rotations using the ideal algorithm, though they couldn’t name the algorithm yet (Joyner, 
2002a). The proof of minimal rotation requirement was first made in 2007, when Daniel Kunkle 
and Gene Cooperman used a supercomputer to prove that the minimum number of rotations is 26 or 
lower. In 2010, Thomas Rocicki and his affiliates proved that “God’s number,” meaning the 
minimum number of rotations is 20. This, however, depends on the optimal state from where the 20 
rotations result in completion. As a general assumption, the n x n x n, n=3 Rubik’s Cube can be 
solved with Θ(n2 / log(n)) rotations (Rokicki et al., 2010).  
  
Fridrich method: 
A very widely known and used method among “cubers” is the Fridrich method. The method 
was developed by Jessica Fridrich and is very similar to the layer by layer method but uses a high 
number of algorithms for the solution. With this method, and lots of practice, the cube can usually 
be solved in 17 seconds, which is why most of the world’s “speedcubers” use this method. The trick 
is to do a simple F2L (first two layers) followed by OLL (orienting the last layer), finishing with a 
PLL (permuting the last layer). The Fridrich method requires the knowledge of 120 algorithms, and 
the solution of the cube can be done with 55 rotations (Joyner, 2002b).  
Cube enthusiasts stress the importance of the notations of the various rotations. These were 
developed by Singmaster for the 3×3×3 cube in the early 80’s; therefore, these are called 
Singmaster notations. The relative nature of the notation system allows us to illustrate the solution 
with disregard to the colors, or fixing the top and bottom sides (Solutions, 2013; Singmaster, 1981): 
- F (Front)  
- B (Back)  
- U (Up)  
- D (Down) 
- L (Left) 
- R (Right) 
- ƒ (Front two layers): middle row of front 
- b (Back two layers): middle row of back 
- u (Up two layers): middle row of top 
- d (Down two layers): middle row of bottom 
- l (Left two layers): middle row of left 
- r (Right two layers): middle row of right 
- x (rotate): rotate whole cube right 
- y (rotate): rotate whole cube up 
- z (rotate): rotate whole cube front 
When the ( ’ ) symbol follows the letters in the description, then we must rotate the front 
side counter-clockwise, if there’s no symbol, we rotate it clockwise. If the letter is followed by 2, 
then 2 rotations are up next, meaning we rotate the layer by 180 degrees. R means rotation 
clockwise to the right, R’ means rotating it back, or rotating it counter-clockwise. The letters x, y, 
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and z are used when the whole cube is rotated around one of the corners. We can do this towards 
the directions R, U and F. When the letters x, y, and z are the base symbols, the cube must be 
rotated to the opposite direction. When they are highlighted in a box, the rotation must be done by 
180 degrees. The most notable difference compared to the Singmaster notation is the official 
standard “w,” meaning ”wide.” E.g.: using Rw means the middle row to the right of the front side 
(Frey, 1982; Rask, 2013).  
In case of the corner first method, we also use the “MES” extension, where the letters M, E, 
and S note the rotation of the middle row (Wiki Rubik Kocka, 2013; Demain et al., 2011): 
 M (Middle): row between L and R, rotation direction L (downward) 
 E (Equator): row between U and D, rotation direction D (rightward) 
 S (Standing): row between F and B, rotation direction F 
Thistlethwaite algorithm
The optimization of the 3×3×3 cube and reaching the minimum amount of rotations began 
with the discovery of group theory using computers, the basis of which was laid down by Morwen 
Thistlethwaite in 1981. The basis of the Thistlethwaite method was to divide the problem into sub-
problems, meaning searching for the solution by dividing the cube into subgroups. He mainly used 
the following categories (Heise, 2002): 
                
                  
                    
                      
       
The above mentioned groups mean a 3D concept, which can be summarized as follows:  
        
He found a rotation sequence for every element and group, which resulted in the following 
groups. Afterwards, he defined the following basic correspondences: 
General cube groups of random cube: 
  
Position of group rotated to proper side: 
      
The following group belongs to the direction of proper solution: 
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He then designated the other groups during the process of solution: 
          
 Though the number of   groups is incredibly high (4,3 x 10
19), the number of groups will 
decrease as we form more and more subgroups. In the beginning, it was assumed that the cube can 
be solved with a maximum of 85 rotations. Then, using the grouping method, the number decreased 
substantially, first to 63, then 52, and finally to 45 (Heise, 2002).
Further developments  
Daniel Kunkle and Gene Cooperman used a supercomputer to determine the number of 
rotations to be 26 in 2007, meaning this is how many steps are required to solve the cube from any 
given position. Thomas Rokicki and his team, as already mentioned above, determined in 2008 that 
there is no need for 26 rotations, as 23 is sufficient. Then with further research they proved that 
“God’s number” can’t be below 20, meaning at least 20 rotations are always necessary to solve the 
3×3×3 cube (Richard, 2008). The scientific world was faced with these criteria by computer 
solution programs as well.  
1.4.3. Simplified mathematic algorithms of the layer by layer method 
We also have to mathematically define the cube solution processes if we want to use the 
Rubik’s Cube-based optimization with a computer application or to let other users acquire it 
through software.  
In order to make the mathematical definition, we have to be familiar with the classic 
naming, which (based on Singmaster) is as follows (Singmaster, 1981): 
 F (Front): side facing the one solving the cube  
 B (Back): side opposite to front  
 U (Up): side above front  
 D (Down): side below front, opposite to up 
 L (Left): side left to front 
 R (Right): side right to front 
The most known method of modeling the process mathematically is when the solution of 
Rubik’s Cube happens through the creation of subgroups. One of the most important goals of using 
a computer program to solve Rubik’s Cube is to create a natural grouping, meaning the formation of 
subgroups (Joyner, 2002a): 
                            
where                is the Rubik’s Cube subgroup, which allows the use of the following 
strategies: 
 let’s mark the given combination of Rubik’s Cube with the element       
 defining all elements of the group        :
              
             where              
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(note:              
 (first step) if                                   
                                                   ,
 (next step) if                                                            
                                                                  
 to summarize, we get                                   
                
We hope that using this, we can define the order of the subgroups in   , preferably via the 
shortest route. We can find the solution steps with a relatively simple cube rotation, which in this 
form isn’t too long:                  
In the case of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, we can calculate the number of possible solutions 
according to the set group                . Based on the number of groups, we get the 
following permutation number: 43252003274489856000  4,3 x 1019.
According to the group theory concept, the strategy of the cube’s solution is as follows. If 
we allow           to mark the correspondence,                  marks the 
communicator for the elements of    group. 
Let   mark the quarter turn clockwise on the side parallel to the middle row. The solution 
of the layer by layer method can be made from 3 basic states, which are the following (based on 
Joyner, 2002b):
1. : Solution of top side and top edges, 
2. : Solution of middle edges (and bottom edges as quickly as possible), 
3. : Solution of bottom corners (and bottom edges, if possible). 
Table 7 contains the algorithms which are summarized by Joyner in the work “Mathematics of the 
Rubik’s Cube” in 1996. The notations of the Table mark the different sides of the cube with 
Singmaster’s codes. The notation   includes the above mentioned rotation in the formula. 
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Table 7: Modified Joyner mathematical algorithms and rotation order for the solution of 
3×3×3 cube  
SERIAL NO. ALGORITHM ROTATION ORDER
1.                           
3 rotations on edges
(UF, UL, UR)
2.                      turning top edges upward UF, UB
3.         permutations (UF, UB) (FR, BR)
4.        turning UB, UL and DF, DB upward
5.                     UFR+, BLD++
6.       permutations(UFR,DFR)(UBR,UBL)
7.                           permutations (UF, UB)(UR,UL)
8.                       permutations(UFL,UBR)(DFR,DBL)
9.                permutations(UFL,UBR)(UFR,UBR)
10.            corners with 3 rotations(BRD, URB, ULB)
Source: self-made, based on Joyner, 2002b 
– 48 –
Csaba Fogarassy
2. CITED SCIENTIFIC SOURCES AND USED METHODS 
2.1. The scientific background and evaluated literature 
Throughout my research, I thoroughly perused, categorized and critically evaluated literature 
sources in both electronic and printed formats, which included domestic and international literature. 
The literary summary was based on the different interpretations of sustainability, the major Game 
Theory solutions used in economic strategy planning, and the Rubik solutions. For the theoretical 
basis of the research, the software analysis of the cube’s inherent attributes was followed by the 
creation of the actual professional database. The primary data used for the SMART (Simple Multi 
Attribute Ranking Technique) 3D analysis was generated through the synthesis of the research 
results of Cleantech Incubation Europe (CIE).   
2.2. The applied methods and their detailed description 
To analyze the software aimed at solving Rubik’s Cube, I used a SWOT analysis during my 
research, and I used theoretic process evaluation to evaluate the processes of the Rubik’s Cube 
solution algorithms. For the sustainability interpretations of low-carbon development processes, I 
used content analysis, for which I employed the aid of the European Union’s Low Carbon 2050 
strategic guide (http://www.roadmap2050.eu/). The main point of the content analysis was to “ask” 
the social product named “A practical guide to a prosperous, low carbon Europe” and other 
professional documents which went through social control during the data collection for the sake of 
obtaining empirical data. During the research on Game Theory algorithms I was searching for, I 
used the process of tolerance, meaning I researched the admissible differences between the 
attributes of the cube, and the parameterization of the Game Theory functions.  
To define the criteria system of the low carbon project development concept, I used the 
Churchman-Ackoff procedure. I examined the estimated usefulness of the factors for the sake of 
optimizing the ones out of all the factor groups which are most important and most useful to the 
project. To determine the relative usefulness of all the factors, I created “usefulness-functions” that 
can properly represent either the equality or the hierarchy of the factor groups. 
2.2.1. SWOT analysis 
DEFINITION OF METHODOLOGY
The SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool which helps evaluate the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities and threats that may come up in case of corporate or personal decisions 
concerning a product, project, or business venture, or any other goal. A SWOT analysis includes the 
measurement of the system, the person, or the inner and outer environment of the business, thereby 
helping the decision maker to concentrate only on the most important topics (Start Up guide, 2012).
 
The answers we seek with the analyses:
Strengths:
 What pros does the analyzed system have in low carbon innovation practice, analysis of 
internal attributes?  
 What does it do better compared to the other system?  
 What is the hearsay about the system, its strengths?  
Weaknesses: 
 What parts could be improved?  
 What should be avoided?  
 What is the hearsay about the system, its weaknesses?  
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Opportunities: 
 What opportunities does it have in the future?  
 What trends and market tendencies are known to it?  
Threats: 
 What problems may surface during its use?  
 What are the competitors doing?  
 Are unfavorable changes visible in the operation environment?  
  The above defined questions are answered in the evaluation table below, by giving short 
answers to them.  
 
  POSITIVE TRAITS NEGATIVE TRAITS
Internal traits Strengths Weaknesses
External traits Opportunities Threats
 
The goal of the SWOT analysis on solution-searching: 
In the case of the examined solution-searching software applications, the goal of the SWOT 
analysis is to determine if the functions of each software are applicable to the input and output 
system attributes of the low carbon project evaluation model and if they satisfy the user 
expectations. According to the data at hand, the object of the analysis should be: how, and how 
much is the low-carbon innovation and incubation system based on the “About low carbon 
economy” (LCE Ltd. 2011), and “Hubconcepts – Global best practice for innovation ecosystems” 
(Launonen, 2011) professional guidelines satisfied by the chosen software.  
Reason for the choice of method:  
The SWOT analysis offers a good opportunity to create an overview comparison, which has 
no exact attributes definable in easily comparable dimensions. In itself, the SWOT analysis has no 
meaning; however, if it’s part of a complex analysis, it can sufficiently facilitate the thought 
process.  
2.2.2. Theoretic process evaluation 
With the solution algorithms of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, the sustainability theories can be 
synchronized and the relations of the cube’s sides define a planning strategy that provides a new 
scientific approach for investment planning. I theoretically evaluated the various solution processes 
and investment planning levels parallel to them by following the solution levels and stages of the 
cube. After these various level-evaluations, I made “low carbon interpretation” summaries. 
The structure of the process evaluation is as follows: 
 defining sector or level, 
 theoretic evaluation, 
 evaluation of process and results (interpretations), 
 summarizing the evaluation of process and results. 
To show the various states of the cube and to attach an explanation to the low carbon 
interpretations, I used the Online Ruwix Cube Solver program. 
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Reason for the choice of method:
The process of the cube’s solution can be defined with various algorithms, although these 
only define the technical process of the solution. Since my goal during the analyses I performed was 
to compare one of the most logical solution methods with the planning process of sustainability 
instead of merely analyzing the fastest rotation algorithm, I couldn’t choose a method more suitable 
and effective than the theoretic content analysis.  
2.2.3. Data collection for multi-dimension "low carbon” development processes with content 
analysis  
Among the various research methods, content analysis can be categorized as a so-called “no 
intervention” type. The biggest benefit of using this type of examination is that people doing the 
research are a proper distance away from the actualization of the problem; therefore, they can 
perform the data collection without any chance of intervention in the process. In this case, there’s 
no problem with our data collection process affecting the respondent. Content analysis is a kind of 
data collection where we conduct the gathering of information and analysis using the designated 
document. It is also a kind of social analysis method used for the examination of human messaging 
(Kérdő, 2008). I analyzed the program documentations through the EU’s social inspection 
mechanism and debates relevant to both the low carbon development concepts and the topic of 
sustainability. The point of the content analysis was to “ask” the social products named the “A
practical guide to a prosperous, low-carbon Europe” and the “National Energy Strategy 2030” as 
well as the professional document “Hungary’s renewable energy plan 2010-2020” (NCST 2010-
2020 for short), which went through social control, for the sake of obtaining empirical data. 
During the completion of the content analysis, I found it important to “ask” these social 
products which are mostly goal orientations and documents – as the source of my empirical data –
in a way that avoids contradictions and to highlight the preference indicators of green energy or 
climate-friendly investments as common decision factors.  
Reason for the choice of method:  
A primary form of data collection in which we try to find an answer with the dissolution of 
contradictions in the professional documentation or continue the examination by re-defining the 
contradictions. 
2.2.4. Evaluation of Game Theory algorithms by process of tolerance and applicability 
The evaluation of the process of tolerance in the sense of engineering means the allowed 
maximum differentiation from the determined sizes, quantities or qualities. In the case of the Game 
Theory algorithms, I researched the following: which method is the same as the solution process 
model of the Rubik’s Cube in terms of its attributes and in what scale does it differ from it while 
staying representative. For the Game Theory algorithms I was searching for, I used the process of 
tolerance, meaning I was researching the admissible differences between the attributes of the cube 
and the parameterization of the Game Theory functions (Ligeti, 2006).  
I took the Game Theory algorithms one by one and chose the ones linkable to the various 
rotation algorithms (interpretations) of the modeling process. For the multi-purpose optimization 
tasks, the process of modeling is as follows (Forgó et al., 2005):
1. Designation of criteria system (and also, major attribute sets) 
2. Independence analysis of attribute sets (avoiding overlaps between attributes) 
3. Designation of choice variables and parameters in attribute sets (deterministic, or 
stochastic (in other words, realized with some level of probability) marking) 
4. Designation of binding criteria related to a set (creation of sets) 
5. Designation of possible criteria of the criteria system and the number of objective 
functions in a set (the number of objective functions is finite) 
The Interpretation of Sustainability Criteria using Game Theory Models
– 51 –
6. Search of the optimum for objective functions 
Reason for the choice of method:  
The modeling process used during linear programming offers a clear view on the criteria 
system of multi-purpose optimization tasks, which is why I chose this method to realize the three-
level strategic objective system planning.  
2.2.5. Determining the criteria and cube attributes with the Churchman - Ackoff method 
It is important to weight the attributes which have an impact on the development processes 
and to choose the groups that give the defining conditions of the development of the project and the 
actualization of the investments. In the method presented by Churchman and Ackoff, there are two 
almost indistinct processes if we go by the number of attributes. The first one was made for one to 
seven attributes, while the second one for more than seven attributes. 
The method is based on consecutive comparisons and is also usable to select a lower number 
of attributes, which in our case is four. (The widely known Guilford-method is only preferred for 
attributes above five.) As a first step, the attributes must be organized based on their supposed 
importance by “feeling,” in other words, a professional estimation. To begin, the most important 
attribute should be given the number one, and weighting the other attributes should be related to this 
one. For specification reasons, the most important attribute and its weight have to be benchmarked 
against the groups made from the other attributes (and the sum of their respective weights). If the 
highlighted attribute is more important but the relation defined based on the weights doesn’t have 
the same conclusion, the weights must be corrected appropriately. After the correction, the 
highlighted attribute must be benchmarked against a group with one less element (Simongáti, 
2009a, Russell, 2003). We should proceed with this process as long as the highlighted attribute and 
the group (which is shrinking) made of the other attributes have the same importance. After 
applying this to the weights as well, we may move on to the second most important attribute, where 
we have to go through the same process. If we have the respective weights of every attribute, we 
have to normalize the dominance definition in a way that the sum of the final weight values is one 
(Churchman - Ackoff, 1957).  
The method made for tasks evaluating larger and more numerous attributes differs from the 
above that in this case, we have to benchmark a randomly chosen attribute against groups consisting 
of less than 5 attributes. One of the pros of the Churchman - Ackoff methods is that we can get a 
precise result, albeit with a high time consumption (Simongáti, 2009b).
To define the main agents (using the fundamentals of the Churchman-Ackoff method as a 
basis), I made the following methodology:  
 Step 0: Creating a preference order estimated in advance (F1, F2…Fn) 
 Step 1: Assigning usefulness values by importance  
 By designating the weight of (F1) as 1, we have to assign the other attributes’ 
weights respectively, relative to that of the first. 
 E.g. Is F1 more important, as important, or less important than the others 
altogether? 
 Formula: W1>(=,<) w2+w3+…+wn? 
 Benchmarking and correction of importance:  
 If F1 is more important but the inequality defined with weights doesn’t reflect 
this, then w1 must be corrected in a way that the inequality reflects the relation 
Step 2. 
– 52 –
Csaba Fogarassy
 If F1 isn’t that important, then w1 will be lowered as such.
 benchmarking F1 against {F2, F3, …Fn-1} group, and continue until we 
conclude at group {F2, F3}.
 Step 2: benchmarking F2 against {F3, F4…Fn} groups as shown in Step 1. 
 Step 3: continuing the sequence, until reaching benchmark of Fn-2 against {Fn-1, Fn}. 
 Step 4: standardization: dividing all weights by Σwi
Pros of standardization: more reliable result compared to immediate estimation. 
Cons of standardization: useless for problems with more than 7 attributes. 
During value estimation processes and choosing dominance sequences, applying the 
Churchman-Ackoff method is popular, therefore, it’s also well-known as a software application 
(Ose L. S., 2008). The shortened software application was not used for the analyses.
Reason for the choice of method: 
There are multiple options which are currently preferred (e.g. the Guilford method, or the 
immediate estimation) for the selection of weighting processes, but since I’d like to introduce the 
best available mathematical tools in terms of precision, I chose the Churchman-Ackoff method.  
2.2.6. Applicability analysis of “usefulness-functions” in multi-dimension evaluation (SMART)  
In order to optimize the most important and most useful attributes of the criteria systems 
(attribute groups) that have an impact on Rubik’s Cube low carbon development, we have to 
evaluate the estimated usefulness of the attributes. To determine the relative usefulness of all the 
factors, I created “usefulness functions” that can properly represent either the equality or the 
hierarchy of the attribute groups. These “usefulness functions” designate a single number to all the 
stages to show the preferability of each stage. By combining the consequences of the actions with 
its probability, we get the estimated usefulness for each action (Russel - Norvin, 2003). 
For the usefulness of state S defined by those attributes that have an impact on the decision, 
we can use U(S). We interpret the various states as the snapshots of the circumstances, which means 
that a non-deterministic A action has Result1(A) states as possible consequences, where the 
index i follows the different consequences. According to Russel and Norvin, before executing A, the 
agent assigns a P(Result1(A)|Test(A), E) probability to each and every consequence, where E stands 
for the world’s conclusive facts reachable by the agent, and Test(A) is a statement that action A will 
be executed in the current state. In this case, we can calculate action EU(A|E)’s anticipatory 
usefulness for given facts with the following formula: 
          
 
                                    
The principle of maximum anticipatory usefulness (MVH) states that a rational agent must 
choose an action that maximizes the anticipatory usefulness of said agent. If we want to determine 
the best sequence of actions using this equation, we’d have to take each action sequence into 
consideration and select the best ones (David, 2002; Russel - Norvin, 2003).  
The usefulness analyses made during the research program and the evaluation functions 
were put into the SMART software application. SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking 
Technique) can also visualize the results of the usefulness analyses and the connections between the 
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various attributes even in 3D; I therefore used primer data from the CIE research program’s 
database.  
SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) is an evaluation technique which can 
organize attributes which may be dominant for the decision into a sequence. Harvard University, 
MIT and the University of Southern California cooperated in its development in the last few years. 
The application can transform the various alternatives’ base values into usefulness values with the 
use of usefulness functions. The most valuable asset of the software is the option of following the 
correspondence systems in both 2D and 3D (Huhn, 2013). The transformation to usefulness values 
using usefulness functions happens according to the steps defined by Simongáti (2009b).
Reason for the choice of method:  
The SMART program can illustrate the data of the usefulness functions and the evaluation 
system in 3D extension.  
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3. SUSTAINABLE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT WITH RUBIK’S CUBE SOLUTION
3.1. Benchmarking of Rubik’s Cube solution programs, and their base correspondences using 
SWOT analyses  
The tools of group theory can simplify the calculations of the process of software 
development by defining subgroups of the hundreds or even millions of layouts that have shared 
mathematical characteristics. The German mathematician Herbert Kociemba used a cunning 
method to decrease the 43 quintillion possible rotations of the cube in 1992 (Ajay, 2011). The 
mathematical basis of the calculation (according to group theory) was how we calculate the 
variation possibilities, in other words, how many different samples we can observe on the cube: 
 8 corners = 8! positions / each have 3 possible orientations = 38  
 12 edges = 12! positions / each have 2 possible orientations = 212  
 Impossibilities:  
- no element substitution (2),  
- no edge orientation (2),  
- no corner orientation (3).  
 Meaning 2x2x3 = divided by 12, which totals for = ( 8! x 38 x 12! x 212 ) / 12 ~= 4.3 x 1019
Kociemba had a different approach to the mathematical relations of the cube compared to 
the usual method of basing it on fix combinations – he made a subgroup that was based on 10 out of 
the 18 possible rotations of the cube. With the combination of these 10 rotations, he found out that 
he can reach 20 billion different configurations from a solved cube. This is an important step 
because this subgroup is small enough to fit an ordinary PC-s memory. Kociemba also developed a 
program for this, named Cube Explorer, which was further developed by the American 
mathematician Michael Reid in 1995, who used it to estimate the minimum required rotations to 
solve the cube, which he defined at 30. Theoretical scientists already considered 20 to be “God’s 
number” (the minimum required rotations), but the proof would have required a supercomputer. 
Finally, the proof of “God’s number” being 20 only happened in July 2010, when Thomas Rokicki, 
Herbert Kociemba, Morley Davidson and John Dethridge (Rokicki et al., 2010) proudly declared to 
the world that it’s proven – “God's Number for the Cube is exactly 20.”
Therefore, Kociemba’s Cube Explorer was the first Rubik’s Cube solution program which 
was able to solve a cube from any starting position using around 30 rotations. Thus, after this first 
software, and also using it as a basis, began the different personal developments for different 
solution programs all around the world. In order to view the connection network of Rubik’s Cube 
software development, as well as the low-carbon project development methodology based on 
Rubik’s Cube’s solution algorithms, I will conduct the SWOT analysis for three different 
development routes. During low carbon project development, the goal is to make the analyzed
development or investment process faster and simpler, even with the use of software. The role of 
the software can be important if, after assigning the attributes to the cube’s respective sides, we can 
define the starting state of the project even with the disordered state of Rubik’s Cube. If we define 
the degree of disorder with the cube’s state, the solution program can easily inform the user how he 
can reach various levels of order. The solution search using software raises one simple question: is 
the route appropriate, and can the process of solution search abide by the various professional 
requirements (global best practice for innovation ecosystems) that lead to the basis of successful 
project development?  
The goal of the detailed introduction of the SWOT analysis in the methodology section was 
to make it clear to me whether the functions of the software are applicable to project the evaluation 
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model’s input and output requirements. The analysis was done by classic SWOT rules, the details of 
which won’t be shown, only the results. For the sake of understanding them, I’ll give short 
descriptions on the various software applications. 
Software evaluated using SWOT analyses: 
 RUWIX PROGRAM (KOCIEMBA CUBE EXPLORER DEVELOPMENT) 
 SOLUTION SEARCHING LBL SOFTWARE (GÁBOR NAGY)
 RUBIKSOLVE PROGRAM (ERIC DIEC) 
3.1.1. SWOT analysis of the Ruwix program (Kociemba Cube Explorer development)  
The complex solution and demonstration program was developed by the Hungarian Ferenc 
Dénes, using Kociemba’s 2005 solver program as a basis. The software chooses the shortest 
possible solution from any given starting combination. The average number of rotations is 50-60, 
which does not prefer layer by layer algorithms. In this case, the developers uploaded a lot more 
algorithms into the optimal solution search program, which finds more right solutions during 
optimization. The online solution software shares all important information with the user and is
great to look at (Figure 3.).  
 Ruwix is an online Java-based web application that doesn’t use any support platforms. The 
developer endowed it with the necessary functions in order to help users learn Rubik’s Cube and the 
various solution methods for it. It is suitable e.g. to animate the process of solution step by step and 
display it to the user. The solution search engine can animate the solution and rotation moves from 
any given combination, which is preferred by users training for Rubik’s Cube solving competitions. 
Using the Ruwix program, users can play with different Rubik products online (2×2×2 cube, 3×3×3 
cube, 4×4×4 cube, 5×5×5 cube, etc.), which offer a pleasant game experience in 3D.  
 
Figure 3: Visual style and shortest solution formula of Ruwix program 
Source: Dénes, T. (2005) Ruwix.com
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The SWOT evaluation of Ruwix (Table 8), in accordance with the low-carbon project 
evaluation model’s input and output requirements: 
Table 8: Ruwix program SWOT Table 
  POSITIVE TRAITS NEGATIVE TRAITS
INTERNAL TRAITS
STRENGTHS
Exceptional graphics and visual 
details, some mention it as the world’s 
most advanced solution software. 
Offers solutions not only to Rubik’s 
Cube, but many other logical games.
WEAKNESSES
Presently not compatible, since it uses 
different, faster algorithms than the layer 
by layer solution, which aren’t the best for 
low-carbon solutions. 
EXTERNAL TRAITS
OPPORTUNITIES
Because of its strengths and the 
applicability, it would be beneficial to 
develop low-carbon specifications as 
well. 
THREATS
Since the program runs in an online 
format, it isn’t possible to add special data 
to it. 
Even in case of a low-carbon 
specification, syncing the free software 
with the pay-to-use SMART add-on 
makes it difficult to use.
Source: self-made 
3.1.2. SWOT analysis of Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s Cube
To introduce the Rubik’s Cube solution software, I will mostly use a domestic development 
made by IT technician and engineer Gábor Nagy (University of Debrecen): “Solution searching 
methods.” This description and methodology guide is unique because of its status space 
representation, which was used to work out the problem of multi-level solution search. The other 
important thing to note about the choice of software was that it prefers the layer by layer solution, 
and as far as I know, this is the only application which uses only this method, because it is
considered “too slow.” (On another note, any solution search could implement the layer by layer 
method, were it coded with it in the first place.)  
The program was developed in 2008 using the Java language and the NetBeans IDE 6.1 
development platform. To make the structure of the program clear, we have to understand the 
respective structures of two packs – the status space and cube packs.  
The pack named Status Space (“Allapotter”) contains two abstract classes and an interface 
which save the exact various elements and attributes of the status spaces. During the main 
problem’s implementation, these elements are specified by the program to fit the representation of 
the status space. The program checks (for each different status) if a given status is the goal or not. 
According to the developer’s manual, the heuristic result is ensured by the interface named 
Heuristic Status (“HeurisztikusAllapot”), which needs to be implemented in the program from the 
get-go. In the case of the solution search program, we define the Cube Status (“KockaAllapot”) 
class, or the cube pack, as the start, the elements of which describe a given element of the status 
space. This class contains the constructors not included in the 54-element byte packets, which 
record the various states of Rubik’s Cube and all the methods applicable for the different statuses. 
The objective status checking function checks the 3D parts of the cube and, if it finds a color out of 
place, returns a “false” message, while if it doesn’t, the cube is solved and every color is in its place 
(Nagy, 2008a). 
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In the program’s description, there is also mention that the status of the cube is defined by 
54 numbers, which are selected from the 0,5 interval, and the numbers symbolize the various 
colors (based on Nagy, 2008):  
                                          
A ≠ H, since not all elements of H can be real statuses. 
               
Description of Cube Pack
Using the classes and interface of the “Status Space Pack,” the created classes are categorized
into the “Cube Pack,” which is closely related to Rubik’s Cube and its structure. The examples of 
the “Cube Status” class define the various statuses of the status space, but the class also contains the 
constructors not included in the 54-element byte packets, which record the various states of Rubik’s 
Cube and all the methods applicable for the different statuses, which are as follows (Nagy, 2008b):
 “Objective status checking function,” which has a return value of either true or false. Using 
three for loops integrated into each other, it analyzes the 3D block that defines the status of 
the cube and, if it finds a color out of place, returns a “false” message, while if it doesn’t, 
the cube is solved, and every color is in its place.
 “Operator” – a function that checks the application master and analyzes if the operator 
condition is applicable to the given status. This also has a logical return value, which is –
for Rubik’s Cube – always true.
 “Apply function,” which contains the operator for the given status as a parameter, and its
return value is the function of the resulting status. It creates a copy of the cube’s status, 
executes the value copying abiding by the operators, and returns with the copy.
 The function that benchmarks the given status against a different status, which is the result 
of a parameter. Has a logical return value, which is true if all elements of the statuses of 
benchmarked cubes are identical. Otherwise, its value is false.
 An evaluation function which is exceptionally important for our research.
 Method to access the “data tags” which register the various states of the cube.
 Methods related to imaging and burning. 
Layer by layer method, and the evaluation function
Due to a choice made by the developer, the program uses a MOHÓ search engine (greedy 
search) to solve the cube; therefore, the evaluation function consists only of the heuristic function, 
which is implemented by the “Heuristic Method” of the “Cube Status” class, as mentioned above. 
The method evaluates and scores the various statuses by the sequential row by row, in other words, 
the layer by layer method. Therefore, due to the impact of the heuristic pack, the program uses the 
layer by layer method to find the solution, meaning row by row, though it is a known fact that this 
isn’t the fastest and most effective way to produce the result in solution search. The program 
doesn’t analyze the starting state, since the optimization of the starting side would require a 
complex evaluation function’s implementation, which was deemed unnecessary for this program by 
the developer, so the program always starts with the yellow side. In terms of the method, this means 
these are easily checkable layers, or in other words, levels, meaning the heuristic function also 
begins by checking this so-called level to avoid checks which are not important on the actual level 
but may be so on lower levels (based on Nagy, 2008c). 
These levels are as follows (Figure 4): 
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Level 0:  Cube doesn’t abide by level 1’s requirements.
Level 1: Edges which also have yellow are in position, with proper orientation, 
meaning “yellow cross” is complete.
Level 2:  Corners which also have yellow are in position, with proper orientation, 
 meaning “upper row” is complete.
Level 3:  Middle row is complete.
Level 4: Edges which also have yellow are in position, with proper orientation, 
meaning “white cross” is complete.
Level 5:  Corners which also have yellow are in position, with proper orientation, 
 meaning the cube is in its finished state.
 
Figure 4: Levels (“szint”) of Layer by layer method in the program
Source: self-made (based on Nagy, 2008) 
According to the developer’s description, we may not be able to continue without heuristics
or breaking the level. In this case, the so-called solution algorithms may help when used for the 
correct statuses, which are series of steps that, though they degrade the heuristics at first, get closer 
to the goal in the end compared to where we were before applying them. The first level (solution of 
first row) may be reached even without algorithms, but this is the part of the heuristic function 
which is implemented with the greatest hardship. According to Nagy, the reason for this is that 
unlike on higher levels, where we primarily use algorithms apart from 1-2 rotations, at first we use 
steps which are simple but numerous and give a high number of various alternatives, so translating 
human knowledge for the program becomes difficult. On higher levels, the use of the heuristic 
algorithm becomes much less of a problem, as we can assign a few fixed algorithms for virtually 
any status: we only have to decide which to implement first. 
With the heuristics of a status, the programmer defines the return value of the heuristic 
function, in other words, the “correctness” of the status. His idea was that while we’re on lower 
levels, the heuristics of the status starts from a higher value, while the farther the next level seems 
during the appropriate checks for each level, the more its value increases. Therefore, the rate of 
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increase is dependent on the positions and/or orientations of the edges and corners required to 
complete the level. Each of these edges or corners raises the value of the heuristics more or less. 
The scale therefore depends on how far it is from its proper position, or a position from which it 
can be moved to its proper position using an algorithm. According to the developer, the value of 
heuristics will never raise so much within a single level that a lower level’s heuristics becomes
lower as well. This condition is necessary for the search engine to find the shortest route to the 
solution, based on the method. One of the consequences for this is that if we reach a certain level 
with the program, it is sufficient to do the checks only for that given level, since all the others either 
already stand true, or aren’t needed yet. According to this, the scoring in the program is as follows 
(based on Nagy, 2008): 
• Determining the level is the first step of evaluation/scoring. The higher the level we’re on, 
the lower the number will be. The starting value of heuristics on level 5’s evaluation function 
is “0.”
• On level 0: An edge in its place with proper orientation barely raises heuristics, while the 
ones far from their position raise it according to their exact “misplacedness.” If we have at 
least two edges in the right position and with proper orientation, we can allow the use of 
algorithms, but this causes the edges to raise heuristics less, if they’re close to being put in 
their proper position using an algorithm. These algorithms consist of only 3-5 steps, but have 
other extra effects. For each side, we have to check using three of these algorithms. The 
reason for this is that the software interprets operators from a fixed point of view, with the 
yellow side always being on top and the blue side in the front. Because of this, the same 
sequence of rotations may be built with different operators for the various sides, but we have 
to be able to choose the correct one. A good example for this would be for us to check three 
different positions for the yellow-blue edge, from where only an algorithm can put it in its 
proper position (Figure 5.). 
 
Figure 5: Edges only solvable through algorithms 
(“eset” stands for case)
Source: self-made (based on Nagy, 2008) 
Algorithm 1: UR, LB, UL.   
Algorithm 2: UR, LF, UL. Algorithm 3: UR, UR, RR, UL, UL.
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Abbreviations are from initials: 
F (Front)  
B (Back)  
U (Up)  
D (Down) 
L (Left) 
R (Right) 
• On level 1: On this level, we can use almost only algorithms to solve a corner. Heuristics 
may further increase due to the corners’ distance of their “algorithm possibilities,” apart 
from the basic increase of the level. On this level, we have to watch 5 different algorithms. 
Let’s go through the blue-yellow-orange corner’s five different algorithms via the 
examples on Figure 6 below:
 
Figure 6: Positions of corners definable via algorithm 
(“eset” stands for case) 
Source: self-made (based on Nagy, 2008) 
Algorithm 1: LF, LL, LB.          Algorithm 2: FL, LR, FR.       Algorithm 3: LF, LR, LB.
Algorithm 4: FL, LL, FR.              Algorithm 5: LF, LL, LB. 
The solution search program therefore uses the above mentioned seven levels’ MOHÓ
search to solve the cube (Table 9). During the evaluation of the above defined methodology guide, 
it’s obvious that the program is able to solve Rubik’s Cube from virtually any starting combination 
using the Layer by layer method. The number of required rotations is dependent on the base
combination, but usually needs more than 70 rotations. However, in case of a simpler starting 
combination, this can decrease to 40-45 rotations (Figure 7).
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Table 9: Layer by layer solution algorithms for 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube using software and the
MOHÓ search engine (on levels 2., 3., 4., 5.)
Level Phase Algorithms
2. Positions definable withalgorithms for second row edges
Algorithm 1: FL, LL, FR, LB, FR, LF, FL.
Algorithm 2: LF, LR, LB, FR. LB. FL LF.
Algorithm 3: LF, LL, LB, LR.
3.
State fit for edge switch, edge 
switch on sealing side 
Algorithm 1: LF, LL, LL, LB, LR, LF, LR, LB, 
LR.
Edge rotation, rotating sealing 
side to match colors
Algorithm 1: LB, RB, FL, LF, RF, LR, LB, RB,
FL, LF, RF, LR, LB, RB, FL, LF, RF, LR
4. Corner switch Algorithm 1: LB, LL, RB, LR, LF, LL. RF, LR.Algorithm 2: FR, LR, RR LL, FL, LR EL, LL
5. Rotating corners to match colors,correction of misplaced corners
Algorithm 1: RB, LL, RF, LL, RB, LR, LR, RF, 
LB, LR, LF, LR, LB, LR, LR, LF.
Algorithm 2: LB, LL, LL, LF, LL, LB, LL, LF, 
RB, LL, LL, RF, LR, RB, LR, RF.
Source: self-made (based on Nagy, 2008) 
 
Figure 7: Evaluation screen of Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s Cube
Source: Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s Cube
The reason I feel it is necessary to present the Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s 
Cube in this much detail is that during the process of solution, it follows rotations by hand almost 
completely and uses each algorithm of the layer by layer method, but doesn’t implement any other 
methods.
The SWOT evaluation of Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s Cube (Table 10), in 
accordance to the low-carbon project evaluation model’s input and output requirements:  
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Table 10: Rubik’s Cube Solution Search program SWOT Table 
  POSITIVE TRAITS NEGATIVE TRAITS
INTERNAL TRAITS
STRENGTHS
The steps of conceptual and practical 
solutions are the same
The layer by layer solution is followed 
through in the program
Uses obvious advancement and 
correction steps
Because of the easy programming, it’s 
also easy to develop
Every algorithm is also definable in 
the steps of the low-carbon project 
evaluation model as well
 
WEAKNESSES
The visual interface is not up-to-date
Slightly slow processing
Not available in online format
As of now, it can only solve the 3×3×3 
Rubik’s Cube
EXTERNAL TRAITS
OPPORTUNITIES
Visual interface
Easy to sync with the SMART 
evaluation software plug-in
The definition of the low carbon 
domain requires no additional software
development 
Because of the easy programming, it 
may prove to be a cheap newcomer on 
the market
THREATS
Quite an old development
The program may seem slow because it 
can’t be accelerated properly because of a 
set of certain configurations
“Easy to copy”
Source: self-made 
3.1.3. SWOT analysis of Rubiksolve program 
This is one of the most well-known solution programs on the web. The developer, Eric 
Dietz, has been interested in the mathematics and programming opportunities of Rubik’s Cube since 
his childhood. His first program that solves Rubik’s Cube was published and shared with the 
members of the Rubik “fun” community in 2002. In 2005, he used Kociemba’s 3×3×3 method to 
popularize his own online program. In 2007, he developed a solver program which he further 
developed by lowering the amount of required rotations with the use of newer algorithms. The one 
that’s currently running, which uses Kociemba’s algorithm, was finalized in 2010, meaning it needs 
less than 25 rotations to finish the cube from any given starting combination. Eric Dietz always 
used Kociemba’s algorithms for the solution, two of which can be seen on Figures 8 and 9, or by 
clicking the link below (Dietz, 2010).  
The program only handles 2×2×2, 3×3×3 and 4×4×4 cubes’ solution algorithms; its portfolio 
has no other Rubik games. It illustrates every detail in 2D, and offers no special visual enjoyment 
either. The illustrations that explain rotations can be interpreted easily, therefore, in the last few 
decades, tens of thousands of players learned to solve Rubik’s Cube with this program’s guides. 
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Figure 8: Notations of sides on the program’s solution interface (flip state)
Source: based on Dietz, 2010 
 
Because of the reduced number of algorithms, we won’t find the same levels as for the 
previously introduced Solution Searching LBL software. The program doesn’t implement the layer 
by layer method as a solution process, but some algorithms of the various methods are the same, 
meaning the same algorithms are sometimes used in different solution searching programs.  
The program works quite fast and only needs a few seconds to display the solution formula 
for the combinations put in. As a comparison, Ruwix and Solution Search need several tens of 
seconds, or even minutes to display the solution formula (Figure 8.).   
 
 
 
Level 1 
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Level 2 
Level 3 
 
Figure 9: Rubiksolve’s solution formula in 20 steps
Source: http://mk2.rubiksolve.com/ 
The SWOT evaluation of Rubiksolve (Table 11.), in accordance with the low-carbon project 
evaluation model’s input and output requirements:
Table 11: Rubiksolve program SWOT Table 
  POSITIVE TRAITS NEGATIVE TRAITS
INTERNAL TRAITS
STRENGTHS
Fast, constantly developed, can use 
layer by layer method
WEAKNESSES
2D, can’t interpret layer by layer logic at 
the input, other user functions are missing
EXTERNAL TRAITS
OPPORTUNITIES
Easy plug-in options offer good 
compatibility with low-carbon usage
THREATS
Since it focuses on fast solutions, not all 
details can be understood by the users
Source: self-made 
The introduced Ruwix Solver and Rubiksolve applications are both the further developed 
versions of Kociemba’s Cube Explorer, which was the basis of most Rubik’s Cube fans’ software 
development work and ideas since 2005. After reviewing the different solution programs, we can 
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say that there is an option to bring in technically any new algorithm, but of course, the goal of all 
the developers was to give the competitors a program that offers the solutions with the highest 
possible procession speed and the lowest number of combinations necessary. In the case of the 
Rubiksolve program, this is below 25 steps. 
The Rubik’s Cube Solution Search program completes the cube with the seven solution 
levels defined by MOHÓ’s search engine. During the evaluation of the methodology manual, we 
made it clear that this one is able to get to the completed stage, meaning the one side – one color 
state from any starting stage with the layer by layer method. Also, the process may be stopped at 
any given stage. The number of rotations varies by the starting stage, but usually it takes more than 
70 rotations to complete the cube. However, from an easier starting point, thus can be reduced to a 
mere 40-45 rotations. 
Also, by analyzing the SWOT evaluations, it can be said that the swift 
strengths/weaknesses/opportunities/threats Table prefers the Hungarian-developed Rubik’s Cube 
Solution Search program, which was optimized for the layer by layer algorithms. This Java-based 
application proved to be best in its functionality for the low carbon project evaluation model’s input 
and output expectations, also noted by the structural trait that the software’s “State Area” pack 
designates almost the same solution levels that the hand-solved algorithms do. (The other evaluated 
software types designate almost completely different levels.)   
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3.2. The principles and sustainability relations of the layer by layer solution method 
 
The various sustainability logics can be synchronized with the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube’s 
solution algorithms and the relations of the cube’s sides define a planning strategy that provides a 
new scientific approach for investment planning. I theoretically evaluated the various solution 
processes and parallel investment planning levels following the solution levels and stages of the 
cube. After these various level-evaluations, I made “low-carbon interpretation” summaries. To 
show the various states of the cube, and to attach an explanation to the low-carbon interpretations, I 
used the Online Ruwix Cube Solver program. 
Cube soul 
In 1980, Ernő Rubik wrote that the cube seems to be alive, as it comes into life while you 
rotate it in your hands. Rubik’s Cube has three rows and three columns, and this can also have a 
symbolic, or even mystical, meaning. If we look at the attributes of the various blocks, the 3×3×3 
cube’s sides, it is almost immediately obvious that in the case of each side, we have system 
elements, or specific small cubes (middle cubes, edge cubes, and corner cubes), which hide a 
specific meaning and keep this meaning in them, regardless of where we rotate them in the system. 
According to Ernő Rubik, the number “three,” through its special meaning, is even able to model 
life itself. It is able to show the relationship of man and nature, the process of creation, care and 
destruction, and the relations of cooperation between our resource systems (Rubik, 1981). We may 
think that the solution to the “mystical cube game” problem may properly portray the biggest 
question of one of today’s hardest problems – the proper and effective use of energy. Nowadays, the 
entire energy consumption system seems like a huge puzzle in which we don’t seem to be able to 
find the correct pieces. However, we suggest that the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube’s solution method may 
help us find the relations between the various pieces and the relevant inclusion of system attributes 
in both a 2D and 3D interpretable manner; therefore, it may give correct pointers on interpreting the 
supply and demand sides of energy consumption (Fogarassy, 2013).  
One of the most widely known and most used methods of solving Rubik’s Cube is the “layer 
by layer” method, but we must also note that it’s the basis for the more advanced methods like 
Fridrich, Corner first, etc. The gist of the method is to complete the cube during the solution process 
row by row. That means that at first, we form a color cross on the first row, then insert the correct 
corners, then comes the middle row, and finally, the lower middle cube goes into its position, 
followed by the lower corner cubes (Fogarassy et al., 2012). 
Most amateurs use the layer by layer method, since this is the easiest to learn, and this is one 
of the few methods that has both a professionally based algorithm and introduction guides. All other 
advanced solution methods began from this one. I introduced the process of solution according to 
the outline provided by the www.rubikkocka.hu official website. However, in the current document, 
I also included UNFCCC’s basic development theories, namely “Low-Emission and low-carbon 
Development Strategies” (LEDS) – which has close ties to basic sustainability criteria – for the 
official solution method cited in this document. We made the assumption that since the Rubik’s 
Cube’s number “three” offers indirect answers to many of our world’s currently unsolved questions 
through its mystical logic, it is correct to also assume that those who can complete the cube can 
think “Rubically” in general, or more specifically, about the questions of strategic planning and 
economic equilibrium search. In the next part of this document, I present the methodical steps on 
solving the cube that can be taken as a compilation theory during strategic development following 
the solution of the cube, usable for e.g. the advancement from fossilized to renewable energy 
support systems. 
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3.2.1. Process evaluation of layer by layer solution method for 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube
The layer by layer method is fundamentally a structured arrangement system which defines 
cornerstones and stages for the process of completion (white cross, second row, yellow cross, etc.). 
Even though these stages can be achieved by different routes, or one might say that everyone does it 
at their own personal leisure, it is technically impossible to advance to the next stage without going 
through the various stages and phases. In the case of sustainability principles and low-carbon 
development concepts, abiding by the steps of development phases is important because, even 
though the circumstances and the makings may define different routes in the search for equilibrium,
the arrangement logic must be the same whenever we search for the equilibrium points – be it 
Hungary, or China, etc. I relied on the methodical guideline of the www.rubikkocka.hu official 
website and the solution designs of Singmaster (1980) during the defining of the row by row 
solution phases. However, because of the low-carbon methodology correspondences, the process 
which is demonstrated and interpreted in this document differs greatly from these guides. To 
illustrate the various stages and different solution levels of the cube, I used the Online Ruwix Cube 
Solver program.   
3.2.1.1. White cross, multi-level syncing of starting criteria 
The special characteristic of the layer by layer method is that it always considers the white 
side as the starting side and the white middle cube (the cube which only ever has one color) as the 
starting point. Naturally, any color can be the starting point of the solution process, meaning the 
same rotation logic can be used starting from any level without any changes. Therefore, after we
have our white middle cube, as a first step, we find all the four edge cubes (edge cubes are the ones 
with two colors) which have white as one of their colors. We rotate these one by one next to the 
white middle cube. The other cubes may be rotated anywhere for now, let’s consider them grey! If 
all white cubes are in place, let’s position them by rotating the white side to match at least two 
above the same color middle cube! Therefore, it is a general demand for at least two (or optimally 
all four) elements to be positioned correctly on the bottom side as well, as seen on Figure 10. This is 
the first step in the process of the cube’s solution, also known as “White Cross.”
 
Figure 10: White cross with matching edge cubes on the side 
Source: self-made 
 It is extremely important for the White Cross to be oriented on the starting side, while the 
middle cubes match on all sides transversely. If the white edge cubes don’t take this position, we 
can’t proceed with the solution according to the method. Bringing the white edge cubes up to the 
starting point can be done in various ways from various positions, but all follow the same logical
sequence. Usually, we have to bring up the bottom row’s edge cubes to the starting side. The 
process of rotating from bottom to top can be seen on Figure 11. The two different cases show two
different cube states. On the upper part of Figure 11 (1), we do a 180º rotation on the top row to 
bring the cube to its place from the bottom. On the lower part (2), we do a 90º rotation upward, 
followed by another 90º rotation of the right column upwards. This is how the white-green edge 
cube goes to its place.   
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Figure 11: Rotating edge cube to its position from bottom row in two ways 
Source: self-made. 
  If the white cube is lodged between two completed edges, we use the rotation seen in Figure 
12. At first sight, this brings the edge cube to the incorrect position, but from here, we can easily 
relocate it to its proper position.  
 
Figure 12: Rotating edge cube to its position from middle row  
Source: self-made. 
 
If only two cubes match the middle cube by the time we make the cross, we can exchange 
the other two sides by finding the pieces we want to switch and rotate that side two times, thereby 
positioning the white on the bottom. After this, we rotate the cube to its own color and then rotate 
this side two times. Now, we have the cubes which were in the wrong position on the bottom. 
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Afterwards, we arrange this cube to its own color, and rotate this side two times, meaning 180º 
(Figure 11, upper part). This method works even if two neighboring cubes have to be switched, or if 
two opposing ones need to be exchanged. If all four colors are in place (white and edge cubes match 
the four color middle cubes, as seen on Figure 10), we can move on to the next step, which is the 
solution of white corners. However, let’s first view what this phase means in the process of 
searching for sustainability.  
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 1:  
Our objective system is defined by defining the boundary conditions of the starting state (or 
the Input side) and the complete or partial rearrangement of the system (fossilized energy provision 
system’s complete or partial change). This is where we define the development program itself, the 
condition framework, and the boundaries of the project or task. We define what kinds of 
correspondence systems have an impact on the creation of our process, project, or concept. This will 
be our white middle cube, which will represent the unchangeable objective system, that is the fixed 
point of our starting state. In our case, according to professional opinions, we can define Energy 
rationalization as our fixed point. We also need four comparison points, which have a strong impact 
on the project environment. These can be the 2D interpretations of the strategic sub-connection, the 
basic technological requirement, the financing requirements, and the basic market positioning. 
These attributes, which correlate with the various edge cubes and fixed attributes of points of 
impact (orange, blue, red, and green middle cubes), give the starting 2D attributes of the 
development.  
Example: If I switch the energy supply system immediately and completely to the new, 
cleaner technology (strategy 1) or I wait until the life cycle of the current technology runs out 
(strategy 2), then I have two different strategic goals. In version 1, I induce an immediate and final 
intervention with decisive costs, while in version 2, the exchange of fossilized energy supply 
systems will happen gradually, take a longer time, and distribute the cost of the investment in a 
longer timeframe. The causality of this process is what should be examined. If we don’t sync the 
operation criteria of the “old and outdated,” and the “new and clean” technologies, the solution of 
the cube and the continued sustainable planning of the project can not advance. In this case, the next 
step of the project can’t be completed, or if it continues, it will take a wrong turn in development. 
Therefore, it is not enough to define the starting basis (solution of white side) with regards only to 
the obvious facts which fundamentally define the starting criteria; we also have to sync it to the 
fixed points of the next level. We can interpret this in practice as the white side (or basics of the 
project) also being solvable while they’re not in sync with the first row, or the fixed points of the 
second planning level, equal to the middle cubes (orange, blue, red, and green). This project/cube 
state can be seen in Figure 13. From this state, the project won’t be sustainable and is doomed to 
fail.  
 
Figure 13: Incorrect solution of white side, meaning  
starting point of project designed incorrectly  
Source: self-made. 
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3.2.1.2. Algorithms of solving white corners, search for equilibrium at starting state 
After making the White Cross, the next step is to organize the corners to their respective 
positions (Figure 14). If this is done correctly, the corners match the colors of the sides. Corner 
cubes are the ones that have three colors (e.g. white, orange, and green). The cube has 8 of these 
altogether, therefore, our task is to rotate those corner cubes that have a white color to the corners of 
the White Cross.   
 
Figure 14: Correct positions of white corners, and solution of first row 
Source: self-made. 
 First, we have to find the four corner cubes and then put them into their correct positions using 
algorithms (rotation combinations) (a) and (b). Both (a) and (b) rotation combinations need the 
White Cross to be positioned facing upwards. We have the easiest solutions if the bottom row has 
white corner cubes. First, let’s see what colors we can find next to the white color. Let’s place this 
color as close as we can to its own middle cube, by rotating the bottom row. This corner cube is
now positioned to the left or right of the middle cube. We take the bottom row towards the way it’s 
aligned and then match the top row as well. To finish the rotation, we rotate the bottom row back 
and then the top row back as well. The two rotation combinations can be seen in Figures 15 and 16.  
(a) The corner cube’s white is oriented towards the right. We rearrange it to the white front. 
 
Figure 15: Right-oriented corner cube’s rotation to correct position from bottom row 
Source: self-made. 
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(b) The corner cube’s white is oriented towards the left. We rearrange it to the white front. 
 
Figure 16: Left-oriented corner cube’s rotation to correct position from bottom row
Source: self-made. 
 Using solution (b) is simple, as seen in Figure 16. We merely have to rotate the corner cube 
“out of the way,” then replace it with the cube that is in the position we want to move it. After 
rotating the corner cube backwards, we rotate the now neighboring white edge cubes (right column) 
and corner cubes back to the top row, rotating the corner to its final position. 
 (c) Solution if the white color of the corner cube faces downward 
 At first glance, the most complicated position is if the corner cubes face downward with the 
white color. In this case, the color can be rotated upwards to the starting side with a 180º rotation of 
the right column, after which we can easily arrange the edge cubes to match it (Figure 17). If the 
corner cube is in the wrong upwards position, it has to be rotated to the bottom row, and we have to 
apply one of the previous rotations. We may use different combinations of the previously 
introduced rotations, depending on personal depth perception and simple skillfulness (left-handed, 
right-handed). 
 If there are no more white colored cubes in the bottom row, we’ve completed our starting 
white side. But we must be cautious, since one of the cube’s sides can be completed even if the 
corner cubes seem in place but don’t match sideways. The corner cube might be in position while 
the white side is facing outwards. Neither of these positions is suitable for proceeding with the 
second row, since the misplaced cubes can’t be rotated into their positions ideally in either case. 
 (d) We use multiple versions if the corner cube is on top but is not orientated correctly 
Let’s turn the cube so that the corner cube faces us from the right side, then rotate the right 
side of the cube to face us. This time, our corner cube went to the bottom row. Let’s rotate the 
bottom row counter-clockwise, meaning backwards, and the right side to face away from us. With 
this process, we result in one of (a), (b) or (c) combinations, where we can put the corner cube into 
its proper position!  
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Figure 17: Rotating downward facing corner cube to its place  
Source: self-made. 
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 2:  
The goal is to define the project’s sustainable development course and the finalization of the 
fixed points of the starting state. Syncing the definitive criteria and definition of the correspondence 
systems can be done with the corner cube defining the three attributes at once. All attributes are 
independent, but the process of their sync can be realized via the shortest route and the most 
effective way. It’s important to note that the corner cube in the top row can also be positioned with 
the white color facing outwards. This can be seen on Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18: Top row corner cube in place, but facing outwards
Source: self-made. 
This is also a position from which the solution can not be continued with the second row, 
since the cubes in wrong positions won’t be rotatable to their correct positions at a later time. This 
shows us that we can also find project attributes in the process of project development which seem 
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to be in place at first glance, but are not in a state of equilibrium. We can’t develop our program 
further, or if we continue to try, the project will take a turn for the worse. In the present cycle of 
project development (and solution), the search for this starting point of equilibrium is underway. 
The state of equilibrium we’re searching for is called a Nash equilibrium. Writing the function 
during the process of project development’s phase of planning of the first layer can be used for e.g. 
defining regulation policies and financing policies. In case of cooperative games, the state of 
equilibrium can be stable even if a strategy combination isn’t a Nash equilibrium, if the players 
agree to choose it.  
By the definition for the Nash equilibrium: 
At the equilibrium point of a                  n-member game or strategy, we classify a
point (strategic n), where 
     
 , …,                          , …,                 
holds not strictly true for every          player. Therefore, the point of equilibrium is called a 
Nash equilibrium. Following the completion of the first layer, only the connection with a Nash 
equilibrium can be further developed, meaning that we can only rotate the cube further from this 
position. The first layer always correlates with the second layer’s middle cube, and can only be the 
same color. The true point of equilibrium for the first layer and the middle cube is what we may call 
a Nash equilibrium.
Example: The syncing of technology developments connected to the objective system and 
the boundary conditions of monetary effectiveness may happen directly or indirectly (by making it 
abide by the regulation conditions – standards, norms), with the use of a rotation that has impact on 
three attributes. A good example to this would be how American standards aren’t applicable to 
European user environments, meaning that in this case, the principle of preferring local acquisition 
over global acquisition means a sustainable and proper point of equilibrium.     
3.2.1.3. Solution of the middle row by rotating edge cubes to position (using 3 algorithms) 
 It is obvious, as seen in Figure 19, that the middle cubes will also be in position after 
completion of the first row, which makes our next task correctly positioning the side edge cubes. 
Comparing the first rows’ solution algorithms to our next ones, I have to say that we need to 
implement longer rotation sequences, which assumes 7 rotations for repositioning each edge cube. 
It is interesting though that the solution of the middle row can be much more easily automated (e.g. 
with a software application). Using heuristic algorithms doesn’t cause a problem here: we can 
define a fixed algorithm for every state and only have to decide which to implement first. 
 
Figure 19: Two rows solved by positioning edge cubes  
Source: self-made. 
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  Therefore, our second row is complete by positioning the edge cubes. There are three (a), 
(b), and (c) possible positions for the edge cubes, which have the following solutions:  
In case of solutions (a) and (b), we need an edge cube on the bottom side of the cube next to 
the yellow middle cube, which has no yellow color. The reason for this is that edge cubes which 
don’t have yellow all belong to the middle row. If we find the edge cubes which belong in the 
middle row, we can match them to their respective colors one by one, meaning rotating them right 
below their middle cubes. If we hold this side to face us, we have to look at what’s the edge cube’s 
other color. The matching color will either be to the right (Figure 20) or to the left (Figure 21).  
  The colors of the middle cube and the bottom cube will match, and in the next step, we’ll 
look at where our edge cube is missing from. (That color must be either to our right or our left.) We 
rotate the bottom row away from the color of the middle cube which matches the color of our edge 
cube. After realizing where we have to rotate our edge cube, we turn that side to face us, and re-
rotate the edge cube to its original position. This leaves us with two white cubes, which we rotate 
back to the white side.  
 If we look at the cube now, we can see that the corner cube on the opposite side (which has 
white in it) was matched with its edge cube (meaning the one we originally picked out). From this 
position, we have an easy task: we simply position the corner cube to its place (as was written in the 
previous part pertaining to the positioning of the white corner cube). 
a) Process of rotating from the right (Figure 20) 
 
Figure 20: Rotating edge cube to its place, if the missing cube faces rightward 
Source: self-made. 
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b) Process of rotating from the left (Figure 21) 
 
Figure 21: Rotating edge cube to its place, if the missing cube faces leftward 
Source: self-made. 
c) The edge cube is in the second row, but in a wrong position or orientation (Figure 22) 
Using solution (c) might be required because, even though the edge cube is in position, it is e.g. in a 
wrong orientation color-wise. In this case, we have to go through either solution (a) or (b), with 
which we achieve that our edge cube, which was previously in the middle row either positioned or 
orientated wrong, is now in the bottom row, from where we can rotate it back into its proper 
position using either algorithm (a) or (b).  
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 3:  
During the process of project planning, our goal with positioning the middle row’s edge 
cubes is to further arrange the correspondence systems of the various attribute sets that have an 
impact and to find the various points of equilibrium defined by the attributes directly influencing 
each other, meaning the attributes inherent in the edge cube’s two colors and the matching colored 
opposite edge cube, which is paired with a different color. Without syncing the variables indirectly 
affecting each other and the attributes they represent, the state of equilibrium isn’t optimal (since 
more than one state or point of equilibrium is present). This state can be defined by the previously 
introduced multi-variable continuous functions:  
Let   be two objective’s payoff function and the u1, u2, vectors be strategic vectors by 
which we can define a two-person game of infinite kind, with at least two points of equilibrium:
 i (u) =  i  (u1, u2,)
The main reason of multiple points of equilibrium is that the cross-affecting attributes can be 
optimized multiple ways (we can optimize the edge cube or its represented attributes to both the left 
and the right, but this is only a stable equilibrium if we can continue the solution of the cube). The 
cube’s wrong state of equilibrium can be seen in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22: Rotating edge cube to position, if the missing cube faces rightward
Source: self-made. 
Example: We can directly sync the most economical technological solutions to high quality 
and innovation, but if the effect of market changes on the financing system (change in interest rate), 
risks of foreign currency, and global effects are disregarded, the project can’t be realized or only 
with major redesign and changes (no innovation, or lower quality).  
 
3.2.1.4. Algorithm of Yellow Cross and tuning Output side 
Rotating the “Yellow Cross” is the most important phase prior to the solution of the cube. 
With this rotation, we start to sync the white and yellow sides. By the time we finish the rotation, 
the yellow colored edge cubes are on the front side facing outwards. In the case of the “Yellow 
Cross,” it is not important for the yellow edge cubes to be color matched, meaning their sides don’t 
have to match the colors of the various middle cubes (Figure 23.).  
 
Figure 23: Yellow Cross 
Source: self-made. 
After the repositioning, we hold the two not color-matched cube parts to face us rightward (Figure 
24) in a way that the yellow middle cube faces upward. We rotate a block of 6 cubes from the 
bottom upwards, making sure the side that faces us contains exactly two columns of white 
(excluding the left column). We remake this into an inverted L shape (Figure 24, upper part, last 
cube). This is done by rotating the top row clockwise, repositioning the two whites in the right 
column to the bottom, and finally rotating the top row clockwise. 
  As we get our inverted L, we take the middle column (the L’s vertical line) to the bottom, 
turn the cube to make the white side face upwards, rotate the missing corner from the left, and turn 
the completed column down. 
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 a) If two neighboring edge cubes are in the wrong position, the rotation sequence is as 
follows: 
 
Figure 24: Repositioning edge cubes on yellow side 
Source: self-made. 
 b) If we find the edge cubes on opposite sides, the rotation sequence is as follows:  
 
Figure 25: Repositioning edge cubes on yellow side, if they’re on opposite sides
Source: self-made. 
  The process of the solution is as follows: we hold the one of the two wrongly positioned 
cubes in front of us, and the other opposite to it, as seen in version (b) (Figure 25). We bring a white 
column up on the right column, rotate the top row (clockwise), and bring the remaining two whites 
(the right column) down. We rotate the top row counter-clockwise, and by rotating the middle 
column backwards, we bring up three whites. In this case, we get an inverted L. This has to be 
completed into a block of six. This can be done by rotating the top row (clockwise), bringing up two 
whites to the right column by rotating it backwards, then rotating the top row counter-clockwise. 
The completed block of six has to be rotated back to the other three whites downwards. 
1
.  
2
.  
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 c) The front side has no yellow edge cubes 
  We might not find an edge cube with yellow on the front side. In this case, we follow either 
algorithm (a) or (b), which results in one or two edge cubes being positioned on the front side. After 
this, we use the rotation algorithms of either (a) or (b) to reposition the edges.  
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 4:  
Basically, the solution of the Yellow Cross is the syncing of the Output expectances (yellow 
side) and the Input side (white side), including all details of the development objective system. The 
goal here is primarily syncing the trends of Input and Output indirectly. This indirect syncing is 
important because this phase still offers opportunities for some corrections, or the modification of 
smaller, flexible attributes, depending on how the points of equilibrium are sorted. The indirect 
coordination is possible due to disregarding the top row’s sync with the middle cubes during the 
solution of Yellow Cross, which means they’re not color matched by the time we finish the rotation 
phase. After the solution of the middle row, the yellow edge cubes might be in various positions in 
the top row. If we can’t find any yellow colored cubes on the front side (excluding the yellow 
middle cube) (Figure 26, state “D”), the repositioning takes more time, since we have to apply an 
algorithm that doesn’t help us advance in the solution but only in the rearrangement. After this 
rearrangement happens, we can begin using the selected algorithm. The above mentioned 
circumstance clearly illustrates that we may find a state in which the sealing side of the cube is not 
as sorted as expected because no edge cubes are in their proper position. This can be said about 
project development as well, since there might be times when we have to rearrange the project 
outputs compared to what the expected outputs originally were. This can easily happen, since 
during actualization we can face situations when the realization of a development or investment is 
months or even years late, which is enough time for the economic environment (market, 
regulations) to generate new changes related to the requirements. One of the more defining 
moments of the economic rearrangement process of the 2010’s was the phenomenon which caused 
failed “giga-developments” not only in Hungary, but all around the entire world (e.g. Chinese 
ghost-towns, failed European ethanol and bio-diesel factories, etc.). Therefore, in the field of actual 
usefulness, the Yellow Cross can have high expectations of being put to the spotlight.  
 
Figure 26: Possible positions of edge cubes after arranging middle row 
Source: self-made
Example: The possible changing of flexible technology requirements compared to the 
planned order is possible in this phase, without changing the output criteria, or the points of 
equilibrium. A similar variable might be e.g. the inclusion of changes in tax and other financial 
requirements that can be handled in a flexible manner. I basically assume that a well-planned and 
long-term predictable economic environment may result in Output criteria that are close to the 
originally planned business requirements; therefore, they have no need of being rearranged into new 
states of equilibrium. Following the cube’s logic, if the Yellow Cross is on the front side 
immediately after the solution of the middle row, the solution of the cube is quite simple, since the 
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only remaining task is to rotate the corner cubes to their respective positions. This state can be 
assumed during project development if the Output expectations of the project form the Yellow 
Cross, which means the project or investment can be completed without changes (Figure 26, state 
“C”). If the finishing phase is like the “B” or “C” states in Figure 26, the project must be rearranged 
into a new state of equilibrium, for which a moderate intervention is advisable. If, however, the “D” 
cube state defines the state of project development, meaning not a single Output expectation is as it 
was assumed to be in the project planning, a major rearrangement of the state of equilibrium and 
serious re-planning is necessary, which is usually time-consuming (and also needs one-two 
additional algorithms) and can delay the project’s finishing phase.
   
3.2.1.5. Positioning yellow corner cubes, and arranging sustainability criteria to a finished state 
  In this rotation sequence, we move all four yellow corner cubes in place, making sure that 
the yellow top row isn’t color matched with the row beneath it. 
 
Figure 27: Independent solution of yellow side  
Source: self-made. 
  A multitude of various possibilities/algorithms were developed for this rotation in the last 
few years, and listing these would be too time-consuming, not to mention needless. For us to be 
able to rotate the corner cubes, it’s sufficient to define an easier combination, which can be repeated 
multiple times, therefore resulting in the solution of the yellow side from any given starting state.  
  In Figure 28, we can see a case when only two corner cubes are in the wrong place, with 
them having the yellow colors on the same side. The cube must always be held in a way that the 
two corner cubes to be rotated face rightwards. We also have to be mindful to have the side which 
has the yellow colors of the corner cubes we want to rotate facing upwards. As a start, let’s rotate 
the right column downwards, then rotate the top row (clockwise). After this, let’s rotate the left side 
backwards, the top row again (clockwise), then rotate the left column downwards, after which 
comes the top row twice (clockwise). As a finish, we rotate the left column upwards. This process 
must be repeated for the right side as well. In case two neighboring corner cubes have the yellow 
colors on opposing sides, we also use this algorithm but hold the cube in a way that the yellow side 
faces upwards, and the cubes we want to rotate face rightwards. In any other possible scenario, we 
can rotate the yellow corner cubes to their place in two steps.  
We also use this rotation combination in case of three corner cubes being oriented wrongly, 
meaning facing outwards from the front side. We start the combination with the “wrong” corner 
cube which is closest to the one that’s in the correct place. As a result of this rotation, the next 
corner cube also gets placed in its position, or faces the front side with the yellow color. Therefore, 
we get a state similar to that of Figure 28, or a different one where two “wrong” corner cubes are 
neighboring, meaning on the same side. Using the rotation combination seen on Figure 28 from this 
state, we can easily do the rotations, correcting the corner cubes.  
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Figure 28: Positioning yellow corner cubes, providing sustainability requirements 
Source: self-made. 
    
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 5:  
After the bottom (yellow) side’s corner cubes are in place, we can continue with arranging 
Output requirements. By completing the Yellow Cross, we can put the system in a state of 
equilibrium that means clear criteria to the “consumer” side, or affiliates, political decision makers. 
Finalizing the attributes of the Output side is done by arranging the corner cubes to their proper 
positions. I assume that one of the keys for sustainable business strategies is if the project or 
development abides by market conditions in a way that they’re arranged by at least four strategic 
objective systems. This can be done easily with the help of the four yellow corner cubes. These 
have a total of 12 inherent attributes, which is a very big subset in terms of the cube. With the 
various sides of the cube, we can define a total of 54 attributes, out of which 3 are inherent in each 
corner cube, respectively. This means that this single rotation algorithm defines the orderliness of 
the system attributes by 22%. Though the multi-dimension problem solution theory for Rubik’s 
Cube will be introduced in the next chapter, this simple correspondence shows that there are some 
system elements (cubes/attributes) which have a strong impact on the state of equilibrium of the 
entire status space with their various positions. The search for points of equilibrium using Game 
Theory solutions shown in the process of specialized literature can be necessary in this case as well, 
if the corner cubes are not in their proper positions. The search for points of equilibrium related to 
project development can be imagined during actualization as searching for the states of equilibrium 
of the corner cubes’ inherent attributes (3 in total) in the status space. This can be defined as a 
function as follows:  
Let   be payoff functions optimizing three objective statuses, while the vectors u1, u2, and 
u3 are strategic vectors, and we can define a three-person game of infinite kind, with at least three 
different points of equilibrium, where the appropriate strategy vectors,           .
 i (u) =  i  (u1, u2, u3,)
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Example: The “possible changing of flexible technology requirements compared to the 
planned order is possible in this phase, without changing the Output criteria or the points of 
equilibrium,” as mentioned in Example No. 4, can be expanded with the fact that neighboring 
attributes with a direct influence (three sides of corner cube) have finalized cooperation strategies. 
Implementing the technological change and the corrected financing construction which follows it 
can be as such. These attributes define the project’s “shelf-life,” meaning its sustainability in a 
changing economical environment. We have to know that economical points of equilibrium, 
meaning attributes that have an impact on business sustainability, are ever changing, with these 
changes taking place quickly. During the planning of investments or in making business plans, this 
is a factor which is hard to balance, which means that the investments related to mandatory 
sustainability criteria (enviro-protection, renewable energy production, climate-friendly, etc.) may 
quickly get into an impossible objective state. This is one thing that the use of the sustainability 
algorithm of project planning based on Rubik’s Cube may help with.    
During the rotation sequence, few connections change, which signifies that the optimization 
of cross-effecting correspondences needs a short time interval, and not much work, but the above 
mentioned intensive sorting effect makes the execution very important.  
3.2.1.6. Linking top and bottom row with edge swap, strict sync of Input/Output variables  
 In this rotation sequence, we have to move all yellow edge cubes to their various positions. 
This is the state of the cube, for which everyone can see that their cube is in harmony, and only a 
very minor step is between them and their objective, success. The first phase of harmoniously 
sorting yellow and white sides can be seen on Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29: Sorting yellow and white sides by main attributes in status space  
Source: self-made. 
   
Similarly to what’s been said in regard to the White Cross, we can either position either two or all 
four edge cubes by rotating the yellow side during the solution. If we move two edge cubes, they 
can either be neighboring or opposite of each other. We use the same algorithm for both cases, but 
if the cubes which are to be swapped are opposite of each other, we have to do the rotation sequence 
twice.  
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Figure 30: Positioning sealing side’s yellow edge cubes
Source: self-made. 
   
  During the positioning of the edge cubes, we have to keep the two cubes which we want to 
swap opposite of each other, and to our left side. Now, let’s rotate the right column upwards, then 
its top row (counter-clockwise), followed by the rotation of the left column upwards, and its top row 
(clockwise). After this, we have three white cubes in front of us to the right: let’s rotate these to the 
bottom row (Figure 30, upper part). Now, let’s make two rotations on the top row (counter-
clockwise), then rotate the left column downwards. Rotating the top row (counter-clockwise), and 
the left column backwards brings the edge cube back in front of us, and the left column will have 
two white cubes (Figure 30 lower part), to which we can arrange the third by rotating the top row 
twice (clockwise). The last step is moving this finished white column back to the other white cubes 
by rotating them downward.  
“LOW CARBON INTERPRETATION” NO. 6:  
The goal of the rotations is linking the Input (white) and Output (yellow) sides. During the 
process of equilibrium search, we’re talking about the strict syncing of the most important Input and
Output requirements. By rotating the yellow side’s edge cubes to their proper place, the strategic 
fixed points (meaning the four definitive middle cubes) and the input variables of the Input side 
form a direct, non-changeable connection with the Output variables and requirements. Practically, 
we finish the whole process/planning/development with this edge swap.  
Example: the edge swap shows us how all the Input and Output attributes important for the 
planning of the project are finalized. Such a case can be if the political requirement system of the 
Input side is finalized in regards to the program’s realization Output. During the project’s evolution, 
we can handle changes or fixation of “corruption factors” or global variables in a similar manner.  
3.2.1.7. Corner swap, defining the final state of equilibrium for system attributes 
 Corner swap is the final phase of the solution of the cube, and the definition of the final state 
of equilibrium for the system attributes (Figure 31).
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Figure 31: The cube is in a state of equilibrium  
Source: self-made. 
  The state of the cube in this phase is well-known – either three corners are in the wrong 
place or all four of them. Solving three corners leads us directly to the solution of the fourth, which 
means this doesn’t need further learning. If we don’t want to learn more, faster solution algorithms, 
it is sufficient to be familiar with a single algorithm for this phase, since using this multiple times 
will lead to the corner cubes being positioned in their proper place. 
  If we have a corner cube which is positioned properly, we begin by holding it to our left and 
starting the task on the right column. Let’s rotate the front yellow row twice (clockwise), by which 
we bring a white row up, and rotate the right column backwards twice as well, making an L (Figure 
32, upper part). Now, let’s rotate the front row once (clockwise) and the left column downwards 
(Figure 32, upper part, fourth cube), finally restoring the L by rotating the front row again (counter-
clockwise). Now, we can make this L into an I by rotating the right column backwards twice. Now, 
let’s rotate the front row once (clockwise), followed by rotating the left column upwards. As a 
finishing touch, we only have to rotate the front row once (counter-clockwise), which puts white 
together with white, yellow with yellow, and continue to repeat this rotation sequence until all the 
corner cubes are in place. If two corner cubes weren’t in place, we do it twice; if three, we do it 
thrice. We know multiple algorithms which can deliver the corner cubes to their “destinations” from 
various positions faster. Obviously, knowing and using these may shorten the time required for 
solution. 
 
Figure 32: Swapping corner cubes 
Source: self-made. 
“LOW CARBON” INTERPRETATION NO. 7:
 The goal of the rotation sequence is to define sustainability criteria and to set the final state 
of equilibrium. During the corner cube swap, the rotations have the characteristic of comparing and 
checking all the attributes inherent in the Input side and the cube side. The edge swap is done for at 
least three different sides, but usually, the swap of all four corner cubes happens with edge swaps. 
By modeling the little details of the project planning or development, we can say that the analysis 
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system gets a finalized frame by these edge swaps. Via the corner cubes which have three inherent 
attributes, four times three, for a total of twelve relevant attributes end up in a final state of 
equilibrium, which is perhaps the most important rotation sequence in the entire solution process. 
During the project planning using Rubik’s Cube, we can call this process of searching for the final 
state of equilibrium abiding by the sustainability criteria. As we can see in the above mentioned 
rotations, the point of equilibrium for the Output side (Yellow Cross, solving yellow corners) can be 
done during the solution process multiple times, but the 3D assortment only means abiding by the 
sustainability criteria if the corner cube swaps are done. 
Searching for the points of equilibrium/sustainability optimum of sealing corner cubes: one 
of the most important values, the final harmony of the development project or strategy, is given by 
the rotation combination based on syncing three different attributes. Without this, there is no final 
coordination between the Input and Output sides, meaning the flexibility of the entire system drops 
significantly since it did not adapt requirements posing the “shelf-life” or capability to adapt to the 
various possible changes of the system attributes.   
In light of the above mentioned, we can define three different strategy programs during the 
process of low-carbon strategy planning:  
A. The existence of a technologically sufficient planning option (to avoid over-planning and 
obsoleteness) 
B. Optimization of liquidity and financial sustainability is met (safe self-sufficiency and 
revenue for at least 10 years).  
C. Avoiding detrimental project effects on the relevant product areas (functionally self-
sufficient system).  
Mathematically defining the above mentioned goals is no easy task; furthermore, writing the 
Game Theory payoff functions after this also requires the definition of specialized requirement 
systems.  
Our task can e.g. be written as a three-person game, where u1, u2, u3 are the strategy 
vectors, and           is the simultaneous strategic vector. This means: 
 i (u) =  i  (u1, u2, u3,) = cTi1 u1 + cTi2 + u2 + cTi3 + u3 = cTi + u    
are the objective functions and strategy vectors, therefore the 
         A1 u1+ A2 u2 + A3 u3 b
requirement holds true for them. In this case, the coefficients will be the vectors and matrixes 
derived from our previous model coefficients (doing the function can be seen on page 27).  
Example: Finding the final acceptable planning option (from both a financial and 
technological point of view) is a good example of this (using a technological solution which offers 
realistic return), since if this can’t be realized, the development might even be detrimental to 
society. However, if the sustainability criteria are met, e.g. the European Union shouldn’t have the 
(quite common) cases, where if financing is cancelled for various development environments, it 
makes (in the best scenario) the related activities falter (e.g. waste collection systems, waste 
management) or (in the worst scenario) the entire product path falls apart (e.g. entrepreneurial 
incubation programs or R&D programs).  
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3.2.2. Summarizing the evaluation of process analysis 
  The processes of project planning and development based on the row by row solution of the 
3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube show us the correspondence of the sustainable use and correspondence 
systems of the resources around us, which makes building our development and strategy concepts 
around this advisable in the future. The process regulation based on the solution process of Rubik’s 
Cube is a swift, effective and low-cost protocol; furthermore, the demonstrated process analysis 
showed us that if it’s not disregarded, the criteria of long-term (sustainable) operations are met, 
which means that we may suppose (with a high probability) that the result of the entire process 
won’t be detrimental to society.   
 vs.  
Figure 33: Cube in entropic and equilibratory states
Source: self-made.
  By solving the cube, we imitated the process of project development, meaning the road from 
complete disorder to the state of complete order. The complete state of equilibrium for Rubik’s 
Cube is the solved state. It’s no coincidence that when someone sees a cube in disorder, the first 
things that comes to their mind is to solve it, since the desired state is the cube which has only 
single-color sides (Figure 33). Rubik’s Cube has inherent harmony even in its color setting; as I’ve 
already mentioned, the choice of colors by the developer was intentional and the neighboring logic 
of colors is not the work of coincidence. Without the mystification of the cube, we can state that it 
already has an inherent and colorful harmony even in its visual appeal, which makes us assume that 
seamless and perfect logic supports its construction.  
   During the theoretical process analysis, the goal of demonstrating the various rotations was 
to show what kinds of cube interactions are assumed behind the advancement from state to state, 
meaning the effects of which cubes/attributes on each other we have to analyze during the rotation 
process. I didn’t define the exact locations and interactions for these during the research, but the 
division of the process to phases did happen, and I also synced the solution phases to the 
mechanisms of project development. The correspondences verified that the two logical processes 
may support each other. During the process evaluation, we proved that sustainability criteria can be 
synced to some solution algorithms of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, and the correspondence systems of 
the cube’s various sides defines a 3D perception and planning strategy which shows the process of 
investment development from a new scientific perspective.  
  In Table 12, I summarized the various definition levels which mean definable intervals in 
the process of project development as well, and in places where I deemed it necessary, I also 
portrayed correspondences of the search for states of equilibrium using Game Theory methods, 
which can be put into a state of equilibrium with project attributes inherent in the various colors or 
phases – for the sake of sustainability.  
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Table 12: Evaluation of modeling process, and results 
CUBE 
INTERPRETATIONS
(number of rotation 
algorithm)
LEVEL OF 
MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT
/LOW-CARBON/ PROJECT 
ATTRIBUTE IN QUESTION
CORRELATION WITH GAME 
THEORY
NO. 1 INPUT “White cross” – defining the starting 
criteria
A stage definable by an n-
person zero sum game of 
infinite kind.
NO. 2 INPUT
“White corner” – defining the 
sustainable development routes, 
equilibrium search, non-cooperative 
optimum
According to functions on Nash-
equilibrium, non-cooperative 
strategy, definable by games of 
finite kind.
NO. 3 MIDDLE CUBE
“Middle row” – anchoring of 
relation points, achieving 
equilibrium, arranging two-
dimensional attributes, positioning 
fixed point
Positioning edge cubes is 
possible with conflict alleviation 
methods. Fixed point
positioning is advised to be done 
with zero sum game.
NO. 4 MIDDLE CUBE “Yellow cross” – indirect 
synchronizing of input/output sides
Definable by oligopolistic 
games of finite kind, or a
method of equal compromise.
NO. 5 OUTPUT
“Yellow corner” – interpretation of 
sustainability attributes during the 
arrangement of outputs
Definable by three-person game 
of infinite kind, needs Nash-
equilibrium.
NO. 6 OUTPUT “Yellow side edge-switch” – strict 
synchronizing of input/output sides
Definable by zero sum game, 
conflict alleviation method, and 
cooperative strategy.
NO. 7 OUTPUT
“Corner switch” – the phase of 
setting the final balance, achieving 
equilibrium, finalizing sustainability 
attributes
Oligopolistic games by 
functions based on either 
cooperative equilibrium strategy 
or Nash-equilibrium. 
Cooperative strategy.
  Source: self-made 
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3.3. Theory of “low-carbon” optimization using Rubik’s Cube
There are a few good software development processes which are used mainly for industrial 
developments, but each of them has their various pros, cons, and limitations. Models are usually 
related to some corporation and organization as well, who further develop, support and promote 
these methods. However, a specific development model will never be applicable to every project, 
and if the program developers want to adopt a method for their own development cycles, they have 
to include the special factors of technologies, limits of resources, time needed to go on the market, 
and quickly changing consumer needs.  
We also have to mention (as part of the research topic) a known software development 
method (Rubik’s Cube software development methodology - RCM), which offers a solution for the 
problem of modeling software “shelf-life” with its specific objective system methodology. The 
RCM model concept is an especially effective method for the development of old software 
applications, and making outlet software applications desirable to consumers. This is a kind of
recycling, which can help us spare our resources and time (and it’s also applicable to the EU’s low 
carbon concept). The basis of RCM is the most widely known solution method to Rubik’s Cube, the 
layer by layer method, which basically follows the solution row by row and is easily interpretable 
during the process of reprogramming the different software. The analogy between the solution of
Rubik’s Cube and software development was realized by Indian software developers in 2011, which 
was partially introduced to practice and thus spared programmers from an excessive load of work. 
Making outlet software applications desirable to consumers is an exceptionally money and time
consuming process, which can be decisively lowered with the RCM method, meaning the concept 
proved to offer a new and cost-effective method of software (Fogarassy, 2012). 
My low carbon optimization theory using Rubik’s Cube has an important characteristic, 
which is to analyze a project on various levels (Input, Output, connection) using the real 
interactions between various project attributes. This helps us spare a lot of time and effort by 
neglecting the needless analyses. The system connections assigned to the sides of the cubes (edge 
cube attributes, corner cube attributes) make the direct analysis of some attributes outright 
unnecessary, meaning not all connections have to “communicate.” The “communications” between 
these system elements can therefore be reached by defining simple border-area connections, or 
through transferred system connections.  
3.3.1. Sustainability correspondences of “low-carbon” developments
When we analyze the technological applicability during the process of a project 
development, it’s important to note that we don’t have to directly consider the market opportunities 
regarding Outputs, but the correspondence between the two exists and is included through their 
interactions. Another similar example is negotiation on the questions of liquidity when analyzing a
given financial conformity, which isn’t directly dependent on the market demand, but both have an 
influence on each other, which connection is included even without analyses – assuring proper 
applicability – by the methodology using Rubik’s Cube. The previously mentioned LEDS (low-
emission development strategies) of the UN is based on the above, which the UN has wanted to 
implement since 1992, but the economical interpretation of the program couldn’t be defined in the 
last few decades.  
Domestic objective system of the main priorities of the « low-carbon economy » (based on 
Fogarassy, 2013): 
 We have to try and improve the effectiveness of all resources, most importantly, energy 
sources. We have to maintain our energy transformation systems in a much more effective 
manner, including the local and maximum use of the heat energy byproduct of electric 
energy production.  
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 Intentional consumption must be realized on a very high level – be it environmental 
protection or taking social liability: it has to appear on the production, trade and personal 
levels.  
 Local production and consuming is preferred. No matter what kind of demand comes up, be 
it energy, material or service, it has to be satisfied by local supply. Energy sources have to 
be produced in low emission systems, using as much renewable and alternative energy as 
possible to reduce CO2 emission to the lowest possible amount. 
 All waste has to be minimized – recycle it, return it, reduce it, because this spares a lot of 
resources and energy. 
In the case of the “low-carbon-economy,” this complex requirement system is incredibly hard to 
realize or to integrate its basic theories into investment processes, where the BAU (business as 
usual) requirements fundamentally disregard sustainability criteria. However, these criteria or 
priorities can be included in various development and investment projects through the solution of 
Rubik’s Cube, which models the objective system of the “low-carbon” developments well with its 
structure interpretable in multi-dimensions.  
3.3.2. Optimization of sustainability criteria and the theory of 3D problem management 
The management of complex risks is assisted by 1, 2, and 3 viewpoint, simultaneous 
problem handling methods with the use of Rubik’s Cube. The base of the cube consists of six 
immovable small cubes which are the basis for the 1D problem handling (Figure 34). We assign the 
attributes of project development or investment to these small cubes, which define the core of 
development in the process, meaning they define unchangeable fixed points in the important areas 
(e.g. technology, regulations, financing, market).  
 
Figure 34: The “skeleton” of Rubik’s Cube is made up of rotatable but immovable middle 
cubes
Source: self-made. 
The number of edge cubes is 12, which serve as the basis for 2D problem handling by 
allowing the optimization or movement of two attributes simultaneously (e.g. technological 
regulations and financing). This practically means analysis along the (x,y) axis pair (Figure 35).  
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Figure 35: Edge cube of Rubik’s Cube, which needs to match two colors 
Source: self-made. 
There are eight corner cubes, which serve as a basis for specialized 3D problem handling 
with its simultaneously movable or optimizable three attributes. This basically means analysis along 
the (x,y,z) axis triple (Figure 36).  
 
Figure 36: Corner cube, which needs to match three colors 
Source: self-made. 
We assume that the six-sided, 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube has a side and small cube that 
harmonizes with each of the elements of project development: 
A. Middle cube – this is a stable/fix element and an attribute of all the cube’s sides, as 
well as the phases of project development. In the case of the 3×3×3 cube, we define 6 
middle cubes, and these stable cubes/fixed attributes also fundamentally outline and 
define the process of sustainable project planning. 
B. Edge cube – this means a direct connection between two colors and attributes. The 
number of edge cubes, in the case of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, is twelve. These edge 
cubes define a 2D inherence of attributes, by which the connected attributes also 
define the syncing and the system criteria together during the evolution of the project.   
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C. Corner cube – the most advanced element of coordinating project planning or 
development, since it optimizes three different attributes during the process of 
development. Between the matching of the three colors, meaning the three sets of 
attributes, it defines a very direct and complex correlation. White side (Input) corner 
cubes mean a stable element to project structure, capable of analyzing all viewpoints 
and attributes, while the yellow side (Input) corner cubes realize the selection of 
sustainability, harmonic energy use and exclusion/correction of detrimental 
developments.  
According to my hypothesis, the low carbon project planning or development method is a 
parallel protocol using the layer by layer solution method for Rubik’s Cube. By assigning the 
various project attributes to the colors of the cube, we can achieve the realization of a specialized, 
sustainable project development process, for which the specifics of development and process are 
offered by the 1, 2, and 3D nature of the various attributes or attribute sets, making them handle 
better during development programs. The objective systems of both low-carbon developments and 
solution method of Rubik’s Cube follow the same guiding principle, meaning they both try to 
achieve the state of equilibrium by following the route of logical and low energy consumption.  
3.3.3. Method of problem handling in 1D, 2D and 3D using Rubik’s Cube
Project planning and development is basically a process optimization based on the collective 
handling of different attributes in a way that the examined segments are placed into the most 
harmonic constellation compared to each other. In case of a supposed “low-carbon optimization 
protocol,” there is a need to create four different determination areas (attribute groups), which can 
be associated with the 3×3×3 cube’s different colored sides. Two opposing sides (white and yellow) 
would be our project’s input and output sides. The attribute groups which determine our 
optimization can be the following in a demonstrational project: optimization of strategic goals 
system (red side), analysis of market opportunities (green side), the area of actualization and 
technological criteria system (blue side), monetary effects (orange side), the attributes summarizing 
input-side goals (white side), and, last but not least, the attributes summarizing output-side goals 
(yellow side). 
One of the most important characteristics of the low-carbon optimization concept (based on 
the software development experiences from India) is that the analysis of various projects on 
multiple levels is based on the analysis of the relevant interactions of various pieces, therefore 
avoiding the analysis of irrelevant interactions spares tremendous time and effort (low-carbon 
solution). The system connections assigned to the various sides of the cube (edge cube 
characteristics, and corner cube characteristics) makes the direct examination of various attributes 
irrelevant, meaning that not all system connections actually have to “communicate” with each other. 
The “communications” between these system elements can therefore be reached by simple border-
area connections, or through transferred system connections.  
When we analyze technological applicability during the process of project development, it is
important to note that we don’t have to directly consider the market opportunities regarding 
Outputs, but the correspondence between the two exists, and is included through their interactions. 
Another similar example is negotiation on the questions of liquidity when analyzing a given 
financial conformity, which isn’t directly dependent on the market’s demand, but both influence 
each other, which connection is included even without analyses – assuring proper applicability – by 
the methodology using Rubik’s Cube. 
It is important to note that some attributes require more interaction between each other than others. 
This means that some attributes (which are parallel to the cube’s color positions) can only be placed 
in their correct position, or have finalized characteristics, if the other attributes are collectively 
optimized. It is also obvious from this aspect that there is a reason for using a 3D interpretable 
project development model.  
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Fundamentally, logical planning and modeling happens in 2D strategic models (e.g. 
logframe matrix – LFA/Logical Framework Approach), for which we imaged a case as to what the 
2D interpretation of Rubik’s Cube would mean. Figure 37 proves that the 2D (x,y) cube structure 
could perhaps handle more project attributes together, but wouldn’t define the correlation between 
them, which can only be done by a 3D interpretation.  
 
Figure 37: 2D Interpretation of Rubik’s Cube structure
Source: self-made. 
We can fundamentally say that if the attributes that have an impact on project development 
are placed correctly, the 3D interpretation zone of Rubik’s Cube is the new pro of practice. Ernő 
Rubik, the inventor of Rubik’s Cube, also had the goal of showing architect students how the 
elements are connected, how they move in 3D, and how their connections change with said 
movement, meanwhile helping them develop a sense for 3D interpretation. The novel 3D protocol 
helps to realize our development projects in the future by fixing incorrect developments time- and 
cost-efficiently. Tables 13-17 show the various attributes assigned to their respective sides/places, 
and the multi-dimensional interpretation. We can also say that the 3D problem management allows 
for the more detailed analysis of Input and Output criteria, which was properly followed through 
during the process of project planning, when we rearranged and solved the in detail cube earlier. 
(Rearranging the cube means that the edges or colors are matched via the algorithm relocating the 
cubes to their respective proper positions.)  
In the next Table (Table 13), I summarized the characteristics of the input and output sides 
of an actual project. The typified goal of project development in this case is the advancement from 
fossilized energy resources to renewable ones or to a combined system. The four main agents which 
were assigned to the four colored sides were decided upon by professional evaluation, individual 
weighting and the process of dominance analysis in Tables 14 and 17. Of these four colors, red 
represents “criteria of laws and regulations for strategic program development,” green represents 
“examination of market opportunities,” blue represents “technological criteria system,” and orange 
represents “summarization of monetary effects.” Also, on the various sides (main agents), I defined 
cube characteristics which represent two or three individual attributes through the connection 
system of the cubes themselves. The characteristics, which are unimportant and unrelated to the 
development and actualization of the project per se, are assigned to the middle cubes, of which there 
is one on each side, with one defining attribute – obviously though, even if there are fixed cubes on 
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the Input and Output sides as well, they aren’t associated with main agents. The attributes which 
include two or three different factors were assigned to the edge and corner cubes. The defining of 
the attributes and their association to the cubes was done by their usefulness. The attributes which 
are determinable one way (point-like) were named 1D (x), those which are determinable two ways 
were named 2D (x,y), and those which are determinable three ways were named 3D (x,y,z) 
attributes.  
 
Table 13: Meanings of input (white/W) and output (yellow/Y) sides of Rubik’s Cube
SIDE COLORS
MEANING OF COLORS
1D – single-dimension trait (x) 
2D – dual-dimension trait (x,y)
3D – tri-dimension trait (x,y,z)
WHITE (F)
INPUT:
Defining input requirements, basic system of the product or provision defined along the 
matching of state regulations and market. 
IMAGING OF WHITE SIDE: 
MIDDLE WHITE (1D)
 energy rationalization (W)
EDGE WHITE (2D) 
 strategic base-connection (WR), 
 basic technological requirement (WB), 
 financing expectation (WO), 
 basic market positioning (WG), 
CORNER WHITE (3D), 
 basic requirement of payoff (OGW), 
 conformity to technological criteria and funding instruments (OBW), 
 syncing basic goals with technological threats and innovation priorities (BRW), 
 designating strategically synced market segment at basic criteria (RGW).
YELLOW (Y)
OUTPUT:
Pareto optimal product or provision system outlined by taking into consideration the 
maximum values of resource-usage opportunities.
IMAGING OF YELLOW SIDE:
MIDDLE YELLOW (1D) 
 resource-optimized energy consumption/profitable production (Y)
EDGE YELLOW (2D) 
 strategic congruence of energy and CO2 scale (RY), 
 optimizing technological threat minimization (BY), 
 tax and benefit criteria in the energy-production system (OY), 
 monetary criteria of artificial and actual advancement to the market (GY),
CORNER YELLOW (3D) 
 structure compatible with strategic goals systems, where “shelf-life” is also 
guaranteed (RYG), 
 planning option sufficient in both monetary and technological terms – meaning a
technological solution which guarantees a positive cost-benefit rate (OYB), 
 production and provision conditions sustainable on the market (GYO), 
 long-term and legit option, where the chosen technological solution supports the 
strategic goals to the utmost level (BYR),
(endorsement of sustainability criteria through development).
(Definitions: D=dimension, W=white, Y=yellow, G=green, R=red, B=blue, O=orange)
Source: self-made 
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Table 14: Meanings of attribute side Red (R) of Rubik’s Cube
SIDE COLORS
MEANING OF COLORS
1D – single-dimension trait (x) 
2D – dual-dimension trait (x,y)
3D – tri-dimension trait (x,y,z) 
RED (R)
Criteria of laws and regulations for strategic program development:
Providing the defining information, synergies, cooperations for the planned profile on a 
corporate, local, sectoral, regional or union economic policy level. 
MIDDLE RED (1D)
 realization of local/corporate strategy (R)
EDGE RED (2D) 
 tracking and matching of marketing strategy and economic policy priorities (RG),
 defining technological systems for cost-clear versions, matching the techno-
parameters of financing priorities to the project (RB), 
 strategic congruence of energy and CO2 scale (RY), 
 strategic base-connection (RW)
CORNER RED (3D) 
 syncing basic goals with technological threats and innovation priorities (BRW), 
 designating a strategically synced market segment at basic criteria (RGW), 
 structure compatible with strategic goals systems, where “shelf-life” is also 
guaranteed (RYG), 
 long-term and legit option, where the chosen technological solution supports the 
strategic goals to the utmost level (BYR)
(Definitions: D=dimension, W=white, Y=yellow, G=green, R=red, B=blue, O=orange)
Source: self-made. 
Table 15: Meanings of attribute side Green (G) of Rubik’s Cube
SIDE COLORS
MEANING OF COLORS
1D – single-dimension trait (x) 
2D – dual-dimension trait (x,y)
3D – tri-dimension trait (x,y,z) 
GREEN (G)
Examination of market opportunities:
Evaluation of market opportunities and positions in artificial and actual market 
segments. 
MIDDLE GREEN (1D)
 the price in the supply and demand equilibrium can be planned (G)
EDGE GREEN (2D) 
 tracking and matching of marketing strategy and economic policy priorities (RG), 
 effects of market changes on the financing system, analysis of foreign currency risk 
factors, and global effects (OG), 
 monetary criteria of artificial and actual advancement to the market (GY), 
 basic market positioning (WG). 
CORNER GREEN (3D) 
 structure compatible with strategic goals systems, where “shelf-life” is also 
guaranteed (RYG), 
 production and provision conditions sustainable on the market (GYO), 
 basic requirement of payoff (OGW), 
 designating strategically synced market segment at basic criteria (RGW).
(Definitions: D=dimension, W=white, Y=yellow, G=green, R=red, B=blue, O=orange)
Source: self-made 
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Table 16: Meanings of attribute side Blue (B) of Rubik’s Cube
SIDE COLORS
MEANING OF COLORS
1D – single-dimension trait (x) 
2D – dual-dimension trait (x,y)
3D – tri-dimension trait (x,y,z) 
BLUE (B)
Technological criteria system:
Matching of market opportunities and technological solutions. Research of the techno-
risks and opportunities is advised. 
MIDDLE BLUE (1D)
 technological usage that abides by BAT technological requirements (B)
EDGE BLUE (2D)
 defining technological systems for cost-clear versions, matching the techno-
parameters of financing priorities to the project (RB), 
 basic technological requirement (WB), 
 optimizing technological threat minimization (BY), 
 the most cost-efficient technological solution with both high quality and innovation-
level (BO).
CORNER BLUE (3D) 
 conformity to technological criteria and funding instruments (OBW),
 planning option sufficient in both monetary and technological terms – meaning 
technological solution which guarantees a positive cost-benefit rate (OYB), 
 syncing basic goals with technological threats and innovation priorities (BRW), 
 long-term and legit option, where the chosen technological solution supports the 
strategic goals to the utmost level (BYR).
(Definitions: D=dimension, W=white, Y=yellow, G=green, R=red, B=blue, O=orange)
Source: self-made 
Table 17: Meanings of attribute side Orange (O) of Rubik’s Cube
SIDE COLORS
MEANING OF COLORS
1D – single-dimension trait (x) 
2D – dual-dimension trait (x,y)
3D – tri-dimension trait (x,y,z) 
ORANGE (O)
Summary of monetary effects:
Type of financing, relevance of government tools, tax, foreign currency risks, liquidity 
questions. 
MIDDLE ORANGE (1D) 
 time for payoff, corporate value (O)
EDGE ORANGE (2D) 
 tax and benefit criteria in the energy-production system (OY),
 financing expectation (WO), 
 the most cost-efficient technological solution with both high quality and innovation-
level (BO), 
 effects of market changes on the financing system, analysis of foreign currency risk 
factors, and global effects (OG) 
CORNER ORANGE (3D) 
 planning option sufficient in both monetary and technological terms – meaning 
technological solution which guarantees a positive cost-benefit rate (OYB), 
 basic requirement of payoff (OGW), 
 conformity to technological criteria and funding instruments (OBW), 
 production and provision conditions sustainable on the market (GYO).
(Definitions: D=dimension, W=white, Y=yellow, G=green, R=red, B=blue, O=orange)
Source: self-made. 
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Even though the choice of definition of Rubik’s Cube’s attribute sides and its cubes was 
random (Tables 14., 15., 16., 17.) in our following project, it’s still advised to examine their 
usefulness with some kind of function-like connection, because we can define the importance of the 
attributes and the preference comparisons. Also, in order to increase the reliability of the model, we
employed a new method to weight criteria and define dominance.  
3.4. Process of project development with Rubik’s Cube using Game Theory interpretations 
The low-carbon project planning and project development using Rubik’s Cube is a specially 
constructed planning concept which – as of now – is a one of a kind concept that can interpret 
factors with an impact on processes in 3D. For “setting” the equilibrium point of the economical or 
resource-usage of input and output sides, and to describe the relation between them, I used Game 
Theory solutions which weren’t used for this purpose during scientific research before. 
Used before the process of modeling, the evaluation of the process of tolerance in the sense 
of engineering means the determination of the allowed maximum differentiation from the 
determined sizes, quantities or qualities. In the case of Game Theory algorithms, I researched the 
following: which method is the same as the solution process model of Rubik’s Cube in terms of its 
attributes, and in what scale does it differ from it while still remaining representative. For the Game 
Theory algorithms I was searching for, I used the process of tolerance, meaning I was researching 
the admissible differences between the attributes of the cube and the parameterization of the Game 
Theory functions. 
During the complex modeling, I analyzed the Game Theory models one by one, and through 
the process of modeling I assigned the relevant models to the various rotation algorithms 
(interpretations). I separated the attribute groups of the cube to three different aggregations, which 
are INPUT side attributes, MIDDLE CUBE side attributes, and OUTPUT side attributes. I used 
Game Theory methods to determine the points of equilibrium between the three attribute groups. 
The gist of this was that where the attribute elements were tagged with a “not allowed difference” 
by the SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) analysis, I listed parameters which 
lead to the points of equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) through strategic models. Both the analyses and 
the modeling were conducted via a three-stage system; therefore I also conducted the Game Theory 
modeling of the entire process on three levels, meaning the matching of three different types of 
Game Theory models (or three different cost-functions).
The Game Theory payoff functions referring to the various modeling levels were made by 
analyzing the attributes of the Input side, the middle cube, and the Output side, which were tagged 
with a “not allowed difference” by the SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique)
analysis in their respective attribute groups, which I took and optimized as sustainability strategies 
interpreted in a business environment. 
3.4.1. Imaging algorithms of Input-side 
The project begins in this phase. We can find the answer to the following question: what do 
we have to keep in mind when starting a project? The incorrect rotation of the first layer, or row of 
cubes, results in incorrect continuation, therefore, we can’t approach the next layer.
We can easily explain this with a simple energy-transaction. If we change our initial energy-
supply system in a way that the old one still has a life expectation of 20-40% of its estimated use 
duration, then we may end up with a considerable financial loss if we intervene. To avoid ending up 
in such a situation, we can use e.g. a Nash equilibrium to calculate the optimal intervention time. 
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GAME THEORY MODELING OF INPUT SIDE (LEVEL 1)
Enviro-orientated developments are fundamentally against the economic development 
priority system (e.g. the program for lowering greenhouse gases and for the use of fossilized energy 
sources contradict each other, since the former promotes the minimization of energy consumption, 
while the latter promotes the increased use of pollutants). When planning the first layer, this can be 
used in the process of project planning in terms of regulation policy and financing policy (Figure 
38). We also have the same situation concerning the water base defense and the rising requirements 
of favored water-dependant energy plants. In case of various projects, we have to include the 
criteria of non-cooperative competitors as well for the sake of realizing clear business regulations 
and sustainable business strategies. In this situation, it is incredibly hard to find the Nash 
equilibrium, but it is imperative nevertheless since the project can’t be further developed in a 
controversy.  
Definition:  
By the definition for the Nash equilibrium: 
At the equilibrium point of a                  n- member game or strategy, we classify a
point (strategic n), where 
     
 , …,                          , …,                 
holds true not strictly for every i=1,…..,n player. Therefore, the point of equilibrium is called a 
Nash equilibrium. 
Thesis: 
Following the completion of the first layer, only the connection with a Nash equilibrium can 
be further developed, meaning that we can only rotate the cube further from this position. The first 
layer always correlates with the second layer’s middle cube, and can only be the same color.  
Figure 38: Equilibrium point for the first row or layer (circled), where the middle cube is 
always the same color (illustrated by the lines). 
Source: self-made. 
Proof: 
Let   = (            be one point of equilibrium for the game. In this instance, in case of any given  
            :
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from where, through simple addition, it is obvious that  (x^*,x^*) ≥  (x^*,y). Based on this, a 
well-performing algorithm can be provided to define the points of equilibrium which have an 
impact on planning and to solve the fixed problems of the aggregations.  
Example:  
 During the planning of biomass-based renewable energy production, whether the high 
amount of water consumed can have a detrimental effect on the project’s profitability and can 
become the criteria for use of the most effective technology is a critical point. Therefore, the 
question and the criteria is viewed as strictly technological in nature, and we try to match the 
strategy and Game Theory optimum with the corner cube which has 3D attributes (colors are red-
green-white), where white means input, red means regulation criteria, and green means 
technological solutions, which we handle collectively (Figure 39). 
 Luckily, solving water distribution problems plays a major role in Game Theory solutions, 
but we can usually reach the points of equilibrium that provide criteria for the outlines of an assured 
system usage only through defining many intricate function-correspondences, calculating 
mathematic correlations for which is quite difficult. Multi-purpose water usage and the interests and 
cost-functions of those connected to it offer different optimums, which usually suppose a game of 
multi-player and nonlinear nature, and yet which is somehow still a non-cooperative game based on 
some kind of Nash equilibrium. 
 To define the problem – according to the low-carbon developments using Rubik’s Cube – I
made a three player optimization regarding water usage for the process of strategic planning using 
Rubik’s Cube, based on the guide by Szidarovszky and Molnár (2013).
 Multi-purpose water usage as a decision-method task has been a problem for decades, and 
one with many solution options. In our case, we’re searching for one on a non-cooperative three-
player (agricultural consumer (for irrigation), industrial consumer (for cooling), and household 
consumer (for functional uses)) Nash equilibrium. The central element of the low-carbon strategy 
problem is how the agricultural (biomass producer) water usage project developer will decide 
whether the project has enough water out of the resources at hand. 
  
 
Figure 39: 3D attributes of “white-green-red” corner cubes (WGR), the technological solution 
that assures payoff (optimized for three-person water usage)  
(Dimensions from left to right: SMART value, Cube type and dominance, Main agent 
inherent attributes) 
Source: self-made. 
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The problem has three dimensions, where the Rubik solution is the issue of the input side. 
The basis of water usage can be water, underground water, and purified wastewater. Let k = 1, 2, 3 
be the three players who can follow variations of decision during their decision phase as follows:  
The strategy for each player can be described by a five variable vector:  
                      
where 
fk = local water tk = local underground 
water
kk = purified wastewater
fk = import water tk = import underground 
water
The payoff function for the total amount of water used for each player is as follows en:  
                    
All players have two common complicating criteria, one of which states that the amount of 
used water may not be less than the minimal requirement D_k^min, while the other states that it 
may not be more than the maximum requirement of technology (D_k), either. (These sustainability 
criteria are to avoid wasting water.)  
                        
                     
In addition, the agricultural player (k=1) has to introduce two additional criteria for water usage, 
which have the following variables:  
G  = group of plants exclusive to underground water 
ai  = rate of plants (i) by entire agricultural area 
wi  = water-dependence of plants (i) by hectare  
T = group of plants which can be watered with purified wastewater 
                                                      
We know that the underground water supply offers the best quality water while purified wastewater 
offers the worst, so we have to define the volume of plants (sensitive) in the agricultural portfolio 
which can’t be watered with purified wastewater. The water requirement which draws solely from 
the underground water sources may not exceed the water-dependence of the plants which are 
exclusive to clean, quality underground water:    
      
                          
the equation converted to linear form: 
                                   
where             
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Similarly, the rate of use and availability of purified water can also be modeled. The water 
requirement for purified wastewater may not exceed the total available amount, either. This 
correspondence gives the volume of plants that can either only or also be watered thus (e.g. plants 
for energy use).    
  
                          
equation converted to linear form: 
                                 
where             
For the other players, we similarly have to define the correspondences of the functions 
defined by complications, for which the system can be found in the cited publications, before 
adding numeric data. 
In light of the above facts, it can be stated that if we design our agricultural systems for the 
use of biomass as energy by allocating the complicating energy source (in this case, water) into an 
equilibrium state right at the beginning with Game Theory methods, then the planning process is 
also applicable to the sustainability criteria system. The actual result of the entire analysis can be 
one of the following: either we won’t over-calculate water usage (over-calculate, as in the allocation 
won’t be disproportionate), or we will discard the project entirely because it doesn’t abide by the 
sustainability criteria, since if it’s clear at this point that the amount of water at hand is insufficient 
to reach the Pareto optimal production state, then the shortage of water causes a water-deficit in the 
analyzed system.  
3.4.2. Defining input and output connections with Game Theory correlations 
GAME THEORY MODELING OF MIDDLE CUBE CONNECTIONS (LEVEL 2) 
Keeping the middle cube in position and solving the row or layer imitates the zero sum 
game, since the position of the middle cube can not be changed, so it serves as a fix point for the 
rotation of the other cubes. Their position is fixed (meaning they can’t be rotated out of their 
position, or correspondence systems) and their defined value elements can be considered constant 
(Figure 40). 
 
Figure 40: Zero sum games are always illustrated with the fixed middle cube (circled), which 
serve as criteria for the optimization of edge cubes (two colors). 
Source: self-made. 
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Definition: 
A  game with   players is called a constant sum game, if the sum of the wins and losses 
of the player is a constant  , regardless of strategy. 
Formula:  
  
 
               
   
Where    , the game is zero sum.
Thesis:  
With the zero sum game, we do a constant sum optimization because the resource has a 
limited sum due to the fixed point trait; therefore, the goal is to harmonically divide the resources at 
hand, and we search for the point of equilibrium of the attribute group (Figure 41). During the 
SMART analysis, we verified that the orange middle cube of Rubik’s Cube shows a “not allowed 
difference” attribute. Currently, the inherent attribute group of the orange side is the monetary value 
of the project, and the time needed for payoff. The analysis of this trait with Game Theory 
optimization methods shows us how the fixed resources of the low-carbon project will optimize
themselves into a Nash equilibrium.      
The imbalance on Figure 41 can be ascribed to the insufficiency of the stability of external 
factors which have an impact on the payoff of the investment. We have to analyze the 
circumstances of market entry of the newcomer. 
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It isn’t easy to solve the problem if there are attributes in the group which are non-market 
elements (externals) but nevertheless have an impact on the time required for payoff (e.g. tax- and 
regulation policy, pollution control, foreign currency policy, etc.).   
Proof: 
I defined the points of Nash equilibrium for the middle cubes of Rubik’s Cube (four different fixed 
attributes) by searching for the attributes which aren’t part of the Pareto optimal state. 
  player constant sum games can be used to demonstrate the points of equilibrium for the four 
different attributes. 
If we take a                     point of equilibrium, we can define that
                                     for every       .
and 
                                      for every      .
and 
                                      for every      .
and 
                                      for every      .
The game is zero sum, therefore 
                                                                    
The second equality goes as follows 
                                                                                  
For either attribute to get a “not allowed difference” tag, as                  
                                     
Prevalent for a constant sum game’s every strategy as follows:
                                                                                
                                                                               
The point of equilibrium of the four player constant sum game ceases, if a shift in strategy happens 
for either of the factors:                                   
thus the shift in strategy (the change of any element of strategies) leads to inequality, 
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This inequality-system states that if player one chooses a strategy different from    and thus leaves 
the                  equilibrium and the game itself, his payoff-function can only be either equal to
or lower than that of the others. If the fourth player differs in a not allowed manner but the others 
don’t change their strategies, then his payoff-function will also be equal to or lower compared to the 
                       of the others.
                                          
Since this is a zero sum game, meaning the total payment can neither get higher or lower, the 
payoff-function of the                        factors will either be equal to or greater as well.
3.4.3. Imaging algorithms of Output-side 
One of the popular types of non-cooperative Game Theory solutions is conflict alleviation 
methods. From these, we can highlight the axiomatic solution system of Nash, which creates axiom 
aggregations in order to assure the solution always places on the Pareto-line. The Kálai-
Smorodinsky solution defines the minimum reachable or the last available point (meaning worst 
acceptable) to the solution of the conflict by defining the worst possible leaving point of the 
conflict.  
GAME THEORY MODELING OF OUTPUT SIDE (LEVEL 3) 
The phase of setting the final equilibrium state by the corner switch on the leaving side, the 
equilibrium search, and the finalization of the sustainability criteria can usually only be done with 
cooperative strategy.
Definition: 
Cooperative games can be defined by the following concepts.            as in 
aggregation of players, where the  subset is known as a coalition:    . Let  be an aggregation 
of the subsets, meaning the aggregation of possible coalitions. The  main aggregation is called 
coalition total.
Thesis: 
In low-carbon investment concepts, the project generates energy drawn from renewable 
sources, but the produced electricity can only reach the consumer if the owners of both the green 
electricity producer (Investor/B) and the electricity system (System/H) agree with each other that 
the product reaches the consumer through the system. A criterion of cooperation is that the investor 
pays a usage/transport fee to the owner of the system, and the owner acknowledges that instead of 
the previous (fossilized) product, he transports a private product via the system, and in a lower 
volume. As compensation, the system gets the pay from the investor. This compromise, in essence, 
means that there has to be a valid agreement on provisioning conditions on the market. We tried to 
match the “green-yellow-orange” attribute cube of the previously established Rubik’s Cube project 
planning method with the model, and to assign the proper strategy to the cooperation.  
Proof:  
We can introduce our conflict-alleviation method with a two-player game. In the example, 
let the players’ strategies be represented by   and   , and the two payoff-functions by          .
The aggregation of possible payoffs will therefore be 2D, and can be shown as follows:
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In this case, as always, the payoff of both players aims at maximization, but naturally the 
various payoffs of one player depend on that of the other and the fact that raising one player’s 
payoff will lower the other’s stands as a rule. Therefore, the objective is to find a solution that is 
acceptable to both the investor and the system owner, meaning both parties simultaneously. We also 
have to state that in case of the agreement not being “signed,” both parties get a lower payoff, or a 
punishment. 
Standard representations:  
            
this will be our standard payoff vector, where we assume that there is a           where    
   , and       . The problem is defined mathematically with the pair. This pair was defined in
Figure 5. We also assume that aggregation H is not open, convex, or bounded, so in the case of:                           
           and bounded in both coordinates, meaning 
                    
in case of        .
 
Figure 42: Figure of conflict state with the position of the payoff-function 
Source: self-made 
We also assume that the borderline of H is the graph of a          function, which is 
strictly falling in   and is concave. The graph of function   is usually called the Pareto line;
therefore, the conditions of satisfying the optimum criteria of sustainability can be met here. We 
must also take into consideration with the game and solution criteria that no rational player will 
accept a compromise that means a worse payoff than the payoff without agreement.
This way, we can tighten the payoff aggregation as follows: 
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Conclusion: 
We concluded an unorthodox Game Theory optimum search on the different (cube) levels 
for the low-carbon planning of the project development process. During the Game Theory optimum 
search, I defined a theoretic model structure, which means fundamentally placing three different 
types of Game Theory solutions after each other, while keeping tabs on which Game Theory 
method is most efficient for featuring the various economic criteria systems: 
1. Cube level one: non-cooperative three player game (for the correction of not allowed 
differences on Input side), 
2. Cube level two: non-cooperative zero sum game (for the correction of not allowed 
differences of middle cube connections), 
3. Cube level three: conflict alleviation method with two player game (for the correction of not 
allowed differences on Output side). 
The three different Game Theory models can together define the states of Nash equilibrium 
required during project development, which help achieve sustainability during the realization of the 
project. The sufficient selection of Nash equilibrium is possible through the SMART value 
definition based on the correspondence system of the cubes. An introduction to this will be given 
later in this document. However, we must stress that the Game Theory row that I selected (three 
person cooperative game, non-cooperative zero sum game, conflict-alleviation method) is 
applicable mainly for typified energetic development, and a strictly defined economical 
environment (Hungary and Central Eastern Europe). Therefore, we can say that economic externals 
or development goals that differ from these can allow different Game Theory sequences to be used 
as well.    
3.5. Weighting criteria and cube attributes; the Churchman - Ackoff process of dominance  
As I already mentioned during multi-dimension problem handling, the two opposing cube 
sides (white and yellow) will be our project’s Input and Output sides, respectively, while the 
attribute sets/main agents defining the low-carbon optimization in our demonstrational project will 
be as follows:  
 optimization of strategic objective system (red side)  
 analysis of market opportunities (green side)  
 actualization, technological requirements (blue side) 
 matching financial effects (orange side)   
We might ask – what’s the reason behind defining these main agents as the important 
attribute sets? Naturally, the designation of main agents took place after a careful systematic pre-
selection, the process and methodology of which can be summarized as follows:  
During the selection, we basically need to weight those attributes that have an impact on the 
development process for us to be able to select the most important attributes, which give the 
definitive criteria of the planning of the project or the actualization of investments. The six sides of 
the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube were linked to the attribute sets but, as we’ve already mentioned, the 
opposing sides of the cube (white and yellow) give the Input and Output sides of the project 
process, respectively. In this correlation, the definition of the main agents is narrowed to four 
dominant attributes, which are later assigned to the red, blue, green and orange sides. In the 
methodology section, we already described the specialized steps that gave basis to this selection.  
During the evaluation process and the visualization of the various attributes of the main 
agents, I used the SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) software, so I also applied 
the process of dominance and the data it uses to the software’s data input criteria as well. The 
implemented method uses three different coefficients during the estimation, namely:  
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1.) Summarizing results, applying them to the analysis  
2.) Queries between professional groups  
3.) Direct interventions from professional groups via online correction  
The operative steps of the guided process are as follows:  
Step 1: Arranging layers or attributes (with professional estimation). Interval: 1-100. 
Step 2: Defining subgroups from groups defined by layers, selection of control attribute, which 
will be attributes definable by 50. All control attributes are sorted to their various subgroups. We 
weight the attributes using professional estimation.  
Step 3: Determining importance, using professional estimation. We can define three categories 
of the subgroups by the control attribute, using the professional estimation:  
 more important than control attribute (+) 
 less important than control attribute (-) 
 as important as control attribute (0) 
At the end of the process, the algorithm of the method generates finalized results to the 
attributes according to the given values and answers. Using this, it sorts the attributes into order, 
and sets the sensitivity, meaning the point for which any given attributes show the not allowed 
difference.    
The fossilized-renewable energy changing systems I analyzed can only support steps 1 and 2 
if we don’t define subgroups but assign the control attributes to all four sides. It is advisable to 
include a professional team for step 3 if the basic criteria so suggest. During the process of 
dominance, I provided five different attribute groups, out of which four were selected. I assigned 
these to the various sides of the cube and defined the level of dominance of each main agent. In the 
case of fossilized-renewable energy changing systems, the assumed protocol for weighting 
attributes and cube sides is as follows:  
     Step 1:  
 Summarization of financial effects  
 Technological requirement system 
 Strategic program positioning 
 Examination of market opportunities 
 Adaptation of law and regulations 
Step 2: 
Group 1: weighting of attributes 
Summarization of financial effects: 90 --------►orange 
Adaptation of law and regulations: 70 -----------►green
Examination of market opportunities: 60 --------------►blue
Technological requirement system: 50 -----------------►red
Strategic program positioning:  30 -----------------►not present
Control attribute: Technological requirement system (50 %) 
Step 3: 
Summarization of financial effects: +   
Adaptation of law and regulations: + 
Examination of market opportunities: + 
Technological requirement system: 0 
Strategic program positioning:  - 
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Results of the Churchman-Ackoff process of dominance:    
When summarizing the results of the process of dominance seen above, we can say that 
defining the preference of the four main agents, which have an impact on the project by 
transforming Churchman and Ackoff’s method, is realizable quite easily. The main agent and the 
side/color of the cube match quite well and the correctness of the alternative (  ) is as follows 
(Table 18):
         
   
           
                  
                                            
Table 18: Weighted attributes, importance, and guide to process of dominance  
Attribute group Weighted attributes (wi)
Importance 
analysis Notes
1. Summarization of financial 
effects 90 +
Orange (O) attribute, 
primary preference, starting 
side
2. Legal and regulatory 
adaptation 70 +
Green (G) attribute, since the 
cube usually sorts itself 
clockwise, we put opposing 
attributes on the opposing 
side.
3. Examination of market 
opportunities 60 0
Blue (B) attribute, has lowest 
weight (in this case, this 
doesn’t hold true). 
4. Technological requirement 
system 50 0
Red (R) attribute, position of 
control attribute, backside of 
the cube, point of 
equilibrium.
5. Strategic program positioning 30 -
Not present attribute. Its 
pairing with other dominant 
attributes should be 
examined. as per the 
professional decision, it is
integrated to attribute 2, with 
a 2.7 to 9 ratio. 
  Source: self-made. 
The sorting logic, which can be clearly seen in Table 18, is that the most dominant attribute 
goes to the top side (in our case, this is orange – O), and the weakest attribute opposite to it (which 
is red – R). The reason for this is that the description of their correlation profile (including 
contradictions and errors) can be described best if it’s done through two other attributes (from the 
left, and the right). In our dominance list, the attributes sorted by their weakening should be 
assigned counter-clockwise by their “rate of weakening.” The gist of the order is that attribute 
groups which have a stronger dominance are assumed to be in a stronger order, while the attribute 
groups that show weaker dominance might fall further from the point of equilibrium. The cube’s top 
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side will be taken by the attribute group showing the strongest relevance, while the one that shows 
the weakest will be positioned opposite to it, on the cube’s bottom side. Rotating the cube into order 
usually happens clockwise in different algorithms, meaning they are optimized via the fastest route 
after the various steps. This is why we define the other two sets counter-clockwise (according to 
their dominance values), which is why the stronger cube attribute group falls right to the orange 
side (which is green), and the weaker, third most dominant to its left side (which is blue).  
3.6. Application of usefulness functions to link attributes of main sides  
One of the most important steps of project development using Rubik’s Cube is how we 
choose the attribute elements of the analysis system from the attribute group (of one main agent) 
which was defined by process of dominance beforehand. The attribute groups, meaning the main 
agents assigned to the cube’s sides, have part-attributes defined by the single-colored middle cubes, 
the dual-colored edge cubes, and the tri-colored corner cubes. The selection of small cubes is 
dependent on the basic outline of Rubik’s Cube, meaning that we considered the white side handled 
as Input, and the yellow side considered Output, while also taking into consideration the surfaces 
which represent attribute groups opposite of, or next to each other (the other four sides), which are 
part of the optimum assortment of our project’s environmental effects during the process of 
optimization. I used multi-variable usefulness functions to define the inner part-attributes of the 
main agents assigned to the cube sides, in other words, the small cubes.  
Using multi-variable usefulness functions  
Decision makers must take the prevention of environmental problems and those other 
economic problems into consideration that can surface due to the cessation of various products and 
processes. Without including the benefits and setbacks of these consequences, there can be no 
decision. The multi-attribute usefulness theory handles problems where the effect of the decision is 
defined by two or more variables. We generally assume that all attributes have either discrete or 
continuous values. For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that discrete attributes were defined in a 
way that higher usefulness values are matched with higher attribute values, if everything else is 
unchanged:  
Let               be the attributes, 
and x = ⟨x1, x2, …, xn⟩ be the values of the attribute vectors, to define the 
U(x1, …, xn) usefulness function. 
System of preferences, interpretation of multi-variable usefulness functions 
Multi-attribute usefulness theory assumes that usefulness functions have a well-defined 
structure. The accepted theoretic approach says that we identify regularities in the preferences of 
behavior and by using the so-called representation theses we can show that the attribute which has a 
preference system can be defined by a usefulness function as follows:  
U (x1, …, xn) = f  [f1(x1), …,fn(xn)]
where f is hopefully a simple function, e.g. an addition. It’s obvious that this correspondence is 
similar to how we used the probability webs to break the summarized probability distribution 
function. This is important because we also demonstrate the probability distribution of the various 
attribute groups of Rubik’s Cube in a network-like manner.  
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Preferences without insecurity  
The basic regularity found in the deterministic preference structure is called preferential 
independence. Two attributes, X1 and X2 are preferentially independent of X3, if the preference 
between ⟨          ⟩ and ⟨             ⟩ isn’t dependent on X3 ’s exact value. 
This definition – preferential independence – is important to the Rubik’s Cube 
methodology’s defining of dominance, because this “sorting” is based on quick optimization which 
only includes important attributes, which is why e.g. Indian software developers also chose this 
method (RCM) to renew old software applications.  
If X 1 , …,  n attributes are both preferentially independent, the behavior preference of the agent 
can be defined by maximizing the function below: 
    ,….            
where each Vi is a value function, dependent only on the Xi attribute.
This type of value function is called an additive value function. Additive value functions 
offer a perfectly seamless method of describing value functions of important attributes and are 
applicable to many “real life” situations. Even if the cost preference function doesn’t hold true 
completely, this value function can still offer a proper option for the preferences of main agents. 
This is true even for a case when the cost preference function is only damaged in intervals, which 
compile scenarios rarely happening in real life.  
We can see in the demonstration above that an investment decision can be based on the important 
definitive agents, main attributes via classic decision-making mechanisms, even while disregarding 
main attributes like  
 risks of market and regulation circumstances,  
 effects on environment, climate change, etc.  
helping us in making our investment decisions. In the case of the methodology based on the 
solution of Rubik’s Cube, that for the inner attributes of the cube sides (main agents), we can’t base 
a decision on preference independence, but when we have to make decisions on the comparison of 
main agents’ connections, this is outright mandatory.  
One of the most valuable characteristics of the sustainability evaluation using Rubik’s Cube, 
is that it can handle the various usefulnesses assigned to either main agents (cube sides) or 
definitive attributes, together with the correspondence systems and the other main agents (assigned 
to the cube’s other sides). Besides 2D (x,y) it can also define 3D (x,y,z) connections as well, and 
can identify the various attributes with effects via the rotations. The reason for this is that the dual-
colored cubes can have 2D, while the three-colored cubes can have 3D attributes assigned to them, 
meaning it’s applicable to handling of attributes which are linked to two or three main agents 
simultaneously.   
The attributes inherent in the cubes can be interpreted in various ways. (Since the white and 
yellow sides mean the Input and Output sides of the process, respectively, their functional 
interpretation differs from that of the other four sides during the solution). In order to make the 
connection clear, I’ll demonstrate the correspondence on the next illustration (Figure 42). The 2D 
marking is for cubes and attributes which are dual-colored (e.g. the blue-orange edge cube on 
Figure 42), while the 3D marking is for cubes or connection attribute characteristics which have 
three colors. On illustration 43, the blue-red-yellow corner cube can be called a typified 3D 
attribute.  
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Figure 43: 2D and 3D interpretation of cube side, or main agent  
Source: self-made. 
  2D cube attributes mean that the edge cubes have attributes assigned to them which are 
influenced by the other main agent (orange). 3D cube attributes mean that (in our case, the) blue 
corner cube has attributes which are influenced by two other main agents (red and yellow), and vice 
versa. Marking the elements of the main agents/cube sides with an attribute therefore has to depend 
on its position on this specific side as well. This means that marking the small cubes with attributes 
and defining their usefullness and dominance in the main agents is possible in regards to this. I did 
the usefulness analysis with the SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) attribute 
evaluation software, which was based on the process evaluation and Game Theory optimization 
levels shown in Table 12. Table 19 shows how the levels of the project planning model were synced 
with the attribute analyses of the SMART software application.     
   Table 19: Syncing SMART evaluation levels to modeling levels  
SMART 
EVALUATION 
LEVEL
LEVEL OF 
MODEL 
DEVELOPMENT
/LOW-CARBON/ PROJECT ATTRIBUTE IN QUESTION
(1D/2D/3D - # of inherent traits)
Level 1
INPUT “White cross” – defining the starting criteria (1D, 2D)
INPUT “White corner” – defining the sustainable development routes, 
equilibrium-search, non-cooperative optimum (3D)
Level 2
MIDDLE CUBE “Second row” – anchoring of relation points, achieving equilibrium, 
arranging two-dimensional attributes, positioning fixed point (1D, 2D)
MIDDLE CUBE “Yellow cross” – indirect synchronizing of input/output sides (1D, 2D)
Level 3
OUTPUT “Yellow corner” – interpretation of sustainability attributes during the 
arrangement of outputs (3D)
OUTPUT “Yellow side edge-switch” – strict synchronizing of input/output sides 
(2D)
OUTPUT “Corner switch” – the phase of setting the final balance, achieving 
equilibrium, finalizing sustainability attributes (3D)
  Source: self-made. 
3.6.1. Interpretation of three-level logical analysis   
The three-way layout of the search for optimum using Game Theory models (Input, middle 
cube, Output) already showed us that though the planning levels of the project development based 
on the solution of Rubik’s Cube follow the solution logic, it is advisable to brake the process of 
searching for equilibrium into greater units, meaning some phases (NO1-7) should be merged. 
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During the preparation of the three-level analyses, the first two solution phases (NO1, NO2) were 
brought to the Input level. The next two solution phases (NO3, NO4) were assigned to the middle 
cube, and the last three (NO5, NO6, NO7) to the Output. Therefore, I merged the seven phases 
connected to the layer by layer (meaning row to row) solution method of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, 
and defined three analysis levels, which are as follows:  
1. Cube level 1: Correction of not allowed differences on the Input side (Figure 43.), 
2. Cube level 2: Correction of not allowed differences on the middle cube level (Figure 44.), 
3. Cube level 3: Correction of not allowed differences on the Output side (Figure 45.). 
(Note: I defined “not allowed difference” as a not sustainable attribute in the attribute set) 
On the first cube level (or “layer”), I marked 21 attributes by defining 9 cubes. These, 
interpreted together with the neighboring cubes, which are edge cubes (4×2) and corner cubes
(4×3), and also a single middle cube, are also defined in the other (yellow, blue, green, and red) 
main agent dimensions (Figure 44).  
 
Figure 44: Interpretation of first cube level (Input side)  
Source: self-made. 
The next level can be specified by defining the middle interpretation zone (1×1×3) of the 
cube. In this case, we put 12 inner attributes into the interpretation dimension. This means four edge 
cubes (4×2) and four middle cubes (4×1), meaning we have to calculate with eight cubes as system 
elements (Figure 45).  
 
Figure 45: Interpretation of second cube level, or middle cube connections  
Source: self-made. 
In the last step of defining the interpretation dimensions (levels), similarly to the first step, I 
marked 21 attributes by defining 9 cubes. These, interpreted together with the neighboring cubes, 
which are edge cubes (4×2) and corner cubes (4×3), and also a single middle cube, are also defined 
in the other main agent dimensions (Figure 46).  
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Figure 46: Interpretation of third cube level (Output side) 
Source: self-made. 
We therefore made attribute sets for the SMART evaluation by grouping the middle, edge 
and corner cubes of the first, second and third rows by solution level. We can say that in the case of 
cube attributes definable by values, we have to realize that we can define our entire system with 
9+8+9= 26 complex attributes, which have another 54 independent attributes, apart from the main 
agents (6x9). We also have to stress that because of the complex attribute handling (1D, 2D, 3D), 
this analysis can also clearly define the correspondence systems of the various attributes. 
3.7. SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) analysis  
To interpret the attributes of the cubes and to define the attributes associable to the small 
cubes, I chose the SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking System) method, which can handle 
and illustrate 2D and 3D attributes at the same time. I chose the analysis method as defined in the 
methodology segment, which method counts as a one of a kind software application in terms of 
visually illustrating different attributes. 
The process of the SMART analysis was as follows:  
1. Evaluating the results of process of dominance conducted on main agents, input of data, 
2. Defining the small cube attributes of examination levels, and the estimated usefulness 
values, 
3. Creation of SMART Tables and illustration in 3D.  
Using the results of the Churchman-Ackoff process of dominance analysis, the beginning 
data of the SMART evaluation is as follows (where I defined the color/attribute matches according 
to the results of said process of dominance analysis): 
Group 1: weighting of attributes 
Summarization of monetary effects: 90 --------►orange 
Adaptation of law and regulations: 70 -----------►green
Examination of market opportunities: 60 --------------►blue
Technological criteria system:  50 -----------------►red
Strategic program positioning:  30 -----------------►not present
In the previous chapter, we answered the question of how we can match the solution 
algorithms with the different levels for the process of project planning based on Rubik’s Cube, and,
with the Churchman-Ackoff method, we get the four most important attributes from the list of 
attributes which have an impact on it, namely those we can match to the cube’s sides. If white (W) 
is the Input side, then the most dominant attribute group is matched with the orange (O) side, which 
gives us our WO base side pair, from where we continue clockwise around the white side and the 
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following side pairs of white-blue (WB), white-red (WR), and white-green (WG) will define the 
relevant attributes (agents) in the planning process.  
The sorting criteria is that the most dominant attribute gets placed on the top (in our case, 
this is orange – O), and the least dominant attribute goes opposite to this side, meaning the bottom 
(in our case, this is red – R). The reason for this is that the description of their connection profiles 
(including the contradictions and errors) can be defined best if it happens via a transaction through 
two other attributes (left and right sides). In our dominance list, the weakening attributes located in 
the middle are arranged by their “order of weakening,” namely counter-clockwise. The gist of the 
ranking is that the attribute groups that show a stronger dominance are supposedly in better order, 
while the attribute group of weaker dominance is supposedly further from the point of equilibrium. 
The attribute group with the strongest relevance will be placed on the top, the weakest relevance 
attribute group will be opposite to this side, and finally, we define the remaining two groups by 
their “order of dominance,” namely, counter-clockwise. Since the solution of the cube usually 
happens clockwise in the various algorithms, the parts are optimized towards the point of 
equilibrium through the steps of process following the shortest route to solution, which explains 
why we position the most dominant attribute groups to the green side on the right of our starting 
orange side, and the third strongest dominant attribute group to the blue side on the left of our 
starting orange side.  
Definition of usefulness functions 
Compared to our analysis method, the SMART software offers a general function-definition 
method. The data and criteria introduced in the next structure can be simply added to the database 
of the program and be evaluated with the help of the plug-in algorithms. 
SMALL
CUBE 
NUMBER
USEFULNESS 
(1-100) 
(assumed)
CONNECTION,
DIMENSION 
VALUE
SMART 
VALUE (V)
CUBE TYPE AND 
DOMINANCE
MAIN AGENT INHERENT 
ATTRIBUTES
 
When compiling the tables, the conversion of usefulness functions into usefulness values 
took place by applying the following steps: 
1. the maximum value is assigned a score of 100, 
2. the minimum value is assigned a score of 0,  
3. after defining the two border values, we can also define the middle usefulness value (meaning 
half-useful compared to the maximum), which is assigned a score of 50, 
4. after defining the maximum border value and the middle value, we can also define the 
usefulness value in-between them, which is assigned a score of 75, 
5. after defining the minimum border value and the middle value, we can also define the 
usefulness value in-between them, which is assigned a score of 25. 
 Using a similar method, we can get inner function values and we can mathematically assign 
an interpolation to the points that we get this way. The sufficiency of the alternatives is defined by 
the weighted mean of the usefulness value. I indicated the connection dimension values (which is 
also clearly visible in Table 10) as follows: 3/3 for the three-level connections (corner cubes), 2/3 
for three-level connections (edge cubes), and 1/3 for the fixed middle cubes. In regards to this, the 
usefulness-function for main graph or main attribute is as follows: 
    ,….         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
                      
              
                                
According to the equation above, by portraying the SMART values for the various levels, we obtain 
clear knowledge on the attributes which have an impact on the different dimensions of usefulness 
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for the main agent. We can view the inherent attributes of the main agents (O,R,G,B), their relations 
to each other, and the usefulness attributes of the Input side in Table 20. 
Table 20: Generating SMART Input values for data insertion (’►X’ = usefulness)
MIDDLE WHITE (1D) – energy rationalization   Dominance: 100   (100) max value 
OUTER WHITE (2D) Dominance: Orange/90; Green/70; Blue/60; Red/50  
strategy, regulation base connection (WG),      100/70 ► 85
basic technological requirement (WR),       100/50 ► 75
financing expectations (WO),        100/90 ► 95
basic market positioning (WB)       100/60 ► 80
CORNER WHITE (3D) –  
basic criteria of market payoff (WOB),       100/90/60 ► 83,3
conformity to monetary tools and regulation criteria (WOG),    100/90/70 ► 86,6
syncing basic goals with technological threats and market priorities (WBR), 100/60/50 ► 70
basic criteria designation of matching set of strategies and technologies (WGR),  100/70/50 ► 73,3
   Source: self-researched 
After the input of data generated in Table 20, the SMART Bubble Chart Pro (demo version) creates 
the attribute illustrations via the “Value Score” point rating system, which is useful because the 
attributes compared to each other can be differentiated visually as well, regardless of that happening
by their correctness or their strategic usefulness. Figure 47 shows the input data table of the 
SMART program.  
 
Figure 47: 2D figure of the results table of the SMART program 
Source: self-made based on SMART program 
The equilibrium state of the Input side is unstable, as evidenced by the F1 attribute, which is the 
basic attribute designation of matching set of strategies and technologies (WGR/white-green-red). 
Figure 7 shows the attributes and their positions in the attribute group. If we click on the sphere, we 
get the coordinates (x,y,z) for it, which translate to special usefulness functions. Because of the 3D 
depiction, both the correspondence of attributes and the depth of said correspondences can be easily 
interpreted in Figure 48.  
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Figure 48: Depiction of results and non-equilibrium attributes of SMART program output 
Source: self-made based on SMART program 
With the aid of the SMART program, I evaluated the Input side (as seen on Figures 6 and 7), 
the middle cube side-attributes, and the Output side. The tables and summarizing illustrations 
related to the evaluation can be found in Appendices 2, 3, and 4.  
To summarize the analysis, we can say that I was successful in assigning the project 
development factors to the side colors of Rubik’s Cube going by the dominance of the attribute 
groups. The process of dominance analysis conducted with the SMART pilot program and the 
summary of its results is as follows: 
 The definition of input and output sides of project attributes by picturing them to the 
white and yellow cube sides was completed, 
 In the case of the main attributes, orange was the most dominant with red the least 
dominant; therefore, the dominance values are the highest for orange and the lowest for 
red. If the orange side is in the front, then we find the red side opposite to it, where green 
goes to the right, and blue goes to the left of orange, 
 Going by the dominance, defined in the methodology part, the strongest attribute was 
assigned to orange, the second strongest assigned to green, the third strongest assigned to 
blue, while the weakest assigned to red, following the strength of dominance,  
 I separated the analysis method (including the various attribute groups) into three 
different parts – 1) Input ► 2) Middle cube ►3) Output – for the sake of applicability of 
the Game Theory methods, and the SMART analysis, 
 We can set the Game Theory optimization for the “selection of technology for base 
criteria” attribute of the Input side, because this is where the SMART program showed a 
not allowed difference, 
 We can set the Game Theory optimization for the “monetary value of the project, and the 
time needed for payoff” attribute of the Middle cube side, because this is where the 
SMART program showed a not allowed difference, 
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 We can set the Game Theory optimization for the “market criteria system, balancing of 
market instruments and provisions” attribute of the Output side, because this is where the 
SMART program showed a not allowed difference, 
 Therefore, the results of the analyses on project evaluation of project planning processes 
for projects which aim at advancement from fossilized energy sources to renewable ones 
is that the attributes with the most impact are as follows: selection of technology for base 
criteria (Input side), which has the biggest impact on reaching equilibrium, monetary 
value of the project, and the time needed for payoff (Middle side, or correspondence 
attribute group) which, if interpreted in a manner more suited to sustainability, will bring 
us closer to the sustainable economical value, and market criteria system, balancing of 
market instruments and provisions (Output side), which needs proper and balanced 
planning, for the imbalances it causes may lead to a failed project.     
3.8. New and novel scientific results 
During the analysis of the sources and the completed methodical analyses, I will introduce 
the results in two groups: Cn (new scientific conclusions) for the scientific results, which can later 
be introduced as theses after further research or proper expansion of the analyzed data, and Rn (new 
scientific results) for the ones that can be defined as scientific theses in the current research.   
3.8.1. New scientific conclusions 
C1: The correspondence systems of project specifics which have an impact on the “shelf-
life” and sustainability of enviro-orientated investments or investments that have a positive impact 
on climate change can be defined through Rubik’s Cube’s “Layer by layer” solution method and the 
Game Theory models assigned to the various phases of the method.  
C2: The actual use – including the designation of correct points of equilibrium for – of Game 
Theory models for sustainable modeling of economical events often becomes harder, due to the 
many criteria which come into play. During the search for sustainable points of equilibrium with 
Game Theory models, the simple function-like definition of the correspondence systems of 
compared attributes and the level-by-level handling of said correspondence systems based on 
simple planning phases makes realization easier and more sufficient. 
C3: I used multi-variable trial functions for the selection of attribute groups which can be 
defined as “having a negative impact on the equilibrium of sustainable project planning and 
realization.” In the various phases of project development – using process of dominance and 
usefulness-functions – leads the project’s successful realization towards the proper process and 
helps correct this. 
C4: According to my hypotheses, low-carbon project development or planning processes can 
be called parallel with the layer by layer solution method of Rubik’s Cube. By assigning the various 
sides and colors to project attributes, we can realize a special and sustainable project development 
process in which the specifics of the process and development is achieved through the fact that the 
various attributes or attribute groups can be regarded as either one, two or three-dimensional system 
elements in the development programs. The same guiding theory is followed by low-carbon 
development and the solution system of Rubik’s Cube, which strives to reach the point of 
equilibrium through logic and low energy input.    
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3.8.2. New scientific results 
R1: My comparison assessments verified that the various sustainability logics can be 
synchronized with the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube’s solution algorithms, where the relations of the cube’s 
sides define a planning strategy that provides a new scientific approach for investment planning. 
The first two solution algorithms out of the seven correlate with the Input factors of the investment 
planning process, the third and fourth describe the correspondence system of the starting and the 
finishing phases, while the remaining three can be associated with the attributes of the Output side. 
R2: My analyses verified that the state of equilibrium for the Input side of the project 
development process, which also guarantees sustainability, can also be defined using a simple 
constant sum game or non-cooperative game of finite kind. The correspondence systems and the 
relative points of equilibrium of the Input and Output sides can also be described with the conflict 
alleviation method, zero sum game, or oligopolistic game of finite kind. The point of equilibrium 
for the Output side of the development process can also be described with a cooperative 
oligopolistic game or cooperative strategies for Nash equilibrium. 
R3: I used different calculations to verify that the corner cubes of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube 
have a key role in the search process for the point of equilibrium or sustainability optimum. Their 
rotation combination, based on synchronizing three attributes, may offer investment programs a 
perfect Nash equilibrium. Without setting this, there’s no final balance between the Input and 
Output sides, and the flexibility of the system is greatly lowered since it didn’t adapt the criteria 
which mean the ability of adapting to the possible changes in system attributes, and the relative 
elongation of “shelf-life.”
R4: One of the most valuable characteristics of the sustainability evaluation using the 3×3×3 
Rubik’s Cube is that it can handle the correspondence system and various usefulness cases assigned 
to the attributes defining the evaluation simultaneously with all the other defining attributes (which 
are assigned to the remaining sides of the cube). It can define both the two-dimensional (x,y) and 
three-dimensional (x,y,z) connections and can identify the attributes which have an impact on the 
various factors using the order of rotation. We can associate dual-colored edge cubes with 2D 
attributes and tri-colored corner cubes with 3D interpretations, meaning it can also handle attributes 
which simultaneously belong to two or three main agents. 
R5: I also showed that the process of sustainable business planning can be aptly defined with 
Game Theory models which model a sustainable project development process for the layer by layer 
solution method algorithms of Rubik’s Cube. My examinations verified that a project development 
process can be considered sustainable if the following criteria are met:      
A. The existence of a technologically sufficient planning option (to avoid over-planning and 
obsoleteness) 
B. Optimization of liquidity and financial sustainability is met (safe self-sufficiency and 
revenue for at least 10 years) 
C. Avoiding detrimental project effects on the relevant product areas (functionally self-
sufficient system). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF 
SUSTAINABLITY 
As it became obvious from the process of cited literature, we can find very different 
approaches on the interpretation of sustainability in economics. It is therefore a basic dilemma when 
defining sustainability systems/strategies whether we should employ the theoretical 
correspondences of either weak or strong sustainability for the various interpretations. The 
difference between weak and strong sustainability is basically defined by the relations between 
environmental and artificial funds. The theory of weak sustainability states that environmental and 
artificial funds can replace each other. However, the relatively new index of total economic value 
(TEV) – which is an up-to-date economic adaptation that also includes environmental value – still 
can not properly handle the resource transformation questions regarding the time-value of money. 
This question was sufficiently answered by sustainable economic value (abbreviated as SEV), 
which is an estimation method that can – with the inclusion and goal-oriented use of local 
information – portray the changes in both environmental, social and technological fund-elements in 
an integrated manner, which is only partially realized by total economic value. Said total economic 
value (abbreviated as TEV) supports one of the newer economic branches, the so-called system of 
“low-carbon economy.”
The gist of the low-carbon economy concept is that it prefers structures which operate with 
low energy- and matter input on the level of the local economy or market, therefore considering the 
criteria for long-term proper handling of resources as assured. Therefore, we can rightfully rely on 
the priority system of the low carbon economy during the interpretation of criteria connected to 
sustainability, which is a concept aiming for equilibrium defined with what we can call the currently 
most advanced approach. Obviously, the sustainability interpretations search for solutions on the 
usage of resources, realizable concepts and actual models, the use of which will result in 
equilibrium. We may therefore think that to model sustainability in the future, the only sufficient 
scientific approaches are the ones that can offer well-defined and clear-cut solutions.  
Main conclusions of reviewing cited literature: 
- The economic interpretation of sustainability still has many inherent difficulties, as a result 
of which its imaging is far from the level of operative realization. Today, the sustainability 
criteria and economic criteria can most definitely be caught in the professional guides on 
low-carbon economy, which are considered acceptable enviro- or climate strategy guides by 
both political decision-makers and market participants. 
- The question of the handling and sustainable use of resources opened new possibilities in the 
search for economic equilibrium in the last few years, one of which was the highly 
interesting and amusing solution of using Game Theory methods. Despite the many 
disappointments and losses of trust that Game Theory strategy models suffered in terms of 
economical decisions, we can say that the new theoretical approaches, new ways of finding 
the proper Nash equilibrium, and the use of simplified models is a reassuring occurrence 
coming from the field of mathematic modeling. 
- During the process of cited literature, I already mentioned the new low-carbon software 
development approach, which can mean a new recycling method for old and out-of-date 
software. This solution can be used to satisfy new consumer needs through software 
applications, while using much smaller inputs of materials and effort, which means re-
entering the market with our “dead” product. The secret of this software-regeneration is 
using the layer by layer, meaning row by row, solution method of Rubik’s Cube as a base, 
which imitates the solution of the 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube, thereby “knocking” the 
development process into the proper state of equilibrium through a multitude of short 
interactions, which also correlates with new consumer needs.  
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Main conclusions of my personal research: 
- The sustainability criteria and the classic “layer by layer” solution method of Rubik’s Cube 
can be synchronized with each other. The analysis of connections between the basic 
structure, the sustainability interpretation, and the solution algorithms of Rubik’s Cube 
verify that the process leading to the cube’s configurational balance is a process of searching 
for equilibrium, which in our case is also applicable to model the equilibrium search of 
enviro-defense processes. 
- My analyses on Game Theory strategy models show that in today’s practice, we can find a 
multitude of economic strategy models that don’t really work as intended. The reason for 
this is basically the over-complication of the models and the inclusion of the multitude of 
factors and criteria. In order to save the process of modeling and the actual mechanisms of 
the models from falling into the category of “too complicated, no thanks,” we require a 
simplified and yet correctly working model that is easy to interpret, can be properly loaded 
with different data, and easy to correct. My three-level “unorthodox Game Theory optimum 
search” model, which is compatible with Game Theory models, offers a solution for this 
challenge. 
- During the analysis of the Game Theory models and the strategic optimum search systems, I 
came to the conclusion that it is more beneficial to use smaller, individual and unique Game 
Theory solutions which have different reactions in a business environment to describe the 
process of equilibrium search instead of using complex multi-factor model-structures to 
describe the entire process in the form of functions. In case of development processes for 
renewable energy production, in other words, advancement from fossilized to renewable 
energy sources, by dividing the development program to three levels, then using non-
cooperative Game Theory method for the first, constant or zero sum game for the second, 
and finally, to define output criteria, cooperative Nash-equilibrium search with multi-player 
oligopolistic game for the third, offers a more beneficial result.  
- The unorthodox Game Theory method I described suggests – during the phase of actual use 
– that we use function characteristics which are flexible time-wise for the various levels 
(input, middle cube/correspondence, and output); therefore, it may prove applicable to 
model more complicated processes if we form an optimum search process through the 
consecutive use of many simple Game Theory models. These methods/games can also be 
changed and flexibly adapted to different economic criteria systems, according to the 
changes in business environment.  
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5. EXPLANATIONS AND COMMENTS TO THE RUBIK’S CUBE LOGIC
The topic of the dissertation is the novel approach of the characteristics related to 
sustainability by applying game theory models. The primary goal of the research is to support the 
planning process – despite the economic and political instability – of sustainable investments 
aiming at environment protection or greatly influencing climate change.  
Game theory solutions are used widely nowadays to carry out the tasks of strategy-creation 
or to solve other technical and resource consumption related problems in business life. They plan an 
important role in solving situations in which the opposing interests of more decision makers must 
be taken into consideration at the same time and the circumstances of the situation depend highly on 
individual decisions of different decision makers and on the effects of decision strategies on each 
other.  
Game theory solutions may find the sufficient balance point to develop decisions in many 
cases, however, we usually face situations in which, due to the great number and difficulty of 
factors influencing the circumstances, game theory solutions show more balance points. This makes 
the selection of the right decision more difficult, or in a worse case, they cannot find solutions 
(which are difficult to write down with the use of mathematical relations) among the circumstances. 
Therefore, during processing the relevant literature, I emphasized the introduction of the classic and 
the new approach of the relations of economic value and sustainability, because the interpretation of 
sustainability still carries many difficulties which cause the practical implementation to be hardly 
achieved. 
Many think that the key of interpreting sustainability is to be able to conceptualize the 
criteria-system and requirements of sustainability through function-like relations, as well. The 
mathematical interpretation of sustainability factors, the introduction of sustainable economic 
balance or company strategies through a game theory approach, and interpreting the search for 
classic and sustainable economic balance points are challenges for which many theories, scientific 
papers, generative formulas and a great number of scientific attempts have been connected for 
decades now, but none of them has been fully successful. 
The project-development method shown in the dissertation, based on the functionally 
structured solving process of the Rubik’s Cube, which uses a layer by layer method to search for the 
optimal solution of sustainable project-development by using game theory solutions, uses a
conceptionally different approach compared to earlier ones. 
The essence of the shown Rubik logical approach is that the factors influence the actors of 
the economy or the circumstances around the actors are handled individually. The balance points 
related to them are organized into levels by game theory solutions that can primarily be organized 
linearly, then the solutions possessing balance points are flexibly adapted. The specialty of the 
method lies in the fact that through the method of solving the Rubik’s Cube, the development 
processes can be carried out in a way in which primarily the criteria of sustainability are considered, 
again and again. 
The above conventionalized “pure” game theory solutions, in other words, the ones which 
give certain balance points, are guaranteed by the selection method introduced during the low-
carbon project-development. The important characteristics are then assigned to the corresponding 
sides of the Rubik’s Cube and to the small tiles during the Churchman - Ackoff method and the 
SMART (Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) utility analysis. 
This way, the unorthodox game theory method - based on the solving of the Rubik’s Cube –
is able to map the external criteria system of market mistakes (which is outside the market criteria 
system, but influences it greatly) burdening the economic environment, and it is the primary criteria 
of existence of carrying out sustainable environment-protection investments. 
It is a social requirement that through exactly defining, typifying, and summarizing the 
external effects of developments supporting sustainable economic structures, patterns (being able to 
written down by mathematic functions) should be defined that can conceptualize the currently 
relevant criteria-system of sustainability for market actors and political decision makers.  
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Following the previous logic, “the low-carbon Rubik’s Cube project-development method” 
presented in the dissertation tries to find a solution for the materialization of sustainability, 
technological, and other, primarily “cleantech” economic development processes so that they can 
happen quickly and in the cheapest way possible but feasibly in the long run.  
The resource environment related to renewable energy source investments was considered as 
a primary research field during the development of “the low-carbon Rubik’s Cube project
development method.” These contain much opposition; however, it has improved very quickly 
throughout the past few years. The Rubik’s Cube method can, hopefully, create the basis of a 
project-development practice which can eliminate the implementation of non-sustainable 
investments in the future, and development processes can be avoided which direct the indicators of 
welfare to a negative trend. 
During the analysis of the set of values or the economic interpretation of sustainability, it
became obvious that the traditional value measuring systems are not able to create a criteria-system 
that provides a basis of a system for sustainable economic evaluation and for the design of 
economic structures feasible on the long run. The project development uses Rubik’s logic and is 
based on game-theory to give a new approach in this process. 
Proven hypotheses: 
- H1: The correspondence system of project characteristics that influence the feasibility and 
sustainability of investments aimed at environmental protection or which influence climate-
change positively can be described by models.  
- H2: During the search for balance, the function-like description of the connection between 
the factors to be compared can be performed by using game-theory methods. 
- H3: The multivariable test functions are capable of selecting the characteristic groups that 
predominantly influence the successful implementation of a project. 
Partly proven hypotheses: 
- H4: By the individual solving algorithms of the 3x3x3 Rubik’s Cube, the sustainability 
principles can be synchronized and the correspondence system of the sides of the cube 
writes down a space-approach and planning strategy, which provides a new scientific 
approach during the planning process of investments.   
As a summary, it was proven in this dissertation – in a credible way – that the scientific 
theory, according to which the solving algorithm of the Rubik’s Cube, the “Layer by layer” 
method, is suitable for creating models for project-development processes. However, the 
correspondence system of certain project characteristics can be represented with the corresponding 
game-theory models in a way that different environment and climate-friendly investments can be 
planned easily from the aspect of human resources and of preserving and improving environmental 
factors as well, in a low-risk economic environment. 
Understanding the solving method and the connection system of Rubik’s Cube, its character 
tiles (middle, corner and edge tiles) can ensure – through game-theory methods – that the criteria-
system conceptualized by sustainable economic value concepts can be modeled through the shortest 
time, with the consideration of using a relatively small amount of resources.  
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A2: CORNER-FIRST METHOD 
Description and formulae of Corners-First solution method for Rubik's Cube 
Based on the manual by Victor Ortega and Josef Jelinek 
Stage I: Solve the corners 
1. Orient U corners
2. Orient D corners
Rotate the whole cube so that D becomes U. Orient the corners depending on which of the seven 
patterns below you see: 
letter T pattern:
R U R' U' F' U' F
letter L pattern:
F R' F' U' R' U R
sune pattern #1:
R U2 R' U' R U' R'
sune pattern #2:
R U R' U R U2 R'
(inverse of #1 in both respects)
letter pi pattern:
R U R2 F' R2 U R'
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letter U pattern:
R' F' U' F U R
letter H pattern:
R2 U2 R' U2 R2
3. Permute all corners, by method of number of solved "edges"
Proceed with one of the following sequences depending on how many solved edges you have: 
0:
F2 R2 F2
1 (DB solved):
R U' F U2 F' U R'
((UB solved): R' U R' B2 R U' R) 
2 (DB and UB solved):
R2 U F2 U2 R2 U R2
4 (D solved):
F2 U' R U' R' U F2 U R U R'
5 (UF not solved):
R U' R F2 R' U R F2 R2
Stage II: Solve the edges 
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At this point, align corners and position centers. The cube is now fully symmetrical, except for the 
edges.  
4. Solve three U edges
5. Solve three D edges
6. Solve one more U or D edge, depending on which is easier
7. Solve last U edge, orient middle layer
a) U edge in the middle layer
In the diagram below, edges A, B, or C are oriented correctly (C) if that facelet's color matches the 
adjacent center or the opposite center. Otherwise it is incorrectly oriented (I). 
(facelet D belongs in facelet position B)
("adjacent center" between A and C)
Edge A Edge B Edge C Pattern Sequence
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C C C R R' R' R
C C I R' R' R' R'
C I C R R2 R
C I I R' R R' R
I C C R2 R R R R'
I C I R' R' R' R R R
I I C R' R' R R
I I I R' R' R' R2 R
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b) U edge in position but twisted
There will be 1 or 3 twisted edges in the middle layer: 
FR twisted:
R U2 R' R2 R' U2 R'
FR not twisted:
R' R' R' R'
c) U edge solved
There will be 0, 2, or 4 edges twisted in the middle layer: 
2 adjacent (FL and FR):
R2 F F' R2 F F'
2 opposite (FL and BR):
F F' R2 F F' R2
all four:
R F2 R2 R R F2 R2 
R
all four, when all edges are 
positioned correctly:
F' U' F ( R)4 F' U F
8. Position middle layer
send FR to BL, BL to BR, and 
BR to FR:
R2 R2 ( )
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exchange centers with 
opposites:
( )
exchange FR with BR, FL with 
BL:
R2 R2 ( )
►READY
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A3: SMART CHART AND RESULTS ILLUSTRATIONS FOR INPUT ATTRIBUTES 
Deterministics of Input (white side) attributes: 
Generating SMART Input values for data insertion (’►X’ = usefulness)
MIDDLE WHITE (1D) – energy rationalization   Dominance: 100   (100) max value 
EDGE WHITE (2D) Dominance: Orange/90; Green/70; Blue/60; Red/50  
strategy, regulation base connection (WG),      100/70 ► 85
basic technological requirement (WR),       100/50 ► 75
financing expectations (WO),        100/90 ► 95
basic market positioning (WB)       100/60 ► 80
CORNER WHITE (3D) 
basic criteria of market payoff (WOB),       100/90/60 ► 83,3
conformity to monetary tools and regulation criteria (WOG),    100/90/70 ► 86,6
syncing basic goals with technological threats and market priorities (WBR),  100/60/50 ► 70
basic criteria designation of matching set of strategies and technologies (WGR),  100/70/50 ► 73,3
SMALL CUBE
NUMBER
USEFULNESS 
(1-100) 
(rounded)
CONNECTION, 
DIMENSION 
VALUE
SMART 
VALUE 
(V)
CUBE TYPE AND 
DOMINANCE
MAIN AGENT 
INHERENT 
ATTRIBUTES
F1 73 3/3 73
corner cube with 
more dominating 
attribute
basic criteria designation 
of matching set of 
strategies and 
technologies
(WGR)
F2 85 2/3 57
edge cube with 
less dominating 
attribute
strategy, regulation base 
connection
(WG)
F3 87 3/3 87
corner cube with 
more dominant 
attribute
adherence to
technological criteria 
and funding instruments 
(WOG)
F4 75 2/3 50
edge cube with 
less dominant 
attribute
basic technological 
requirement 
(WR)
F5 100 1/3 33
MIDDLE CUBE,
dominance 
comparison
energy rationalization
(W)
F6 95 2/3 63
edge cube with 
more dominating 
attribute
effects of market 
changes on the financing 
system, analysis of 
foreign currency risk 
factors, and global 
effects 
(WO)
F7 70 3/3 70 corner cube with average attribute
syncing basic goals with 
technological threats and 
market priorities (WBR)
F8 80 2/3 53
edge cube with 
less dominant 
attribute
basic market positioning 
(WB)
F9 83 3/3 83
corner cube with 
average or more 
dominant attribute
financially stable market 
payoff (technological 
solution which provides 
real return) 
(WOB) 
   Source: self-researched. 
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2D Figure of the results table of the SMART program 
Notes: Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték = SMART value
Depiction of results and non-equilibrium attributes of SMART program output: 
Notes: Input oldal = Input side; Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték = SMART value
The 3D illustration shows not allowed differences compared to the state of equilibrium for F7 and F1 
attributes. According to the analyses, the balancing of technological criteria systems (e.g. water usage) 
should be done using the optimum search with the Game Theory method. 
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A4: SMART CHART AND RESULTS ILLUSTRATIONS FOR OUTPUT ATTRIBUTES  
Deterministics of Output (yellow side) attributes: 
Generating SMART Output values for data insertion (’►X’ = usefulness)  
MIDDLE YELLOW (1D) – energy-efficient resource use/profitable production (Y) 
EDGE YELLOW (2D)        (100) 
minimizing technological risk (RY),       100/50 ► 75
strategic conformity of the energy-CO2 scale (GY),     100/70 ► 85
tax and discount opportunities in energy production system (OY)   100/90 ► 95
financial criteria of artificial and actual advancement to market (BY)   100/60 ► 80
CORNER YELLOW (3D) 
technology and regulation matching strategic goal systems (YGR),  100/70/50 ► 73,3
planning option acceptable financially and by market (YOB),    100/90/60 ► 83,3
presence of technological requirements sustainable in market environment (YBR),  100/60/50 ► 70
technological solution is real financial option long-term (YOG),    100/90/70 ► 86,6
SMALL CUBE 
NUMBER
USEFULNESS 
(1-100) 
(rounded)
CONNECTION, 
DIMENSION 
VALUE
SMART 
VALUE 
(V)
CUBE TYPE 
AND
DOMINANCE
MAIN AGENT 
INHERENT 
ATTRIBUTES
S1 87 3/3 87
corner cube with 
more dominant 
attribute
technological solution is 
real financial option 
long-term (YOG)
S2 75 2/3 50
edge cube with 
more dominant 
attribute
minimizing 
technological risk (RY)
S3 73 3/3 73 corner cube with average attribute
technology and 
regulation matching 
strategic goal systems 
(YGR)
S4 85 2/3 56 edge cube with average attribute
strategic conformity of 
the energy-CO2 scale 
(GY)
S5 100 1/3 33,3
MIDDLE 
CUBE,
dominance 
comparison
energy-efficient resource 
use
(Y)
S6 95 2/3 63
edge cube with 
more dominant 
attribute
tax and discount 
opportunities in energy 
production system (OY)
S7 83 3/3 83
corner cube with 
less dominant 
attribute
planning option 
acceptable financially 
and by market (YOB)
S8 80 2/3 53 edge cube with average attribute
financial criteria of 
artificial and actual 
advancement to market 
(BY)
S9 70 3/3 70 corner cube with average attribute
presence of 
technological 
requirements sustainable 
in market environment 
(YBR)
   Source: self-researched. 
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Character table of Output side in SMART program: 
Notes: Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték = SMART value 
3D illustration of Output side attributes in SMART program: 
Notes: Output oldali tulajdonságok determinisztikája = Output side attributes; Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték 
= SMART value 
The 3D illustration shows not allowed differences compared to the state of equilibrium for S9 and S3 
attributes. According to the analyses, the balancing of the market criteria system (e.g. proper market 
platform) and services should be done using the optimum search with the Game Theory method.
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M5: SMART CHART AND RESULTS ILLUSTRATIONS FOR MIDDLE CUBE ATTRIBUTES 
Deterministics of middle cube attributes: 
Generating SMART output values for data insertion (’►X’ = usefulness)
MIDDLE CUBES (1D) 
KN – Orange middle – return time, value of firm      ► (90)
KZ – Green middle – realization of local/corporate strategy     ► (85)
KK – Blue middle – price plannable in supply/demand equilibrium    ► (95)
KP – Red middle – proper technological use        ► (80)
EDGE CUBES (2D) 
K1 – tracking market strategy and syncing it with technological priorities (BR)  60/50 ► 55
K2 – matching parameters of economic tech systems to regulations (GR)   70/50 ► 60
K3 – analysis of market changes, foreign currency risk factors, and global effects (OB)  90/60 ► 75
K4 – designating most economic strategic goal with long-term profits (OG)  90/70 ► 85
SMALL
CUBE 
NUMBER
USEFULNESS 
(1-100) 
(rounded)
CONNECTION, 
DIMENSION 
VALUE
SMART 
VALUE 
(V)
CUBE TYPE AND 
DOMINANCE
MAIN AGENT INHERENT 
ATTRIBUTES
KN 90 1/3 30
MIDDLE CUBE
(1D) – return time, 
value of firm (O)
SUMMARIZING FINANCIAL 
EFFECTS 
KZ 70 1/3 23
MIDDLE CUBE
(1D) – realization of 
local/corporate 
strategy (G) 
STRATEGIC PROGRAM 
PLACEMENT/ LAW AND 
REGULATION CRITERIA 
KK 60 1/3 20
MIDDLE CUBE
(1D) – price plannable 
in supply/demand 
equilibrium (B)
ANALYSIS OF MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES
KP 50 1/3 17
MIDDLE CUBE
(1D) – proper 
technological use (R)
TECHNOLOGICAL CRITERIA 
SYSTEM
K1 55 2/3 36
EDGE CUBE
tracking market 
strategy, and syncing 
it with technological 
priorities (BR)
ANALYSIS OF MARKET 
OPPORTUNITIES /
TECHNOLOGICAL CRITERIA 
SYSTEM
K2 60 2/3 40
EDGE CUBE
matching parameters 
of economic tech 
systems to regulations 
(GR)
STRATEGIC, LAW AND 
REGULATION CRITERIA /
TECHNOLOGICAL CRITERIA 
SYSTEM
K3 75 2/3 50
analysis of market 
changes, foreign 
currency risk factors, 
and global effects 
(OB)
SUMMARIZING FINANCIAL 
EFFECTS / ANALYSIS OF 
MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 
K4 85 2/3 56
EDGE CUBE
designating most 
economic strategic 
goal with long-term 
profits (OG)
SUMMARIZING FINANCIAL 
EFFECTS / STRATEGIC, LAW 
AND REGULATION 
CRITERIA
Source: self-researched. 
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Character table of middle cube side-attributes in SMART program:
Notes: Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték = SMART value
3D illustration of middle cube attributes in SMART program: 
Notes: Kockaközép = Middle Cube Area; Hasznosság = Utility; SMART érték = SMART value
The 3D illustration shows not allowed differences compared to the state of equilibrium for KN and K4 
attributes. According to the analyses, the balancing of the orange middle cube main attribute set’s “Project’s 
return value and time” should be done using the optimum search with the Game Theory method. 
– 139 –
A6: APPENDIX OF ILLUSTRATIONSFigure 1:  Decision tree graph with pre-determined times (t0, t1, t2, t3)  and combination alternatives (K1, K2, K3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 2: Graph of conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Figure 3: Visual style and shortest solution formula of Ruwix program .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 55Figure 4: Levels (“szint”) of Layer by layer method in the program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58Figure 5: Edges only solvable through algorithms (“eset” stands for case) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 59
Figure 6: Positions of corners definable via algorithm (“eset” stands for case)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 60Figure 7: Evaluation screen of Solution Searching LBL software for Rubik’s Cube . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 8: Notations of sides on the program’s solution interface (flip state) .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Figure 9: Rubiksolve’s solution formula in 20 steps  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 64Figure 10: White cross with matching edge cubes on the side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Figure 11: Rotating edge cube to its position from bottom row  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Figure 12: Rotating edge cube to its position from middle row  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68Figure 13: Incorrect solution of white side, meaning  starting point of project designed incorrectly  .  .  .  .  . 69
Figure 14: Correct positions of white corners, and solution of first row .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 70Figure 15: Right-oriented corner cube’s rotation to correct position from bottom row . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70Figure 16: Left-oriented corner cube’s rotation to correct position from bottom row . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Figure 17: Rotating downward facing corner cube to its place .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 72Figure 18: Top row corner cube in place, but facing outwards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Figure 19: Two rows solved by positioning edge cubes .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 73Figure 20: Rotating edge cube to its place, if the missing cube faces rightward .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 74Figure 21: Rotating edge cube to its place, if the missing cube faces leftward .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 75Figure 22: Rotating edge cube to position, if the missing cube faces rightward .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 76Figure 23: Yellow Cross  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Figure 24: Repositioning edge cubes on yellow side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Figure 25: Repositioning edge cubes on yellow side, if they’re on opposite sides  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 77Figure 26: Possible positions of edge cubes after arranging middle row  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Figure 27: Independent solution of yellow side  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 79Figure 28: Positioning yellow corner cubes, providing sustainability requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Figure 29: Sorting yellow and white sides by main attributes in status space .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 81Figure 30: Positioning sealing side’s yellow edge cubes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82Figure 31: The cube is in a state of equilibrium .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 83Figure 32: Swapping corner cubes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Figure 33: Cube in entropic and equilibratory states  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 85Figure 34: The “skeleton” of Rubik’s Cube is made up of rotatable but immovable middle cubes .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 88Figure 35: Edge cube of Rubik’s Cube, which needs to match two colors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Figure 36: Corner cube, which needs to match three colors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89Figure 37: 2D Interpretation of Rubik’s Cube structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Figure 38:  Equilibrium point for the first row or layer (circled),  where the middle cube is always the same color (illustrated by the lines) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 96Figure 39:  3D attributes of “white-green-red” corner cubes (WGR),  the technological solution that assures payoff (optimized for three-person water usage) . . . . . 97
Figure 40:  Zero sum games are always illustrated with the fixed middle cube (circled),  which serve as criteria for the optimization of edge cubes (two colors). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Figure 41:  Prohibited attribute of the SMART analysis  (time for payoff, value of project is not in equilibrium with the other attributes)  . . . . . . . . . 100
Figure 42: Figure of conflict state with the position of the payoff-function   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103Figure 43: 2D and 3D interpretation of cube side, or main agent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
– 140 –
Figure 44: Interpretation of first cube level (Input side) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110Figure 45: Interpretation of second cube level, or middle cube connections  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  110Figure 46: Interpretation of third cube level (Output side) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figure 47: 2D figure of the results table of the SMART program .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 113Figure 48: Depiction of results and non-equilibrium attributes of SMART program output .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  114A7: APPENDIX OF TABLESTable 1. Sustainable and non-sustainable economic systems (1992) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 16
Table 2: Annual data on profits of the various mines (HUF/m3/min) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Table 3: Analysis of water withdrawal points (HUF / m3 / min)   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Table 4: Costs of water resupply points (HUF /m3/ min)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33Table 5: Optimal choice variables at water withdrawal points (3 places)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 33Table 6: Choice variables at water withdrawal points (6 places) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 7: Modified Joyner mathematical algorithms and rotation order for the solution of 3×3×3 cube. . . . 47Table 8: Ruwix program SWOT Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Table 9:  Layer by layer solution algorithms for 3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube  using software and the MOHÓ search engine (on levels 2., 3., 4., 5.)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 61Table 10: Rubik’s Cube Solution Search program SWOT Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Table 11: Rubiksolve program SWOT Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Table 12: Evaluation of modeling process, and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86Table 13: Meanings of input (white/W) and output (yellow/Y) sides of Rubik’s Cube . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Table 14: Meanings of attribute side Red (R) of Rubik’s Cube . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Table 15: Meanings of attribute side Green (G) of Rubik’s Cube  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Table 16: Meanings of attribute side Blue (B) of Rubik’s Cube  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Table 17: Meanings of attribute side Orange (O) of Rubik’s Cube. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94Table 18: Weighted attributes, importance, and guide to process of dominance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Table 19: Syncing SMART evaluation levels to modeling levels   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Table 20: Generating SMART Input values for data insertion (‘X’ = usefulness) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank for the professors of Szent Istvan University PhD School of Business Management their extensive support and generous help.
